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} A collaboration between the Conservation of Human Re-
sources, Columbia University, and NASA requires some explana-
tion, for the Conservation project is best known as a research
group with specialized skills in the area of human resources and
manpower.
The initial contact between NASA and the Conservation
project was made by Dr. Robert Jastrow who, in addition to
serving as the director of the Goddard Institute for Space
Studies, is also a member of the faculty of Columbia University.
In 1971 Dr. Jastrow first discussed with me a suggestion he had
made a few days earlier to his NASA colleagues that the Con-
nervation project might help in one of their new undertakings ---
an exploration of whether it was possible to develop a realistic
- assessment of the economic impact of the entire NASA program.
Jastrow and I had been members of a Columbia seminar on
technology and social change some years earlier, and I had
edited the seminar papers and discussion for publication (1954)
under that title. Even more relevant was the Conservation proj-
eet's . earlier work, The Pluralistic Ec onom r, which broke new
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ground in explaining how large-scale public expenditures in-
fluenced the shape and direction of the national economy.
Other members of the staff had periodically dealt with
scientific or technological matters. Specifically, James W. Kuhn
had written an account of the role of technical personnel in the
diffusion of nuclear energy, and had also done some consulting
for NASA. Boris Yavitz had authored two volumes on com-
puters, the most recent with Thomas Stanback, Jr., Electronic
Data Processing in New York City. Jerome. Schnee, who joined
us specifically to work on the NASA project, had been most
directly involved in the study if technology and economics,
notably as a co-author with Edwin Mansfield and others of
Research and Innovation in the Modern Corporation.
These five — Ginzberg, Hiestand, Kuhn, Schnee, and Yavitz
— became the Conservation project's NASA team. Schnee was
responsible for the largest part of the active research and for
preparing most of the final manuscript. However, the group
worked as a team in the difficult task of designing the several
approaches which were pursued during each stage of the project.
It is no disparagement of the contributions that the others made
to say that Boris Yavitz provided leadership in the complex de-
sign problems.
An early discussion between Dr. George Low, deputy admin-
istrator of NASA, and me confirmed that the senior NASA
staff were deeply interested in having a valid impact study con-
ducted and that they would play an active role in helping the
re:5c:arch team. Once Dr. Low's interest and participation were
confirmed, the Conservation group was eager to undertake the
assignment. We recognized that active participation by the dep-
uty administrator, who had played a key role in the Apollo proj-
ect, could not fail to provide significant lessons. And that is
exactly how things turned out. Throughout the three-year study,
the Conservation group met approximately every three months
with Dr. Low (with various other senior NASA staff members
also attending). Each session lasted several hours and consisted
of reporting by the Conservation staff on its activities, reviewing
with Dr. Low the issues about which Conservation staff needed
enlightenment, and exploring the most sensible next steps. The
best way to describe what happened during this three-year
period is to emphasize that the Conservation group had a con-
i
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tinuing seminar with Dr. Low. Without his active participa0cil
this research effort would have faltered. There were too many
places along the road where a group of outsiders, acting alone,
would have lost their way.
In the preparation of this study for publication, two
members of the Conservation staff made substantial contri-
butions. Dr. Charles Brpcher worked with the authors on
revisions of the final manuscript, and Ms. Anna Dutka care-
fully reviewed and corrected the page proofs.
Eli Cinzbe►g
March 1976
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A foreword is often decorative, little more. The reader can
skip it without loss and get right to the heart of the study and
findings. But this foreword has an essential function: These in-
troductory pages provide a framework for the case study of
NASA. Although NASA is interesting in its own right, it is the
framework that extends its relevance and adds significance to
the findings.
The conventional view is that the dynamism of the American
economy resides in the private sector. The investments that the
private sector makes, the employment it generates, the income it
distributes, and the taxes it pays underpin the growth of the
economy and the well-being of the American people. Clearly,
there is much to support this view. Yet it is exaggerated.
There are large public programs in such diversified fields as
highways, agriculture, education,. research, medicine, space, and
manpower that perform a series of economic functions not
sharply distinguishable from those of the private sector. More-
over, these large public programs play an ever larger role in giv-
ing shape and direction to the American economy and society.
In 1929 the not-for-profit sector accounted for about 10 percent
of the national income; by 1975 the comparable proportion had
reached about one-third.
9
10	 !	 Economic Impact of barge Public Programs
y
The importance of the public sector was the theme of an
earlier study by members of the Conservation staff, The Plural-
istic Economy. In that book my collaborators and I demon-
strated the scale and significance of not-for-profit activities and
argued that a realistic framework for analyzing the American
economy required attention to the principle of complementarity.
The private and public sectors had became increasingly inter-
twined and could no longer be treated as separate entities, each
operating under its own logic, responding to different stimuli..
and yielding distinctive products. While profit, nonprofit, and
government institutions differ in their entrepreneurial roles, each
is often engaged in producing useful goods and services, is con-
strained by revenues, and must obtain labor and supplies in the
market.
Considering the importance of these large public programs
which in total account for an estimated two out of every five
jobs, we find that they have commanded very little attention.
American economists have limited their concerns to dollar flows
through the system, ignoring for the most part its institutional
structures.
This book represents an elaboration and refinement of the
earlier study. The focus is on a single case -- NASA — wherein
approximately $40 billion were spent within one decade with the
specific mission of getting a man to the moon. But during a
similar ten-year period, comparable or larger public expendi-
tures can be identified with a wide range of missions.
The question to be confronted is: What generalizations can be
presented for the study of public programs that range from
Medicare to space? In short, what kind of framework can be
created to facilitate the systematic analysis of large public pro-
grams? The paucity of earlier research into this crucially impor-
tant new dimension of the American economy precludes this
foreword from more than sketching the outlines. it will.require
many investigators, working over a long period of time, to de-
velop a model of public program expenditures that will even
approximate that used for illuminating private sector activities.
The following seven points represent a preliminary check list
of the relevant dimensions of a large public program, which may
W
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become the building blocks for an analytic framework. First,
has the relevant unit of government (federal, state, or local) been
previously engaged in the activity, or is it substantially a new
undertaking? For example, new defense programs can be viewed
as extensions of current functions, but others are entirely new
functions for particular levels of government, such as federal
manpower training after 1962, or the assumption of financial
responsibility for the medical care of older persons with the
passage of Medicare in I965.
Second, what was the source of initiative for the launching
of the program? There may have been a number of strong inter-
est groups that had long lobbied for the new programs, as with
Medicare; or it may have been largely a Presidential initiative,
as in the case of NASA.
Third, to what extent is the new program delineated in the
sense that it has a specific goal? The Works Progress Adminis-
tration of the 1930s specifically sought to provide employment
and income for the millions of unemployed; in contrast, Medicare
represents an ongoing commitment.
Fourth, closely related to the foregoing is the political poten-
tial of impact groups, those who are affected by the new or ex-
panded program. The agricultural support programs which date
►
 back to the late 1920s and early '30s have been hard to modify,
much less eliminate, because of the large numbers of organ-
ized voters who might be adversely affected. Medicare benefi-
ciaries also represent a large block of concerned voters who will
look askance at any radical effort to reduce the benefits provided
i	 by the original legislation. In contrast, it has been possible, not
}	 once but several times in recent history, for Congress to reduce
{	 radically the budget of the Department of Defense, with the con-
sequent closure of production facilities and elimination of jobs.
The result was the abandonment of what were formerly thriving
communities.
The most important observations about impact groups with
respect to large public programs are: (a) their presence, (b) the
essential support they provide in the ceaseless struggle for re-
sources, and (c) part of the price paid for their support is the re-
stricted freedom of the Executive branch and the legislature whose
actions must take into consideration the expectations and values
of the impact groups.
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Fifth, the nature of the infrastructure that must be used in
order to accomplish the new program is still another critical
element. In the case of federal man p ower training programs.
there was no feasible way for the federal government to avoid
involving two principal institutions _.- the vocational education
system and the federal-state employment service --- a constraint
that seriously influenced what the new effort could and could not
accomplish. In the case of Medicare, physicians, hospitals, com-
mercial and nonprofit insurance, and pharmaceutical companies
were hardly passive bystanders. They played a major role in
shaping the legislation and its implementation.
Sixth, every large public program, no matter how innovative
it initially appears, tarnishes with time if only because the
resources that it consumes, if released, could provide the
wherewithall to launch an alternative program. Hence every
large public program becomes increasingly vulnerable with time
and probably will not be able to continue growing at its early
rate. A major challenge to the concerned administrators, the im-
pact groups, and the involved legislators is to explore continu-
ously how the original program goals can be transformed so as
to permit the government agency to help assure the continued
well-being of the various impact groups. The experience of three
large public programs of the 1960s — NASA, Medicare, and
manpower — are indicative of this process of goal transformation.
Although NASA had from the outset the specific mission of
putting a man on the moon, before the Russians could get there
(it was hoped), the project was clearly perceived, at least by its
first administrator and his closest advisers, as also having the more
open-ended mission of space exploration. Similarly, the
Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) program
was only one year old when Congress expanded its mission from
the retraining of skilled workers, who had presumptively lost
their jobs from automation, to the much broader goal of assisting
all those who were encountering difficulties in the world of Vvork.
To reinforce this shift, Congress waived the requirement of state
contributions and substantially enlarged appropriations to give
increasing evidence of its long-term commitment to manpower
development. The circumstances were not so different in the case
of Medicare. Many of the proponents, in and out of Congress,
looked upon its passage as simply a first step toward a compre-
hensive system of national health insurance.
i
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Seventh, within the federal arena, important networks of
political alignments are crucial to the launching and survival of
large public programs. For many years federal expenditures
for biomedical research increased rapidly as a result of the
intimate alliance among the leadership of the National Insti-
tutes of Health, Senator Hill and Representative Fogarty, the
respective chairmen of the appropriations subcommittees of the
Senate and the House, and the principal beneficiaries of the
research grants who provided the expert testimony which the
chairmen used to persuade their colleagues that the enlarged
appropriations were being well used. This linkage among impact
groups, congressional leaders, and the responsible bureaucracy
provides the dynamism for ongoing support for many large
programs, even after the interest of the President and public may
have waned. (It might be noted that the brutal dismissal of so
many senior officials at the end of the first Nixon Administration
was predicated on the theory that the President would be in a
better position to be the sole ruler of the bureaucracy if the
preexisting links between his political appointees and their own
staffs and between the departments and the congressional leaders
could be severed.)
Folklore has it that the bureaucracy is responsible for the
survival of many programs that are no longer needed. While the
bureaucracy unquestionably often plays a role, the true answer
must be sought in the powerful alliance between impact groups
and key legislators.
In summary, the building blocks that we have identified
for an analytic framework for the study of large public programs
involve the following:
(1) The nature of the program, more particularly whether it
represents a new governmental activity or a change in
scale of an existing function.
(2) The source of the initiative: is it located in the Executive
branch, the Congress, or among special interest groups?
(3) The goal of the program: is it specific and time limited,
or general and ongoing?
(4) The characteristics of the principal impact groups; that is,
the identifiable beneficiaries of the new program, both
producers and consumers.
`••.l
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(S) The extent to which existing infrastructure can or must 	 W,
be used to implement the new program; or whether and
to what extent an infrastructure must be created.
(b) The potential for transforming the goals of the program
once broad-based support has begun to wane.
(7) The strength of political alignments among the bureauc-
racy, congressional leadership, and the impact groups.	 4
To what extent can these building blocks be used to illuminate
selective aspects of large public programs? A first effort follows
by focusing on two elements in the schema — the transforma-
tion of goals and the role of the existing infrastructure — for
three programs launched in the 1960s — manpower, Medicare,
and NASA.
As earlier suggested., the effectiveness of the federal man-
power efforts during their first decade was substantially con-
strained by the capabilities and limitations of two principal
structures — vocational education and the federal-state employ-
ment services. It was impossible for the federal government to
launch a large-scale training program for the disadvantaged
except by developing a working alliance with vocational educa-
tion, the only system that had nationwide scope and experience
in skills instruction within the classroom.
The fact that the leaders of the field had built a system that
generally was deficient in providing a variety of training was
beside the point. There was no other infrastructure available,
at least initially, to meet the new program's needs. And it should
be noted that vocational education put aside its aversion to
dealing with the disadvantaged and responded with considerable
speed, enthusiasm, and good will to the new program. The
leadership recognized that the substantial new flow of federal
funds offered it an opportunity that it dare not neglect if it
wanted to remain in control of its field. True, the leadership
made clear that it preferred the new funds to come directly to
vocational education rather than through manpower channels;
but when they found that Congress was not interested in heeding
this advice (for fear that the poor would again be dealt out), the
leaders went along with the new program, with only occasional
sniping from the sidelines.
a
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The employment service with its multiple functions of
registering and paying benefits to the unemployed, providing
testing and counseling for new and hard-to-place applicants, and
serving as a placement agency for the unemployed and those who
sought new and better jobs --- had long been the bane of many
federal officials who were unable to control it. Moreover, the
employment service had a generally poor reputation among
employers, organized labor, and, in particular, minorities. Accord-
ingly, in the early days of MDTA, senior Labor Department
officials explored whether the new program could be launched
without relying on the employment service for assistance. These
efforts were largely stillborn because only the employment service
had a network of suitable offices throughout the United States.
Whatever the shortcomings of the employment service — and
there were many, although a large proportion of the criticism was
unrealistic — the leadership of the Labor Department found itself
without an effective alternative. Labor Department officials. did
the only thing possible and worked hard to modify the focus and
operations of the employment service so that it would be more
responsive to the disadvantaged and would play a leading role in
the referral of eligible persons to the new training programs. There
are many who believe that the Labor Department succeeded to
such an extent that the employment service, in its new effort to
serve the disadvantaged, lost its capability to meet the placement
needs of its regular clientele, and thereby put itself in an unten-
able long-run position.
The crucial point of this review of manpower infrastructure
is to emphasize on the one hand that the new national program
had to rely on the two principal institutions. in place at the time
when it was launched, and on the other hand that over the
following years the federal government was able by strenuous
efforts to modify the operations of both, even while putting new
structures into place.
The Medicare story perhaps reveals even more about the role
that theexisting infrastructure plays in the shaping of new public
programs. The dominant physician lobby had successfully resisted
any large-scale government insurance system until 1965 when
Congress, with the President in the lead, could no longer ignore
the large number of middle-class and working-class voters who
saw the risk of bankruptcy hang over their heads should their
W/
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parents in their old age be stricken by a serious illness. But even
in its moment of defeat the physician lobby had considerable
power: Congress agreed that when treating Medicare patients,
physicians would receive their customary fees and would be under
no compulsion to alter in any way their conventional pattern of
practice.
The hospitals also made their influence felt. They convinced
Congress not only to allow full reimbursement, including depreci-
ation, but to provide an additional 2 percent override, ostensibly
to help hospitals modernize and keep abreast of new developments.
Nor was the insurance industry without influence. It suc-
ceeded in winning for itself a preferred role as the fiscal inter-
mediary between the Social Security Administration that paid
the bills and the hospitals and physicians who provided the serv-
ices. Moreover, several private insurance companies developed
policies specially designed to supplement Medicare coverage.
In sum, physicians, hospitals, and insurance companies were
all well takeij care of under the new legislation. That is, initially.
It required only two years before the Social Security Administra-
tion recognized that its initial cost estimates were seriously awry
and that if future costs were to be kept within bounds the law
would have to be amended. The next years saw the first steps at
cost control. The hospitals' 2 percent override was the first to go.
Then limits were placed on fee reimbursement. Later, the Social
Security Administration sought to prevent the construction of an
excessive number or beds by limiting its reimbursement to those
new beds that had been approved by the local hospital planning
agency. Eventually, steps were taken to encourage physicians to
prescribe generically rather than by brand name. And the federal
government devised additional rules and regulations all aimed at
keeping its financial commitment under control.
To the extent that its goal was directed to relieving old people
of financial burdens growing out of high medical bills. Medicare
has had considerable, but not phenomenal, success. In 1973
Medicare covered approximately 40 percent of the total medical
expenses of the eligible age group, but this is a smaller share than
in its first years. This reduction in relative coverage has been
accompanied by repeated increases in premiums paid by the par-
ticipants and much larger drains on general revenues than the
actuaries had anticipated.
iForeword
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A more interesting aspect of Medicare in the present dis-
cussion of infrastructure is the steady compulsion that the federal
government has been under to alter the shape and operations of
that infrastructure because of the financial burden which it
assumed. Reference has already been made to the government's
concern with bed control, prescription practices, and fee structure.
One should also note its insistence on rationing new expensive
services such as dyalisis. Further, the terms under which it will
reimburse hospitals for patient care have led to the elimination
of large wards in teaching hospitals.
The government is currently locked in a major dispute with
medical schools and their teaching hospitals over the conditions
under which it will pay for physician services. It is posF ble
that in the near future, the federal government will use its reim-
bursement practices to alter the number and distribution of
residents in training for the several specialties. While the conse-
quences cannot be foreseen at this early date, the passage in
1972 of the Professional Services Review Organization
amendment to the Social Security Act may have launched a
national experiment in quality assurance in the delivery of medi-
cal care.
In short, what started as a social insurance scheme to cover
the high costs of illness among older persons is today, as the
American Medical Association foresaw, transforming the delivery
of health care. The issue in the present perspective is not whether
such a transformation will turn out to be a gain or a loss but
rather the extent to which quite specific and delimited goals are
transformed in the process of implementation and eventually ef-
fect changes in the critically important infrastructure.
This brings us to the second element of large-scale public pro-
grams where the NASA story suggests generalizations; the trans-
formation of goals. No public program, no matter how strong
its initial support and how liberal the funding it is able to secure,
can exist for more than a short time before some major unit of
government or some important group in the community — scien-
tists, journalists, specialists will raise questions about the rele-
vance of the undertaking or the efficiency of its operations. One
significant parallel among space, manpower, and Medicare is the
i
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relatively long period of friendly toleration that each received
from both legislators and the public.
But sooner or later the period of grace is certain to come to
an end as the benefits, costs, and secondary consequences of the
new program come under more careful scrutiny. There is no
possibility of escape because Congress is committed to annual
appropriations, which means that it will be under pressure to
make a periodic reevaluation. In the case of NASA, this became
inevitable once Apollo had achieved its mission of landing a man
on the moon. Likewise, MDTA escaped critical scrutiny until
the reelection campaign of 1972, when most Great Society pro-
grams came under attack by conservative Republicans who ar-
gued that one cannot solve difficult problems by throwing money
at them. But not even the most conservative politicians contem-
plated the abolition of Medicare. Rather, the battle lines were
formed about the rate at which the beneficiaries should con-
tribute through co-insurance and the rate at which new and
costly benefits should be introduced.
The more time that has passed since the launching of a new
program, the more scope there is for critics. There has been a
repeated challenge to NASA to explain how the space shuttle
is to be used and the results that can be anticipated. Many
Congressmen believe that $:i billion a year for space explora-
tions, with no specific objectives in view, is much too high. But
they are still in the minority.
The criticisms of manpower training cut deep. The argument
was made that the roughly S3 billion spent annually to train the
disadvantaged had an imperceptible effect on the national unem-
ployment rate and that it was unclear whether those who were
trained did conspicuously better in the labor market than those
who were not. Criticisms of a somewhat different order related
to the inability of the federal government to be constructively
involved in designing and overseeing more than ten thousand
specific projects every year. Congress ignored the first argument
and acted on the latter. In 1973 it passed the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA) which allocated federal
funds to cities and states that henceforth would have the primary
responsibility for designing and running the program. The several
amendments passed by Congress in 1974 increased the federal
government's capacity to respond to rising unemployment and
iForeword	 0	 19
underscores Congress's belief that the nation required a strong
manpower policy and could not return to the pre-1962 situation.
In the Medicare arena Congress has sought to respond to the
accumulating evidence of excessive charges, poor quality, and
wasteful duplication by seeking ways to control these excesses
while considering its next step in the structuring of a program of
national health insurance. As of 1976 the congressional leaders
recognize that there is no easy answer and that whatever they do,
including biding time, will be the prelude to further difficulties.
The same understanding is widespread among Fell-informed
persons in the medical community. For a long time to come the
American people will be forced to struggle with the prevailing
system, if only because of the wide gap that remains between its
aspirations and the present reality.
W,
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Large public programs require a sizable commitment of resources.
At some point in time it may be relatively easy to gain the con-
sensus required to secure the resources. But in the scramble that
always exists among different interests for a larger share of the
public revenue, it is inevitable that the more resources a public
program commands, the greater its vulnerability.
These general considerations about large public programs
provide a backdrop to this book, which focuses on the experience
of NASA, perhaps the most dramatic new program in the post-
World War II experience of the United States. The remainder of
this foreword deals with the delineation of this study and the
manner in which the study evolved. Further, it provides a preview
of the chapters that follow, including a few of the important
Iessons that can be extracted from this case study that obear on
the improved management of large public programs.
In. 1971, the senior officials of NASA began to ask themselves
whether it was possible to develop a realistic assessment of the
economic impact of the entire NASA program_ They sought a
valid methodology and hard data that would enable NASA to
inform interested outsiders - Congress, the press, the public —
of the economic impact of the more than S40 billion that repre-
sented NASA's total outlays in putting a man on the moon. After
this spectacular goal had been achieved, questions arose with in-
creasing frequency about the "value" of the space effort, particu-
larly because many other social objectives -- from eradicating
-.s
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poverty to rebuilding the cities — were lagging as a result of a
serious shortfall in federal funding. The initial intent of NASA
officials was to learn more about how the agency's large expendi-
tures had affected the American economy and to make this infor-
mation broadly available.
The hidden assumption that underlay the interest of the
NASA officials in a new impact study was their belief that such
a study would reveal a very large multiplier — second-order
effects that disproved the simple thesis that all government dollars
spent had comparable effects. They had developed this strong
conviction as a result of their own direct experience, supplemented
by the findings of earlier NASA-commissioned studies that
pointed to diverse impacts, including the development of new
commercial products, the diffusion of new technology and
management techniques into the private sector, the training of
specialized personnel, the expansion of aerospace infrastructure,
and other contributions.
The Conservation project undertook to explore the NASA
officials' thesis without making any a priori judgment about
whether it would be substantiated. After several months of seeking
to develop an appropriate methodology to assess NASA's
economic impact in "macro" terms, the Conservation staff con-
cluded that this was not the most productive way for the group to
proceed. It reached this conclusion on the basis of a critical
review of the prior impact studies. This review of prior efforts
is presented in chapter 1.
T; c i:::plications of the previous efforts after review became =
clear. While NASA might eventually have easily recognizable
second-order impacts of major proportions reflected in the growth
of an important new industry, the limited time dimension (one
decade) precluded the likelihood of firmly establishing such a
development. Moreover, the Conservation group questioned
whether the interaction among new technology, new products,
and new markets was such. that one could ever ascribe to one par-
ticular effort such as NASA the sole or predominant credit for
the development of a new industry. The more the Conservation
group considered the developmental processes involved in the
growth of such major industries as railroads or chemical, electrical,
automotive, and aeronautical products, the more it doubted the
feasibility of establishing a simple one-to-one relationship be-
w!^
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tween a specific historical occurrence and the emergence of a new
industry. There were too many intervening factors at work,
mutually affecting one another, to enable the student, even with
the advantage of historical distance, to relate a major outcome to
one specific event.
At this point the Conservation group suggested a different
methodology — one that would focus more on understanding the
dynamics of impact than on the, development of hard economic
data. The alternative methodology was a case study approach,
aimed at probing more deeply into the different meanings of
impacts in selected areas where informed persons had alerted us
that NASA had left its mark. The three areas chosen for analysis
were: the computer industry, astronomy, and weather forecasting.
The single largest commitment of the research staff during the
three years of the project was .directed to working up the three
major case studies. Aside from the usual difficulties that research-
ers encounter — the absence of significant quantitative data, the
inability to reconstruct fully the crucial forces operating at
particular decision points, the hesitancy of various interest groups
to reveal information that they believe may put them at risk — we
ran into one special problem that warrants attention and reflec-
tion. The simplest way of describing the problem is this: All
persons well informed about the agency's impact are likely to
have played a decision-making role at an earlier stage. Moreover,
each did so from a special vantage: as a government adminis-
trator, as a member of the industry, or as an academic with
close ties to one or another of the organizations involved.
Hence there is no informed neutral; he does not exist. Each
expert who recounts what transpired does so from a restricted
viewpoint and from a specific value position.
It took the Conservation group some time to become fully
aware of the subjectivity of the evidence that was accumulated in
studying the impact of NASA in these three areas; and it took
even longer to determine where the predominance of the evidence
pointed. The reader should be alerted both to the difficulties
that were encountered in collecting the evidence and to the
inevitable errors which probably remain, despite the conscien-
tious effort of the Conservation staff to sift and weigh it carefully.
Chapter 2 is the first of the three case studies. It is devoted
specifically to the influence of NASA on the growth of semi-
yii
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conductors and the computer industry. The chapter emphasizes
at the outset that it is necessary to treat the federal government
as a unit, and that it is the combined influence of the Defense
Department and NASA that is being assessed, with the former
accounting for most of the expenditures. The analysis is cen-
tered round three economic aspects: (1) the role of the federal
government in financing research and development in this area,
(2) the importance of the government as a market, particularly
in the early stages of an industry's growth, and (3) the extent
to which government policy encouraged the entrance of new firms
and permitted the survival of companies that might otherwise
have failed. The chapter also deals with the contribution of the
Defense Department and NASA to the acceleration of tech-
nological changes and the development of specialized manpower
on which the progress of the industry largely depended. The
chapter concludes that _the federal government played a major
part in enabling the American computer industry initially to
assume the lead in this field, a position that it has maintained
since.
Chapter 3 has a different focus. Its probe is concerned with
the influence of NASA on what can be called the "rebirth" of
the oldest of the sciences --- astronomy. The last two decades
have been a period of unparalleled discovery in this field. The
chapter emphasizes that the breakthrough in radio astronomy
predates NASA, but it was both NASA's needs and NASA's
liberal financing that led to the transformation of the. small
field of optical astronomy to a large-scale science based on
satellites and other advanced technology in which the numbers
being trained and the resources at their disposal grew by several
orders of magnitude.
The story of this transformation is told in considerable detail
in a constant search to uncover the role that NASA played, but
with great care not to equate the large resources that it made
available to the significant results achieved. There can be little
question that NASA was responsible in many different ways —
from providing the resources for the training and employment of
new doctorates to stimulating the renewal of geodosy and plane-
tary studies — for the rebirth of. astronomy, a field of human
inquiry that had for a long time demonstrated relatively little
initiative in theory or discovery. Scientific leadership opposed the
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large budgetary support for astronomy from NASA out of fear
that too many dollars would be redirected away from high-
priority areas in physics and biology. But some of the scientific
opposition was grounded in the belief — later proved to be
grossly mistaken — that little new scientific knowledge would
result from space exploration.
The story of the renaissance of one of the oldest branches of
human inquiry is exciting on its own terms. But in the context
of this study it presents overwhelming evidence that within a
single decade the federal effort in space had permanently altered
astronomy — i.e., the questions astronomers asked, the available
data with which they could work, and the tools with which scien-
tists carried out their work. While the more important results
from this rapidly accumulating body of new knowledge remain to
be revealed in the near and distant future, the broadening and
deepening of understanding about the universe are without recent
parallel.
Chapter 4 presents the results of the third probe, an analysis
of the economic impacts of meteorological satellites. The chapter
starts with a review of the recent advances in meteorology,
beginning with the launching of the first weather satellite, Tiros 1,
in I960. It then considers the extent to which limited computer
capacity restricted the processing of the large amounts of new
data that became available as a result of improved observations
and transmissions. Next, the focus shifts to explore the evidence
of the economic value of improved weather forecasts and points
out that there is a considerable underutilization of currently
available forecasts and that certain highly. distinctive weather
phenomena, particularly tornadoes, cannot as yet be predicted
with a lead time sufficient to be useful in the protection of prop-
erty. The author concludes his chapter as follows: Meteorological
satellites have transformed weather observation but have not as
yet led to improved accuracy of weather forecasting, although it
is reasonable to expect gains to be made in the future.
Before the Conservation group's work was finished, the mem-
bers made still one more shift in focus. While the three probes
had provided considerable, understanding of both the potential-
ities and limitations of impact studies, and of NASA's influence
in the development of the computer industry, astronomy, and
weather forecasting, a general methodology had not been
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devised that could guide future efforts in this area. Consequently
the Conservation group made a strenuous effort to develop an
analytical framework for the study of large public programs and,
further, to illustrate how such a framework could prove useful
to the administrator of such a program. In short, the members
sought to make an initial contribution to both the analysis and
management of public programs.
The two concluding chapters are directed to extracting some
of the general findings contained in the preceding three probes
and pointing out how impact analysis can be used by the
administrator as a planning and evaluation tool. The analytical
framework delineated in chapter 5 provides some guidance to
future investigators who seek to bring order out of the complex
forces that are constantly interacting whenever large public
programs are initiated and implemented. Chapter 6 is an effort
to apply this structure to the purposes of management control
within NASA. A few highlights from these chapters follow, but
no effort is made to do more than suggest the ground that they
cover.
The authors remind their readers that every large public pro-
gram does not start afresh, even one as unique as putting a man
on the moon. Clearly, the federal government had to look to the
existing aerospace industry to undertake the design and manufac-
ture of the required equipment, to the universities to educate the
additional specialized manpower required to staff the many new
positions, and to existing as well as new communities to expand
rapidly so that new space missions could be carried out. The
study of large public programs must therefore begin with an
ability to identify and assess the principal institutions that are
likely to be involved in the new program and the manner in
which they are likely to respond to . the setting of priority objec-
tives and the flow of resources to meet them.
A second finding suggests that the nature of the impact of the
new program on established institutions will be determined in
considerable measure by the relative importance of the new re-
sources made available in comparison to those available from
existing sources. Hence NASA had a much greater impact on
Huntsville, Alabama, and on the communities around Cape
Canaveral in Florida than on Houston, Texas. For the same
reason, although it represented but a small part of NASA's
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total budget, the monies it made. available to university depart-
ments of astronomy loomed so large in comparison to their
regular budgets that NASA's impact was significant in shifting
the scale and focus of their operations.
Once NASA was well advanced in implementing its several
programs, it found itself with a set of impact groups whose well-
being and future were closely linked to its own. While such groups
provided strength and support for NASA in the ongoing compe-
tition for resources, they also reduced the agency's ability to
change its plans or operational decisions without taking their
interests into account. Chapter 6 presents a novel and suggestive
approach to impact group analysis, drawing on the experience
of certain large private companies that have sought to build
such an approach into their planning. By sketching the Broad
outlines of impact group analysis, this chapter provides the top
NASA administrators with a tool that, as they shape and hone
it, may turn out to be useful in selecting new directions for NASA
and in reducing the risks of pursuing them.
This, then, is a preview of what follows. Clearly, the chapters do
not make an integrated whole. They are, rather, the products of
a research project that found it essential to respond to the conse-
quences of its own efforts and to change direction as it proceeded.
But what this book lacks in neatness and symmetry it compensates
for in the scope of the questions explored and in the suggestive-
ness of its answers.
As the first half of this foreword has sought to make clear,
public policy is in need of major advances in the analysis of
large public programs. This book can be viewed as a pioneering
effort directed toward this goal. That the goal is important can
be suggested by scanning just three figures -- the $40- billion
federal expenditures for NASA between 1963 and 1973; the S53
billion for Medicare during 1965 to 1973; and the $16 billion for
the M DTA and related manpower programs between 1962 and
I973, making a grand total of $109 billion for these three new
programs within one decade!
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For better or worse the American economy is today — and
will be tomorrow — an admixture of a market sector, a govern-
ment sector, and a nonprofit sector. It behooves economists,
politicians, and government administrators to recognize this fact
and to learn as quickly as possible how to improve the planning
and management of Iarge public programs so as to better cope
with their impacts.
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assessment of the
Impacts of the Space Program
As the activities and expenditures of the federal government
have grown during the past two decades, the impacts of large pub-
lic programs have come under closer scrutiny (Solow, 1961-62;
Benoit and Boulding, 1963; Oliver, 1971; and U.S. Department of
Labor, 1973). impacts are distinct from the specific accomplish-
ments of an agency in carrying out its overall mission. The
placing of a man on the moon or the orbiting of an earth
resources satellite are examples of a specific accomplishment.
Whereas specific accomplishments relate directly to agency objec-
tives, impacts do not. In achieving a specific goal, a public agency
may stimulate the development of a new technology or a new
industry, dramatically alter the infrastructure of a city or a region
of the country, or create new occupational categories. These
ancillary effects are all examples of a program's impact.
The legislation which created the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) explicitly recognized that the
agency's programs would influence the economic and social I
structure of the nation. The National Aeronautics and Space Act
of 1958 directed NASA to conduct long-range studies of the
potential benefits from the use of aeronautical and space activ-
ities for peaceful purposes. Since its inception, NASA has
carried out this mandate by supporting various impact studies
of the space program.
27
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The studies supported by NASA have examined several types
of program impacts. (A preliminary classification of impacts is
given by Bauer, 1969, p. 18, and will be reviewed later in the
chapter.) These types of program impacts are:
(1) Economic: A program may alter'iie sales and price levels
in an industry or the level of employment in a local com-
munity.
(2) Technological.- A program may change the matrix of
products, processes, techniques, and materials in an in-
dustry or technological field.
(3) Scientific: A program may increase understanding of basic
phenomena in a particular discipline.
(4) Managerial. A program may influence managerial practices
and techniques in organizations other than the administra-
tive agency (business firms, other government agencies,
and so forth).
(5) Social.• A program may influence human values and the
quality of life.
Previous impact studies have typically dealt with only one of
the above. Yet the ultimate significance of a program is that its
several different impacts may act on the same institution and, in
the aggregate, result in momentous institutional transformations.
Because these institutional transformations are of great import, any
effort to assess the impact of a large public program such as
NASA should focus on the ways in which large public programs
modify institutional structures.
The previous impact studies of NASA have never been or-
ganized along institutional lines. Thus a first step in assessing
NASA's institutional impacts is to extract from earlier studies
the significant findings relating to the program's impact on
major institutions. This chapter is devoted to a reconsideration
of previous studies from the perspective of (1) the total national
economy, (2) the local communities that housed major NASA
installations, and (3) the industries which sought to meet NASA's
technological needs.
NASA's Influence 017 the Total Econona},
The macroeconomic effects of the space program have been
considered in four major studies. First, a Midwest Research lnsti-
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W,tute study (November I971) used an econometric approach toidentify and measure that portion of economic growth — as
measured by changes in gross national product — which could be
attributed to technological progress. An examination of the
relationship between research and development expenditures and
technology-induced increases in gross national product indicated
that on the average each dollar spent on research and develop-
ment returns slightly more than $7.00 in gross national product
over the eighteen-year period following the expenditure. Assuming
that NASA's research and development expenditures have the
same payoff as the average i : the economy, Midwest Research
Institute concluded that $25 billion (in 1958 dollars) spent on
civilian space research and development during the 1959-69 period
returned $52 billion through 1970 and will continue to produce
payoff through 1987, at which time the total gain will have been
$181 billion.
A second econometric investigation of the relationship
between NASA expenditures and the U.S. economy has recently
been carried out by Chase Econometric Associates, Inc. (March
18, 1975, and April 1975). The first phase of the Chase study
used the 185 interindustry input-output model developed at the
University of Maryland to analyze the short-run economic impact
of NASA research and development expenditures. Simulations of
the input-output model were conducted, assuming that $1 billion
of federal expenditure is transferred (proportionately) from other
nondefense programs to NASA with no change in the size of the
federal budget. Chase estimated that the $1 billion transfer would
increase manufacturing output in 1975 by 0.1 percent, or by $153
million (measured in 1971 dollars). It was also estimated that this
$1 billion transfer would increase 1975 manufacturing employment
by twenty thousand.
The second phase of the Chase study considered the long-run
effects of NASA research and development expenditures. Using
a production function which related NASA research and develop-
ment expenditures to the rate of productivity growth in the U.S.
economy over the 1960-74 period, Chase concluded that the social
rate of return on NASA research and development expenditures
was 43 percent (Midwest Research Institute's estimated social rate
of return was 33 percent). This second phase also estimated the
effects that changes in NASA research and development expendi-
i
a
rr^
t
1
^	
r
>	 t
{
r
t -
30	 e	 Economic Impact of Large Public Programs
tures would have on economic growth and stability. Over all,
these long-term estimates confirmed the significant positive effects
of NASA research and development expenditures on national
productivity and employment levels.
A third study of the macroeconomic impact of NASA research
and development  has been conducted by the Space
Division of Rockwell International (December 1974). Rockwell
investigated the relationship between NASA's space shuttle
program and additional employment in the state of California.
Using an econometric model developed at the University of
California (at Los Angeles), the Rockwell people estimated that
the space shuttle program had an employment multiplier of 2.8;
i.e., direct shuttle employment of 95,300 man-years in California
produced an increase of 266,000 man-years in total employment.
Each of the econometric studies qualifies its conclusions by
noting the several conceptual and data limitations associated with
an aggregate quantification of the returns to the economy of
research and development investment. ( From the standpoint of
the study for this book, a major limitation is the assumption that
each dollar of NASA research and development spending is
equal.) No distinction is made, for example, between spending
funds to promote the development of new electronic components
and the funding of new instrumentation techniques to support
astronomical experiments. There is no illumination of how
benefits come about or how institutions change.
A unique and provocative exploration of NASA is the-Ameri-
can Academy of Arts and Sciences study of the social impact
of the space program initiated in 1962. Because the Academy
working group believed that second-order social consequences of
actions are often more important than the original action, the
project was directed toward anticipating and detecting the second-
order effects of massive technological innovation. The study group
felt that anticipation or early detection of second -order conse-
quences would affect the choice of a program's goals or the
manner in which they are pursued. If undesirable consequences
of the space program could be detected during its early years,
action could be taken to avoid or offset these consequences.
Alternatively, the early anticipation of desirable second-order
effects would enable program managers to facilitate these poten-
tial benefits ( Bauer, 1969).
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An integral part of the Academy's study was the application of
the historical analogy of the American railroad industry to the
U.S. space program. The long-range technological, managerial,
and social consequences of the nation's efforts to span the conti-
nent with railroads were explored in. depth. A historical analogy
was then used to determine if the long-range consequences of this
earlier nineteenth century innovation suggested the potential
second-order effects that might result from space exploration
(Mazlish, 1965). This approach provided. an interesting analysis
of the railroad industry, but it proved less useful in assessing
space efforts because so little time had passed since the program
began. Historical analysis could work only after more historical
evidence had been accumulated.
NASA's Influence on Local Communities
The acceleration of manned space flight programs, which
began in 1961, resulted in a significant expansion of existing
federal facilities in Florida and Alabama, and the establishment
of three entirely new NASA facilities in Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Texas. In the early 1960s, NASA established the Marshall
Space Center in Huntsville, Alabama; the Kennedy Space Center
in Brevard County, Florida; the Manned Spacecraft Center in
Houston, 3'exas; the Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans,
Louisiana; and the Mississippi Test Facility in Hancock County,
Mississippi. Because NASA's manned space flight activities have
been concentrated in a "southern crescent" along the Gulf of
Mexico, the space program has had a notable influence on this
region.
Economic Imparts
E The space program's economic impacts in the South have
received substantial attention. Earlier studies (Konkei and
Holman, 1967; Kcmkel, 19613; Haugh, 1968; and U.S. Congress,
1964) have generated a number of propositions regarding the
regional economic effects of large public programs. We shall
examine three of them here.
Proposition one: The eeunojtiic impart of NASA in a locality
varied directly with the importance of program employunent
in the cummunh r.
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The significance of space employment varied greatly among
the five manned space flight communities; NASA's share of local
employment was far greater in Hancock County (Mississippi),
Brevard County (Florida), and Huntsville (Alabama), in that
order, than in either Houston or New Orleans. Specifically,
NASA employment, both civil service and contractor, comprised
57 percent of the total 1966 employment in Hancock County,
22 percent in Brevard County, 17 percent in Huntsville. 3 percent
in New Orleans, and less than 2 percent in Houston.
In those areas where NASA accounted for a large proportion
of local employment, the economic impacts of the space program
were direct and identifiable. Hancock County, Brevard County,
and Huntsville each experienced large increases in sales volume of
local business establishments and growth in per capita income
(Table I-1). Between 1960 and 1965, average increases in retail
sales volume and per capita income were 39 and 86 percent
respectively for the three communities.
Proposition two: The economic impact q f. NASA varied
inversely with the strength of the local economy at the incep-
tion of the program.
A comparison of NASA's economic impacts on Houston with
those of New Orleans illustrates this second proposition. The
two cities represented strikingly dissimilar economic environments
prior to the NASA buildup. New Orleans, which is the much older
city, and Houston both achieved population levels of four hun-
dred thousand daring the early 1940s. By 1968, Houston's
population was two million people, a level almost twice that of
New Orleans. Houston's population increase during the ten-
year period before 1968 matched the total population growth in
New Orleans between 1928 and 1968.
Employment growth in Houston had been sustained at a very
high rate since I940. The annual growth rate during the 1950s
was 4.2 percent as compared to a national rate of employment
growth of 2.2 percent. In contrast, the annual rate of employ-
ment growth in New Orleans during the 1950s was 1.7 percent.
The 1957-58 economic recession had a much more severe impact
on New Orleans. Unlike the rest of the nation, which had recov-
ered from the 1957-58 recession by 1959, total employment in
Table 1•-1
Program Impact on Huntsville, on Brevard County, and on Hancock and Pearl Counties (1960 and 1965)
Residential
	
I'er.uot;t l
School	 Public School	 Building	 Income
Population	 Enrollment	 Classrooms	 Permits	 per Capita	 Retail Sales
Category	 number" Percent Number" Percent Number Percent Number Percent Income Percent Amount" Percent
Huntsville:
1960	 72.0 15.3 568 1,436 $1,537 $111.3
1965	 144.0 32.2 1,010 5,066 2,054 207.8
Percent	 100%D I10% 78% 236% 341010	 87%
$revard County:
1960	 111.0 20.2 651 2,614 2,319 125.4
1965	 225.0 48.2 1,514 6,933 3,435 291.3
Percent change	 103 137 133 165 48	 132
Hancock and Pearl
River counties:
1960	 36.4 8.7 NA NA 1,134` 20.5"
1965	 42.3 10.2 NA NA 1,528` 49.3
Percent cliange	 16 17 — — 35	 40
A
NA = nut acailablc.
'i Itl thollsalalds.
Millions tit dollars.
Axerage fen' Hancock and Pearl Ri%Cr Cuuntics. e
' Retail sales I 'ar 1961.
Source: Ronald Kunkel and Mare ! It^lnnul..Li u,rnnr^r hiq,uc-r of the ,llururrcl Spurr Flight 1'r •o4',•rint(Washington, D.C.: National Aero- w
nantics and 5laacc .IdtninitiEret[iun..lanu; a	 1967). chapters 4. i. and 7. w
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New Orleans did not regain its 1957 peak of about 292,000 until
1963.
Between 1961 and 1966, employment at both the Michaud
Assembly Facility (New Orleans) and the Manned Spacecraft
Center (Houston) increased by about eleven thousand personnel.
Although the employment increases were roughly similar, the
economic impact on the depressed New Orleans economy was far
greater. New Orleans, which had experienced an increase in the
rate of unemployment from 2.7 percent in 1957 to 6.2 percent in
1961, became one of the ten fastest growing cities in the nation
between 1961 and 1966. Space employment directly accounted for
17 percent of the total increase in wage and salary employment
during this period. If the secondary employment gain of NASA is
included, 38 percent of the total employment growth in New
Orleans during this period was due to the space program. It is
estimated that New Orleans' employment growth between 1961
and 1966 was 60 percent higher than it would have been without
NASA.
In comparison, NASA employment directly accounted for
10 percent of total employment growth in Houston between 1961
and 1966. If secondary effects are included, 30 percent of total
employment growth may be attributed to the Manned Space-
craft Center. Houston benefited less, relatively, from space
employment than did New Orleans; the employment growth .was
40 percent higher with NASA than it would have been without the
space program influence (the comparable figure for New Orleans
was 60 percent).
Proposition three: There are substantial differences in the
capabilities of individual communities to diversify beyond
the dominant federal program and build an economic base for
longer term growth. These differences in capabilities are dice
to the nature of the federal program on the one hand and
local geographic, political, and social characteristics on the
other.
The economic growth generated by government programs
works in both . directions; the local area also becomes more
vulnerable to cutbacks or complete elimination of federal pro-
grams. The contrasting experiences of Huntsville and Brevard
W,
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County illustrate that all communities are not equally vulnerable
to contraction of the one large government program.
The city of Huntsville was far more successful than Brevard
County in diversifying beyond the dominant NASA program.
While much of HuntsviIle's success was due to organized Indus-
trial development, the technological characteristics of NASA
activities at the Marshall Space Flight Center afforded Hunts-
ville an important advantage in its diversification efforts. The
primary responsibility of Marshall was the manufacturing and
testing of rocket propulsion units, such as the first and second
stages of the Saturn V launch vehicle. In contrast, the John F.
Kennedy Space Center at Cape Kennedy was NASA's prime
launch facility and, as such, involved no development or
manufacturing activities. The engineering and manufacturing
programs at Marshall provided a firmer base for attracting
industry than did the launch, maintenance, and technical ser-
vice activities at Cape Kennedy.
Huntsville capitalized on the industrial opportunities at the
Marshall Space Flight Center and the Redstone Arsenal by
developing an active and well-planned campaign to attract
industry and educational institutions to the city. The Huntsville
' Industrial Expansion Committee was instrumental in raising
funds and mobilizing support for the establishment of the
University of AIabama Research Institute. In 1960, Wernher
von Braun, director of the Marshall Space Flight Center,
assisted the expansion committee by making an appeal before the
Alabama state legislature for funds to establish the institute. A
state bond issue provided $3 million for buildings and equipment,
!	
and an additional $400,000 was pledged by the city of Huntsville
! and Madison County. A concurrent development was the creation
of Industrial Research Park by a nonprofit group known as
Research Sites Foundation, Inc., a land-holding arm of the
industrial expansion committee. This organization leased and
sold properties on a 200-acre tract adjacent to the arsenal to
private firms and research groups at attractive rates.
..	 As part of the plan to attract more industry, particularly non-
1
	
	
space-related companies, Huntsville undertook new programs to
improve the quality of public_ services, the local government
{	 replaced public buildings, such as the city hall and public library,
F	 and established a new .municipal airport. The Huntsville Jet fort
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was identified as a major factor in the decision of nonspace
firms, such as Dunlop Tire, Pittsburgh Plate Glass, American
Electric, and barber and Colman, to locate in Huntsville.
As the statistics in Table 1-1 document, the economic changes
in Brevard County — higher per capita incomes, more schools,
increased construction activity, and so on --- are comparable to
those in Huntsville. Unlike Huntsville, however, Brevard County
made little progress toward sustaining longer term industrial
growth and economic stability. As noted earlier, launch activities
at Cape Kennedy did not provide a firm basis for attracting
new nonspace firms. These limitations were accentuated by the
geography of Brevard County and the individualistic nature of
major communities in the county.
The geography of Brevard County separates the major popula-
tion centers in a way which inhibits cooperative effort among
communities. The distance from Titusville, the largest northern-
most town, to Melbourne and Eau Gallie, the major population
centers in the south, is about forty miles; the entire area is situated
on two thin strips of land, one solated from the other by the
intercoastal waterway. Towns along the mainland are themselves
isolated from one another as well as from the beach towns, and the
NASA facilities location on Merritt Island provides an additional
separation factor. As a result, there is no central city in Brevard
County; instead, there are four cities almost equal in population
which provide a center for their particular area in the county
Titusville in the north, Cocoa in the center, and Eau Gallie and
Melbourne in the south.
The geographical separation of Brevard County communities
has been compounded by the desire of each town to preserve its
individuality. Despite great pressures since 1950 for.cooperation
to attack common problems, the communities have never chosen
to combine their resources. Smaller cities have developed in each
of the population centers, in some cases almost surrounding the
larger, older cities. The resulting fragmentation of political
authority among the separate cities made it difficult to achieve
the concerted industrial development which has characterised
H untsville.
Social Impacts
In addition to direct economic impacts, NASA has altered the
quality and context of the local environment in the southern
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crescent. The influx of large numbers of scientists, engineers, and
other professional personnel to these small cities led to the ex-
pansion of university and graduate programs in the local area.
The expansion of university programs in Huntsville, Alabama,
and southwest Mississippi illustrates the influence of federal re-
search and development activities. The Huntsville Center of the
University of Alabama and the university's Research Institute
developed concurrently with the growth of NASA's Marshall
Space Center and the Army's Redstone Arsenal complex. Dur-
ing the mid-I960s, enrollment in the University of Alabama at
Huntsville grew to more than four thousand students, with more
than fifteen hundred estimated to be dependents of federal em-
ployees at NASA, Redstone, and employees of related industries.
This four thousand plus enrollment compared with a total en-
rollment of fifteen hundred in degree-granting institutions in the
Huntsville area prior to I958. The government's research and
development activities provided the impetus for the University
of Alabama to become the largest graduate engineering school in
the South as of 1964.
The NASA Mississippi Test Facility had a similar influence
in upgrading education facilities throughout southwest Missis-
sippi. In September 1965, the University of Southern Mississippi
established an extension center offering undergraduate courses
in the city of Picayune, which is located in Hancock County.
Pearl River Junior College began to offer evening courses in
Picayune to equip students with the specialized skills required
for positions at the local NASA facility. In the fall of 1965, the
Jefferson Davis Junior College, which is located in Harrison
County, Mississippi, about midway between Gulfport and Biloxi,
began operation.
The educational impact of federal research and development
programs was not limited to the university and junior college
level; primary and secondary school systems also improved mark-
edly. The huge increases in populations and school enrollments
in southern communities are shown in Table I-1. Moreover, the
rapid growth in school enrollments and construction were accom-
panied by substantial improvements in average education attain-
ment and in educational quality at the primary and Secondary
levels. In Huntsville, the 1950 figure for median school years was
well below the national average (7.5 as against 9.3 years); by 1960,
}
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the Huntsville average was 0.2 years above the then national aver-
age of I0.6 years. By 1964, between 75 and 80 percent of all
Huntsville secondary school graduates entered college.
The composition of the educational staff and course content
also changed substantially. In 1964, some 350 spouses of NASA
and Redstone personnel or of local defense-related industry em-
ployees served as teachers in the Huntsville system. Of the more
than eight hundred teachers in the city school system, approxi-
mately one-fourth held masters' degrees, a high percentage com-
pared with other Alabama cities. Significant improvements in
curriculum content were made, with advanced biology and cal-
culus added to the secondary school programs.
Another educational innovation for the Huntsville area was
the establishment of' an extension unit of the state vocational-
technical school in the early 1960s. The extension unit offered
high school students the opportunity to complete the eleventh
and twelfth grades with training in electronics, auto mechanics,
and related technical fields. The effect of this new program was
to upgrade substantially the labor force for the entire area. Many
of the graduates of the technical school found ready employment
at the Redstone Arsenal and the Marshall Space Center.
NASA's Influence on Industry
The third major area which previous NASA studies have ex-
plored is the program's impact on private industry. Specifically,
i	 these studies have dealt with NASA's impact on market demand,
industrial technology, and management practices.
Market Demand
4 As a result of NASA's multibillion-dollar budget daring theI960s, the agency became an important customer for several U.S.
industries. An input-output analysis of NASA's expenditures
for fiscal years 1966 and 1967 provided an industrial breakdown
of the agency's direct expenditures for goads and services. The
industrial breakdown, based on the four-digit standard industrial
i	 classification (SIC) code, revealed that NASA expenditures were
i	 distributed in more than one hundred different industries (Orr and
1	 James, 1969). The industries with the largest NASA expen-
1	
-
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itures were aircraft (SIC: 3721), aircraft equipment (SIC: 3729),
and complete guided missiles, system assembly, and related en-
gineering (SIC 3722).
The space program expenditures had a significant influence
on the U.S. aerospace industry. Total sales of aerospace products
increased from $16.4 million in 1961 to $22.6 million in 1967.
Among the three major components of industry demand ---- De-
fense Department, NASA and the Atomic Energy Commission,
and commercial purchases — there was a significant shift in
relative importance during this period. The combined NASA
and Atomic Energy Commission share of total industry demand
rose from 4 to 19 percent, commercial purchases from 11 to
18 percent, and the Defense Department demand dropped from
85 to 63 percent (Table 1-2). The impact of the manned space
flight program on the aerospace industry is based on the study by
Konkel and Holman (1967, pp. 31-70).
The importance of NASA as a source of industry demand in-
creased each year from 1960 to 1965. From 1963 to I965, the
rising demand from NASA programs served to offset decreasing
defense purchases within the industry. The major impact of in-
creased NASA purchases in the aerospace industry during this
period was a shift of employment away from aircraft production
into missiles and space production.
In 1966, the relative importance of NASA purchases began
to decline because of large increases in defense and commercial
purchases. Demand for military aircraft rose as a result of the
U.S. commitment in Vietnam, there was al`,) a rise in the com-
mercial demand for transports. As a resuh, the aerospace em-
ployment shift of 1960-65 was reversed. By 1966, employment in
missiles and space had declined by about seventy thousand from
its peak level of 57$,000 in 1963.
Industrial Teehnolog},
New technology provided by a government program can sub-
stantially alter the matrix of products, processes, techniques,
methods, and materials within an industry. A dramatic example
of such a technological impact is the influence of NASA's com-
munications satellites on the growth of the international com-
munications industry. The distinctive contribution of these
satellites is best understood by tracing the historical development
W/
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Table 1-2
The Structure of Aerospace Demand
(196I-67)
NASA and
Atomic
Total Government Department of Energy C,lnlml`reial O
Aerospace Purchasos Defense Commission 11urcha,cs
Products and
Year Services Amount Percent ' Amount Percenth Amoun: Percent» Amount Percent» cy
4
1961 $16,377 $14,501 88.5% $13,871 84.7% $	 630 3.8% $1,876 11.5%r
I962 17,437 15,665 89.8 I4,331 82.2 1,334 7.6 1,772 I0.2
AQ
1963 18,304 I6,819 91.9 14,191 77.5 2,628 14.4 1,485 8.1
1964 .18,873 16,853 89.3 13,218 70.0 3,635 19.3 2,020 10.7 ro
'v
1965 18,702 15,886 849 11,396 60.9 4,490 24.0 2,816 15.1
n
1966 2I,350 17,950 84.1 13,110 61.4 4,840 22.7 3,400 15.9 b
1967 ` 22,550 18,550 82.3 14,150 62.8 4,400 19.5 4,000 17.7 A
Millions or dollars.
t' Percentage of tolaI.
`Estimated.
Source: Aerospace Industries 	 New,% 1 December 20. 1966). Table 1.
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of this industry (Martin. 1969, Wilson, 1953, International Com-
munications Union, 1965). International communications date
back to 1866 when the British installed the first transatlantic
ocean cable. After World War I, transoceanic communication
via high-frequency radio developed into an industry with RCA
the leading firm.
The first transatlantic telephone cable (TAT-1) was laid in
1956. The cable overcame man y of the transmission difficulties
which characterized high-frequency radio. Due to the success of
the cable, international communication services, particularly
telephone, experienced exceptional growth. Three additional
cables (TAT-2, -3, and -4) with improved design and capacity
linked the United States and Europe by 1965. The cables were
originally laid by the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, with associated foreign countries sharing in their owner-
ship. Although they were primarily intended for telephone use,
they were easily adapted to handle all varieties of telegraph or
record traffic and soon led to the obsolescence of the earlier (pre-
1956) cables.
The first satellite communications system, INTELSAT-I, be-
came operational in 1965 after a fifteen-year national research
and development effort to build commercial communications
satellites. The first effort in satellite communications was the
Navy Communication by Moon Relay project in which radar
signals and voice communications were transmitted from Pearl
Harbor to Washington, D.C., via the moon. The first communi-
cations program of NASA was Project Echo, which originated
with NASA's predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, in 1956. Echo 1, which was a hundred-foot alumi-
num plastic balloon, was successfully launched into a thousand
mile orbit on August 12, 1960. Because Echo influenced subse-
quent technology in ground stations and radio propagation, and
publicly demonstrated the concept of satellite communications,
it was a historic milestone. During the 1958-63 period NASA,
with th? assistance of various military agencies, AT&T, Space
Technology Laboratories, and Hughes Aircraft, carried out sev-
eraI additional innovations to advance satellite communications
technology. (The role of NASA in the development of communi-
cations satellites is discussed in detail in the study by the Midwest
Research Institute, November 1971.)
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The Communications Satellite Act of 1972 created COMSAT
to manage the country's commercial communications satellite
system. It (COMSAT) operates as a carrier's carrier and leases
satellite circuits to the International Record Carriers, who in
turn lease circuits to the public. Because of their greater channel
capacity, INTELSAT-I spurred a major expansion in the volume
of international communications. Between 1966 and 1970, the
volume of international communications (excluding telephone)
increased by 55 percent; this increase represented the highest
rate of growth for any five-year period since 1961. By 1971,
COMSAT had invested almost $200 million in equipment and
facilities; between 1965 and 1970, COMSAT's revenue grew from
just over $2 million to nearly $70 million (Interagfia, 1972, p. 52).
The new technology which industry acquired from NASA
had a significant effect on the industry's cost structure. The an-
nual cost of a satellite communications circuit was $25,000 when
INTELSAT-1 was launched in 1965; the cost had dropped to
$7I9 when INTELSAT-IV was launched in 1971. It is estimated
that the annual cost of a circuit will drop to $30 by 1976 when
INTELSAT-V will be placed in orbit. The cost of earth stations
has also declined substantially; whereas space station costs
ranged between $6 million to $12 million in 1969, the range
had been reduced to between $2 million and $4.5 million by 1971
(Midwest Research Institute 1971, pp. 54-59). The commercial
results of these technological advances are reflected in the recent
history of transatlantic telephone charges. For example, the
monthly rates for a leased telephone circuit between New York
and Paris remained unchanged for a number of years; but in 1966,
immediately after the first communications satellite went into
operation, monthly charges dropped sharply and have continued to
drop since that time. The $4,625 monthly charge in 1971 was less
than half the monthly rate for 1965 (Jastrow and Newell, 1972,
p. 541).
Technological Progress
In addition to generating specific technological gains for in-
dustry, NASA has also sought to promote general technological
progress. In 1962, NASA became the first federal agency to es-
tablish an agencywide program to promote the transfer and
application of its technology to outside agencies. The 1958 Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Act provided a statutory basis for
W,
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the NASA Technology Utiiization Program by calling for the
widest possible dissemination of information concerning space
activities and for the study of the long-range benefits to be de-
rived from space.
When the Technology Utilization Program was created, it
was widely believed that the technical byproducts of the space
program, or "space spinoffs," would be both large in number
and commercially significant. The concept of "space spinoff' as-
sumed that a specific, discrete innovation in the space program
would be identified as relevant to a need outside the program.
It would then be adapted and applied commercially. (The history
and operation of NASA's Technology Utilization Program are
discussed in Lesher and Howicic, 1966; Doctors, 1968, p. 69;
Rosenbloom, 1969, pp. 156-65; and Geise, 1971.)
The first substantive study of space spinoffs was commis-
sioned by NASA and carried out by the Denver Research Insti-
tute in 1963. The Institute's researchers were unable to identify
a significant number of technical by-products. Moreover, they
suggested that the term "spinofr , was misleading because it im-
plied that space contributions were direct and readily identifiable,
when in fact they were not (Denver Research institute, 1963;
Welles and Waterman, 1964, p. 106).
Since 1963, a more realistic view of the space program's
technological influences has been adopted. The Technology Utili-
zation Program is now focused on developing improved methods
of technology transfer, rather than generating "space spinoffs."
This new approach was assessed in a 1972 study of NASA's tech-
nological influences on industry (Denver Research Institute, May
1972).
The 1972 study proceeded as follows: Non-NASA technical
experts in industrial firms, universities, and government labora-
tories were asked to identify the major developments in twelve
technological fields — cryogenics, electrochemical enr.rgy con-
version and storage, high-temperature ceramics, h'gh-tempera-
ture metals, integrated circuits, internal gas dynamics, materials
machinery and forming, materials joining processes, microwave
systems, nondestructive testing, simulation, and telemetry. A
total of 109 developments were identified in this fashion.
The technical people of NASA then specified 366 NASA con-
tributions to the advancement of the 109 selected developments.
i
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The contributions of NASA per field ranged from a low of four-
teen in telemetry to a high of 61 in high-temperature metals, with
an overall average of approximately thirty NASA contributions
per field. The NASA respondents assessed the nature, signifi-
cance, and impact of' the space program's contributions and also
the magnitude of the technological change represented by these
contributions.
The most significant finding of the 1972 study is that the
principal technological impact of the space program is to accel-
erate technical advance. The survey indicates that a major share
(78 percent) of NASA's contributions were advances that would
have eventually occurred even in the absence of the space pro-
gram; NASA's role was to accelerate development. The study also
found that most NASA contributions (65 percent) represented
an incremental or systematic advance in technology rather than.
a more significant "step function" change or a less significant
"consolidation of knowledge."
Mathematica, Inc., has recently conducted a "pilot study" to
measure the economic value of NASA's acceleration effect (June
1975). Drawing on four of the Denver Research Institute's case
studies (gas turbines, cryogenic multilayer insulation, computer
simulation, and integrated circuits), Mathematica, Inc., concluded
that the economic benefits which result from NASA's acceleration
of technology are indeed large. The value of a speed-up in tech-
nology in those four fields was estimated to be between $2.3 bil-
lion and $7.6 billion (in I974 dollars). Mathematica, Inc.'s most
probable estimate is that the four cases in the pilot study alone
produced savings equal to 6 percent of all NASA research and
development expenditures since 1958 (on a discounted value
basis).
Management Impacts
Improvements in management techniques as well as techno-
logical advances have been viewed as an impact of NASA. A 1971
Denver Research Institute study was the first systematic attempt
to examine the application of aerospace management techniques
outside the aerospace industry. A total of 25 techniques, used
widely within the aerospace industry, were identified. The dis-
tinguishing characteristic of the techniques is use and not orig-
ination in aerospace. Many of the 25 techniques (such as program
and review techniques (PERT), simulation analysis, and manage-
S1
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i
ment information systems) originated elsewhere; aerospace mana-
gers have played an important role in refining, transforming, or
augmenting the techniques.
The principal contribution of the Denver Research Institute's
study is in furthering understanding of the processes for trans-
ferring management technology. The research team concluded
that the transfer and application of aerospace management tech-
nology occur primarily through the movement of the industry's
trained and experienced people to organizations outside the aero-
space field.
Another recent study of NASA's management contributions
was conducted by Sayles and Chandler (1971), under the auspices
of the National Academy of Sciences. The authors focused on
what future large-scale programs can learn from NASA. They
conclude that NASA's most outstanding contribution is in the
area of advanced systems design: ", .. getting an organizationally
complex structure, involving a great variety of people doing a
great variety of things in many separated locations, to do what
you want, when you want it" (p. 314).
The distinctive skill of NASA in advanced systems design was
its ability to integrate widely separated, specialized efforts. Space
program managers employed a variety of methods (such as data
banks, configuration management, and endless performance re-
view meetings) to attain what Sayles and Chandler term "system-
wide performance visibility." The internal management control
capabilities of NASA enabled the space agency to penetrate its
total work system in an almost unprecedented manner. Although
Sayles and Chandler clearly document NASA's integrative man-
agement control skills, their study does not indicate the extent
to which these management skills have been adopted by other
large organizations, or the blocks to their adaptation.
1
Summary
Previous NASA studies have explored the economic and
social impacts of the space program on southern communities,
the impact of NASA on industrial demand, technology, and
management, and the relationship of NASA to the social
economy.
First, space employment had a major impact on the econ-
i	 omies of the five NASA manned space flight communities
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bordering the Gulf of Mexico the "southern crescent." The
economic impact of NASA on a local community varied directly
with the relative importance of program employment in the com-
munity and inversely with the strength of the local economy at
the inception of the program. Diversification of the economy
beyond the dominant federal program varied with the nature of
the particular space facility and the individual community's
geographic and political characteristics.
Second, the NASA experience demonstrates that high-tech-
nology public programs can have an important influence on the
quality and context of a local environment. These social im-
pacts of government research and development programs are
especially noticeable in smaller localities which have a limited
technology base. In such communities the influx of scientists,
engineers, and professional personnel helped to produce marked
improvements in the primary and secondary school systems. In
addition, new junior college and university facilities were estab-
lished and existing institutions were greatly expanded.
Third, government research and development programs can
prop ide important new technology for particular industrial sec-
tors, as NASA did for the international communications industry.
Indeed, NASA was the leader in a fifteen-year research and de-
velopment effort which produced INTELSAT-I, the first oper-
ational communications satellite system. The greater channel
capacity of satellites stimulated a 55 percent expansion in the
volume of international communications (excluding telephone)
between 1966 and 1971. The continual decline in the costs of
satellite circuits has been accompanied by reductions in the
prices of all forms of international communication; 1971 trans-
atlantic telephone rates, for example, were almost half those of
1965.
Fourth, the space program's primary technological influence
has been to accelerate technical development. A study of more
than a hundred developments in a variety of technical fields
suggests that most technical advances occurred earlier than
would have been expected in the absence of NASA. These
findings suggest that earlier "space spinoff" studies, which
searched for commercial adoption of complete NASA-developed
systems, were misdirected.
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Fifth, NASA's most significant contribution to management
practice is in the design of advanced systems. The space program
developed and refined management methods for achieving ob-
jectives in extremely large and complex systems. At the present
time, the adoption of NASA's management techniques by organi-
zations in the private sector has proved difficult to identify and
document.
A more general conclusion is that earlier studies have tended
to deal with only one category of impacts — economic, social,
technological, or managerial. This approach has focused atten-
tion on the type of impact rather than on the affected institution;
most earlier impact studies have failed to recognize the existence
of and potential for institutional transformations. Yet the real
significance of public program impacts is that they may ulti-
mately serve to modify and transform institutional arrangements.
In order to overcome the limitations of past studies, the Con-
servation project undertook three case studies organized round
an institutional framework.
4
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Chapter Two
•
New Industries.. Public Support for
Semiconductor and Computer Development
Electronics has been one of the world's fastest growing indus-
tries during the twentieth century, expanding almost a hundredfold
between 1939 and 1974. The industry's most rapid expansion has
occurred since the mid--1950s as the result of dramatic growth in
.:orld computer and semiconductor markets. The early develop-
ment and subsequent growth of these two sectors of the electronics
industry have been due to the significant technological advances
since World War 11.
American firms have dominated the semiconductor (solid-state
electronic components) and computer industries since their post-
World War II origins. International Business Machines, for
example, accounts for more than two-thirds of all computer in-
stallations both inside and outside the United States. In semicon-
ductors, American firms have carried out all of the notable
innovations since Bell Laboratories discovered the transistor in
I948 (Freeman, 1965, p. 1).
Large U.S. government programs in national defense and space
exploration have played a major role in the development of the
nation's computer and semiconductor industries. This chapter
identifies and describes three types of influence -- economic,
technological, and manpower — which the space and defense pro-
grams exerted on these new industries. A comprehensive analysis
of all three impact categories is needed to understand the full
5I
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range of support a public program can provide to a new indus-
try. The influence of government policy and programs on the
electronics industry is not a post-World War I1 phenomenon;
some segments of this industry (e.g., radar and equipment for
radio broadcasting) have had a continuing involvement with gov-
ernment policy since World War I (Freeman, pp. 52-56; Postan,
Hay, and Scott, 1964; and Maclaurin, 1949).
Economic Impacts: Support for Research and Development
The economic dimension of government influence has been
evident in both the computer and the semiconductor industries.
Specifically, three types of economic impacts can be identified:
(1) Direct and indirect financial support by space and defense
programs for semiconductor and computer research and
development
(2) Assured demand provided by space and defense programs
during the early years of the industry
(3) The use of space and defense demand to support new firma
and to affect the competitive balance within the industry
as it matures
1
 Because innovation — the application of technology — has been so
crucial in the development of the computer and semiconductor
industries, let us begin by considering space and defense financial
support for research and development.
The development of active (or current modifying) electronic
components may be divided into three "generations." The first
} consisted of electronic tubes which were produced commercially
beginning in 1920. The invention of the transistor by Bell Labora-
tories in 1948 marked the birth of the second generation of active
1 electronic components. Whereas a tube altered electrical current as
it passed through a vacuum or inert gas in the tube, a semicondisc-
for could alter current as it passed through solid materials. The
use of solid materials increased reliability and reduced the size of
components, thereby permitting miniaturized and more complex
products. The second generation is familiar to the average con-
sumer in the form of portable transistor radios as well as numerous
I	 other products. A third generation of electrical components, inte-
grated circuits, was introduced to the market in the early 1960s.
}	 Integrated circuits are combinations of two or more electrical
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components joined together within a solid-state material (Tilton,
1971, pp. 7-9). The use of integrated circuits permitted "micro-
miniaturization," and thus highly complex circuits could be housed
in a reasonable space. Integrated circuits have recently reached the
consumer in the form of "pocket calculators."
Prior to the discovery of the -transistor, European firms were
the equal of American firms in advanced component technology.
Some of the most significant advances in electron tubes were made
by European firms and European universities. The role of Euro-
pean firms in advanced component technology has declined con-
siderably since 1948. Almost all of the important inventions and
innovations in components have been made in the United States,
and there has been a lag of one to four years before manufacture
has begun in Europe, often by American subsidiaries (Freeman,
1965, p. 63).
The leading role that American firms have played in advanced
component technology is directly related to the research and
development support provided by the government. In the early
1950s, the military services became convinced of the military
value of transistors and other semiconductor devices. They be-
lieved these devices could miniaturize, and thus make more por-
table, considerable military equipment and also improve the
reliability of equipment in field operations. As a result, the De-
fense Department financed semiconductor research and develop-
ment on a large scale and aided the principal firms in enlarging
their production capacity. By 1953, the Army Signal Corps was
financing pilot production lines for transistors and related de-
vices at five sites operated by Western Electric, General Electric,
Raytheon, RCA, and Sylvania (Tilton, 1971, pp. 92-95). Between
1955 and 1961, direct government funding for semiconductor
research and development and production refinement totaled
S66 million (Table 2-1).
This government financial support was provided in two forms:
(1) direct contracts for research and development projects and (2)
government-financed production refinement programs. Approxi-
mately 30 percent of the funds were expended in 1956 when a
special appropriation of S14 million was allocated to production
refinement projects for transistors. Contracts for the development
of thirty different types of transistors over the following several
years were placed with twelve semiconductor companies. In many
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Table 2-1
Direct U.S. Government Funding of Semiconductor Research and
Development and Production Refinement'
(1955-61)
Production Refinement
Research and	 Diodes and
Year Development	 Transistors	 Rectifiers Total
1955 $3.2	 $2.7	 $2.2 $8.1
1956 4.1	 14.0	 0.8 18.9
1957 3.8	 0.0	 0.5 4.3
1958 4.0	 1.9	 0.2 6.1
I959 6.3	 1.0	 0.0 7.3•
1960 6.8	 0.0	 1.1 7.9
1961 11.0	 1.7	 0.8 13.5
"Millions of dollars.
Source: Business and Dclense Services Administrati,»i. U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Semiconductors: U.S. Pruduciion and Trade (Washington. D.C.:
Government Printing Office. 1961). Table 8.
cases the Defense Department's investment was matched by simi-
lar amounts of capital equipment or plant space supplied by the
contracting companies. Contracts called for the delivery of about
three thousand transistors of each type to be made on production
f lines capable of producing that many per month. )eventually the
special $14 million expenditure aided in greatly expanding semi-
conductor production capacity in the United States (Arthur D.
Little, Inc., 1963, p. 163).
R The Army Signal Corps was extremely active in supporting
semiconductor research during this period because of its concern
with improving military communications equipment. In 1961,
this agency employed 27 commercial contractors on research pro-
grains for semiconductor devices, forty commercial firms on elec-
tronic parts and materials projects, and thirteen commercial
firms on quartz crystal units. The Signal Corps program pro-
duced some notable commercial benefits for these firms by en-
abling them to substantially reduce the length of commercial
'	 development projects. The Signal Corps believes that the time
f
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needed on these projects was shortened by as much as 75 per-
cent (U.S. Congress, Senate, 196I).
It should be noted that the data on direct government fund-
ing of semiconductor research and development (Table 2-1)
vastly understate the amount of total government support. Many
semiconductor firms received support indirectly. Government
contracts for space and weapons systems also enabled the prime
contractors to subcontract with semiconductor firms for research
and development. A 1960 Defense Department survey measured
the amount of direct federal semiconductor support as well as the
indirect amount which was subcontracted to semiconductor firms
by weapons systems prime contractors. The survey estimated that
'Defense Department direct and indirect semiconductor research
and development funding totaled $13.9 million in 1955 and
$16.2 million in 1959. These totals were over twice the amount
of direct Defense Department research and development funding
in those years. The survey also revealed the relative importance
of government-sponsored research and development in 1958 and
1959; the Defense Department funded 25 percent and 23 percent
respectively of total semiconductor industry research and devel-
opment expenditures (Tilton, 1971, pp. 93-94). As these figures
make clear, substantial support was provided for semiconductor
research and development during the early stages of the industry's
development. The $66 million in direct support, as well as nearly
equal amounts in indirect support, aided the firms in refining
i	 their products and expanding production capacity.
I	 A similar pattern of early large-scale government research and
i development support is evident in the computer industry. Fed-
eral agencies began to play an instrumental role in development
of the U.S. computer industry in the 1940s. ,Although the first
U.S. computer, the automatic sequence controlled calculator,
was developed by a Harvard-international Business Machines
team between 1937 and I944, all subsequent U.S. computer de-
velopments from the end of World War 11 until the mid-1950s
had the strong financial support of various U.S. government
agencies. Work on the first electronic computer, the electronic
numerical integrator and calculator, began at the University of
Pennsylvania in 1942 and was completed in 1946. This electronic
computer received financial support from the Army and was
f	 mainly designed for calculating trajectories of shells and bombs.
4-
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From 1945 to 1955, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, the
Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Bureau of Stand-
ards all placed major contracts for the development of improved
computers with several universities and with the firms who first
began design and manufacture -- especially Remington Rand
(Univac) and, later, IBM. As a result, rapid progress was made
in solving some of the problems of logic design, memory stor-
age systems, and programming techniques.
The major technological advances during this period were
made in the large computers demanded by the military and other
government agencies. These advances were subsequently incor-
porated in the medium and small computers, which were designed
for smaller scale, less complex applications. In the 1950s, govern-
ment contract research and development accounted for about
60 percent of total research and development expenditures at
IBM; by the early 1960s, government-sponsored research and
development was but a small part of the company's $125 million
research and development budget. The large IBM computers,
such as STRETCH, were built on contract for government
agencies. brit the highly successful transistorized 1401 series and
the 360 and 370 series have been privately funded projects (Burck
et al., 1965, p. 82).
Government support of U.S. computer developments takes
on added significance when the U.S. experience is contrasted
with that of other countries. Although it is widely believed that
the first successful computers were built in the United States and
Great Britain, the first electromechanical computer was actually
developed by Frederich Zuse in Berlin between 1936 and 1941.
Moreover, Zuse was also the first to begin work on the electronic
computer during the early 1940s. But the lack of official support
by the German government for his project, and the disruntinn
which occurred at the end of the war, caused the lead in com-
puter development to pass to the United States, and to a lesser
extent, to Great Britain. In England, electronic computer develop-
ment work began in 1946-47 after British scientists and engineers
had visited the first American installations. The earliest work
was at London, Manchester, and Cambridge universities, and at
the Elliott Brothers Research Laboratory on digital computing
for fire control for the Admiralty, Although financial support
for several computer projects was provided by the National Re-
W,
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search and Development Corporation, total funding was limited
to $2.5 million during the I947-57 period because British military
agencies remained unconvinced that there were substantial
benefits to be derived. Consequently, British computer firms
were never able to compete effectively with their U.S. counter-
parts. Initially, ten British firms were involved in the develop-
ment and manufacture of computers. But few of these firms ever
developed a computer model with sales exceeding fifty units, and
by the mid-1960s the number of British computer manufacturers
had declined from ten to three (Bernstein, I966, Freeman, 1965,
pp. 56-62; and Jacobowitz, 1963, p. 97).
Impact of Assured Demand
The preceding discussion makes it clear that government re-
search and development funding provided vital financial support
for the early technological development of semiconductors and
computers. Government programs were equally important when
these products first reached the market; the earliest sales of semi-
conductors and computers were to military agencies. The dis-
cussion in the remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is
based upon data found in publications of the Business and De-
fense Services Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce,
1960), the Electronic Industries Association (1969), and John
4	 Tilton (1971, pp. 89-92).
The first semiconductors were marketed in the early 1950s.
By 1955, the semiconductor market was $40 million, with military
agencies accounting for 38 percent of these sales. The space and
defense markets for semiconductors grew from $15 million in
1955 to $222 million in I961, At times, space and defense de-
mands accounted for almost 50 percent of the total semiconduc-
tor market (Table 2-2).
Government demand proved even more significant during the
first years of integrated circuit commercial production. The
earliest integrated circuits were used in the Minuteman missile
{ program and various Navy programs in 1962 and 1963. In 1962,
space and defense sales accounted for the total $4 million inte-
grated circuit market. By 1968, the space-defense share of inte-
grated circuits had declined to 37 percent (Table 2-2).
Space-defense business was vital in an industry where learning
^	 economies are substantial. Typically, the price for each new com-
r
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Table 2-2
U.S. Production of Semiconductors and Integrated Circuits for Defense Requirements (1955-68)4'
Year
(1)
Semiconductor Production
spacc	 (3) as a
Mid	 Percentage
Total	 11elense	 of (2)
(2)	 (3)
	
(4)
Integrated Circuit
Productions'
Space	 (6) as a
and	 Percentage
Total	 Defense	 of(5)
(5)	 (6)	 (7)
Seruiconductorand Integrated
Circuit Production
Space	 (9) as a
and	 Percentage
Total	 Defense	 of(8)
(8)	 (9)	 (10)
Ln00
1955 $ 40 $ 15 38% $	 40 $ 15 38°0
I956 90 32 36 90 32 36
1957 i51 54 36 151 54 36
1958 2I0 8I 39 210 81 39 ^.
1959 396 I80 45 396 180 45
1960 542 258 39 542 258 48 A
1961 565 222 39 565 222 39
1962 571 219 38 $	 4`	 $	 4	 100w 575 223 39
1963 594 196 33 16	 15	 94` 610 2I1 35
1964 635 157 25 41	 35	 85` 676 192 28
1965 805 190 24 79	 57	 72 884 247 28
1966 975 219 22 148	 79	 53 1,123 298 27
1967 879 205 23 228	 98	 43 1,107 303 27
1968 847 179 21 312	 115	 37 1,I59 294 25 `bd
'Dollar amounts are in millions. Defense production includes devices produced for equipment needed by the Defense Department, the Atomic ya
Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
h Commercial production of integrated circuits began in 1962. tol
Estimated.
Source: For semiconductors -- Business and Defense Services Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Electronic Components: Production
and Related Dara, 1952-59 (Washington. D.C.:	 U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960); for 1960-68 — ibid., "Consolidated Tabulation:
Shipments of Selected Electronics Components" (annual reports), and Electronics Industries Association, Electronics Industries Yearbook,
1969 (Washington. Q.C.: Electronics Industries Association, 1969). These data appear in a different form in John Tilton, Imernatrnual
Dirf ssion of Technology: The Case of 5emiconduerors (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institutions, 1971) Tables 4-7 and 4-8.
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Table 2-3
U.S. Integrated Circuit Production and Prices
(1962-68)
Average Price per
Total Production	 Integrated Circuit
Year	 (millions)
	
(dollars)
1962	 $ C	 $50.00
1963	 16	 31.00
1964	 41	 18.50
1965	 79	 8.33
1966	 148	 5.05
1967	 228	 3.32
1968	 312	 2.33
I Irstimated.
Source: "Total production and average price figures Electronics Industries As-
sociation. Electronic.% hnla%iries Yearbook, 1969(Washington. D.C.: Elec-
tronics Industries Association. I969). Table 55.
ponent innovation was too expensive for industrial or consumer
electronic products. But NASA and the Defense Department
provided a substantial market for new devices because reliability
and performance received higher priority over costs in the space
and' defense environments. Later, as the firms increased produc-
tion, learning economies were realized and costs fell. In a few
years, the price was low enough to penetrate the industrial mar-
ket and, eventually, the consumer market.
Semiconductor firms estimate that the average cost of pro-
'	 ducing a new component falls between 20 and 30 percent every
j time its cumulative past production doubles. The impact of
learning economies on the price of integrated circuits has been
dramatic. In I962, when the total market was $4 million, the
average price of an integrated circuit was approximately $50.
By 1968, the market had grown to $312 million, and the averaget	 #	 price had dropped to $2.33 (Table 2-3). At the 1973 price of $0.63,
1	 integrated circuit customers could purchase fifty units of increased
i
r
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f
complexity for the same price they had paid for one unit in I963
(Texas Instruments, Inc., I973, p. 3).
Computer manufacturers, as well as semiconductor firms,
benefited from government purchases during the industry's early
years. Military . demand for computers was critical in the early
I950s. By the time Sperry Rand delivered the first UNIVAC
computer designed for business data processing to General
Electric in I954, the military market for data processing systems
had already reached nearly $200 million. Although sales of
commercial data processing hardware rose rapidly to $500 mil-
lion in 1960, the military and space market for data processing
systems was still larger (5900 million) in that year. The sales of
commercial data processing systems did not surpass military and
space hardware sales until 1962, nearly eight years after delivery
of the first computer designed for business use (Table 2-4).
The relationship between military and space demands for
computers and overall market growth is similar to that observed
in the semiconductor industry. In both cases, space and defense
demands accounted for a large share of the total market at the
outset. The space-defense share of the total computer hardware
market was initially 100 percent and remained over 60 percent
for the next seven years. Although the space-defense share of the
computer services market was lower than the space-defense share
of the computer hardware market, government purchases still
accounted for nearly half of total sales through 1960 amd did not
drop below one-third of the total market until 1963 (Burck et al.,
1965, pp. 73-78; Bernstein, 1966, pp. 81-82; and Gropelli, 1970).
The above statistics document the direct spending of space
and defense agencies on computers, but they do not capture the
indirect effect of space and defense expenditures resulting from
computer spending by large aerospace companies. A computer
science professor of a major eastern university (in a personal
interview with the author) described the indirect effects of space
and defense programs on the computer industry by saying that
"big spenders are significant factors" in the computer industry of
America. He noted that American "dominance of computers and
computer science" is due in large part to "massive government
space-defense spending" during 1950 through 1965, adding that
these funds "flowed to large aerospace companies who in turn
Computer Market Statistics
(1954--63)
Sala Space-Defense Share yComputer 5aless
Computer
	
Computers and Computers and Z
Year Commercial Space-Defense Total Services Services Computers Services 4
1954 $ 200 5	 200 $ 200 100%p 100%
to'
1955 S	 68 250 318 S 50 368 79 54
1956 185 300 485 175 660 62 45
1957 230 350 580 200 780 60 45
1958 200 500 700 250 950 71 53 0	 -
I959 310 800 1,110 300 1,410 72 57 r
1960 600 900 1,500 500 2,000 60 45 n
1961 820 1,000 1820 750 2,570 55 39
0
I962 1,200 1,100 2,300 1,000 3,300 48 33
1963 1,370 1,200 2,570 1,200 3,770 47 32 y
"Millions of dollars. •
Source: G. I3urek et uL, The Computer Age (New York: Harper & Row. 1'uhfishers. Ineorpor:tted, 1965, pp. 73-78; and A. Gropelli. "The
Growth Process in the Computer Industry " (New York: New York [University, 1970), appcndix.,Doctoral dissertation.
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became big spenders" which resulted in the "emergence of the
pioneering IBM 7090 and 7094 lines."
The large space and defense markets for computers produced
three significant secondary benefits for computer firms. First,
space and defense sales enabled companies to fund higher levels
of research and development, which in turn promoted technolog-
ical progress. Research advances, together with the learning
economies which resulted from increasing volume levels, led
to continual declines in prices. An index of computer prices
for the 1954-65 period reveals that prices in I965 were approxi-
mately a tenth of those in 1954, as the following shows (Chow,
1967, p. 1124; 1960 equals I00):
Year	 Corrrpurer Price hidex
1954	 303.8
1955	 276.3
1956	 236.4
1957	 216.2
1958	 189.8
1959	 148.2
1960	 100.0
1961	 84.4
1962	 64.1
I963	 53.3
1964	 39.1
1965	 3I.9
A second valuable benefit provided by space and defense
demands was experience with new types of computer applications.
Military requirements for space, speed, and reliability resulted
in more sophisticated applications than those first sought by
business firms. Typically, the techniques used in a particular
computer application would initially be developed and refined
in a military system. Subsequently, the same techniques would
be applied to a commercial data processing system. The most
notable example of applying military computer experience to
commercial problems is in the area of real-time computer
systems. The first commercial real-time computer systems were
descendants of the Air Force's pioneering real-time air defense
computer system -- the semiautomatic ground environment or
SAGE.
4
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An executive of a major computer company, with substantial
experience in both the space-defense and the commercial markets,
stressed in an interview with the author the relationship between
applications in the two markets when he said: "Space and defense
computer applications have served as a `crystal ball' for pre-
dicting the future direction of computer use in industry." He based
his statement on his premise that "because many computer appli-
cations in the space and defense programs are on the leading edge
of the technology, they point the way to future applications in
industry — and elsewhere in government — two to three years
hence."
A third benefit of space and defense demands was the
"demonstration effect." Sales in the commercial computer market
depended on the acceptance of complex systems by business
executives. Many of these executives lacked the technological
knowledge needed to fully appreciate the potential of computers.
The combination of unfamiliarity and skepticism among business
executives would have been an immense barrier to commercial
sales were it not for the "demonstration effect" of space and
defense computer systems. In the 1950s military demonstrations
of computer ability accelerated the business world's acceptance
of the computer. More recently the widely publicized use of
computers for NASA space missions during the 1960s produced
an unparalleled demonstration effect. One computer industry
observer, the computer engineering professor quoted earlier,
noted the significance of NASA's "successful use of computers,
particularly on Apollo [which] greatly increased industry's
receptivity to computers." Moreover, he found that managers
became "more willing to let computers control things, such as
in process control of oil refineries," and added that "the momen-
tum generated by Apollo had a big effect on confidence, pro-
ducing a sudden turnaround in industry receptivity."
Competition and the Support of New Firms
Space and defense demands have not only stimulated the
growth of the semiconductor and computer industries, they have
also helped stimulate and maintain competition in these fields.
The ability of new firms to enter the market is an essential
characteristic of competitive industry. In both the computer
and the semiconductor industries, government demand had been
w
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a factor in supporting new firms, but space-defense stimulation
of competition is more pronounced in the semiconductor market.
The first commercial producers of semiconductors were
Western Electric and such major tube manufacturers as General
Electric, RCA, and Sylvania. General Electric, Raytheon, and
RCA began producing transistors in 1951, and by 1954 eight
different firms were manufacturing transistors. Other firms were
slower to respond to the new technology, but they entered
the market in large numbers during the mid-I950s. The three
types of firms which entered the market were: (1) firms which
were large and diversified before they entered the semiconductor
industry, such as Hughes, Motorola, IBM; (2) small firms
engaged in other branches of electronics or in other industries,
such as Texas Instruments, General Instrument; and (3) new
companies which were initially established to manufacture semi-
conductors, such as Transitron, National Semiconductor (Tilton,
1971, pp. 65-69).
Many of the new firms were able to enter the market because
the military agencies were willing to buy from new and untried
firms. By 1957 these new firms accounted for 64 percent of the
total market and 69 percent of the government market (Table 2-5).
The two largest firms in the market, Texas Instruments and
Transitron with 20 and 1 I percent market shares respectively, had
both benefited greatly from military demand. In early 1953,
the military authorized the use of Transitron's gold--bonded diode
before the company had made any significant commercial sales
(Harris, 1959, p. 142). In 1954, Texas Instruments, building on
research at Bell Laboratories, introduced the first silicon tran-
sistor. The innovation opened a vast new market, particularly
in products for military use.
Space program demand has been especially important in
establishing a competitive market for metal oxide semiconductor
(MOS) devices. The first MOS transistor was introduced by
Fairchild in 1960. However, as a result of several technical
difficulties and the departure of many MOS specialists, Fairchild
dropped these devices from their product line after two years
of commercial production. Then, beginning in I963 the new firms
quickly entered the field. General Micro Electronics was founded
by Fairchild personnel in 1963 and received one of its first
contracts to produce MOS integrated circuits from NASA. When
j
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Table 2-5
U.S. Semiconductor Market Shares of Major Firms,
(Selected years)
Percentage of Market
Type and Name of Firm	 1957	 1111^3	 1963	 1966
Western Electric 5% 5% 7% 9%
Receiving tube firms:
General Electric 9 8 8 8
RCA 6 7 5 7
Raytheon 5 4 (b) (b)
Sylvania 4 3 (b) (b)
Philco-Ford 3 6 4 3
Westinghouse 2 6 4 5
Others 2 1 4 3
Subtotal 31 35 25 26
' k	 New firms:
F	 Texas Instruments 20 20 18 17
Transitron I2 9 3 3
Hughes 11 5 (b) (b)
Motorola (b) 5 10 12
Fairchild (b) 5 9 13
Thompson Ramo Wooldridge (b) (b) 4 (b)
General Instrument (b) (b) (b) 4
Delco Radio (b) (b) (b) 4
Others 21 16 24 12
Subtotal 64 60 68 65
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
" Market shares are based on company shipments and include in-house govern-
ment sales.
"Not one of the top semiconductor firms for this year. its market share is in-
eluded in the "others" category.
Source: John E. Tilton, International Di1%u5ion of"Terhnolog t .: The Case ol'Senri-
1	 conductors (Washington. D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1971).i p. 66.
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Philco-Ford acquired General Micro Electronics in 1966, several
of the latter's employees left to form American Micro-Systems
which was subsequently awarded a NASA contract. The firm
developed the technology required to produce stable MOS
devices and became one of the early suppliers of specialized
commercial MOS devices. American Micro-Systems eventually
became a major source of such devices throughout the country
(Denver Research Institute, 1972, pp. 15I-55).
The impact of space and defense demands on competition
among computer firms is less pronounced than among semi-
conductor producers, but the impact is -vident, particularly in
the industry's early years. Remington Rand, the company which
delivered the first UNIVAC computer, had a head start on IBM
during the early 1950s. IBM did not enter the electronic computer
industry until 1953, but it was the clear industry leader by
1956. Most analyses attribute the overwhelming IBM success to
the firm's aggressive salesmanship. While essentially correct,
these analyses ignore the significance of space and defense de-
mands for IBM. Space and defense purchases exceeded 30 per-
4 cent of the firm's computer revenues in the mid-1950s and did
not drop below 20 percent until 1958 (Burck, et al., 1965;
Bernstein, 1966, pp. 81-82; and Gropelli, 1970).
During the late 1950s space and defense sales were vital to
the growth of many new computer firms. The most significant
j	 of those was the Control Data Corporation begun by former
Sperry Rand employees in 1957 as a small but successful
i supplier of standardized systems for military and scientific use.
Control Data Corporation raised revenues from almost nothing
in 1958 to around $121 million in the fiscal year ending June
1964. By 1965 the firm had displaced RCA as the third largest
computer manufacturer — behind IBM and Sperry Rand.
Space-defense business provided the initial impetus for Control
Data Corporation's growth; almost all of the company's pre-
1960s sales were to government agencies (Burck, et al., 1965,
pp. 89-90; Wall Street Journal, I963, p. 32; and Electronic
News, March 6, 1967, p. 29).
During the 1960-70 decade, space and . defense demands
aided several computer manufacturers, particularly Sperry Rand^J	
and Control Data Corporation, to maintain or improve their
competitive position vis-a-vis IBM. A 1962 government policy
b4
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shift from computer rental to the direct purchase of computers
promoted the growth of IBM's competitors. In 1963 IBM began
to feel the impact of this policy when several space and defense
agencies converted from IBM to other equipment. In 1961, IBM
was responsible for 81 percent of all computers supplied to the
government. By 1966, IBM's net shipments to government
agencies were negative as a result of returned rental equipment
which was replaced by new equipment purchased from IBM's
competitors ("Something to Think About," 1963; and Gropelli,
1970, p. 215).
The market share data demonstrate the momentousness of
space and defense sales for IBM's competitors. Approximately
a fourth of all installed UNIVAC computers were located in
space or military agencies by 1970. The comparable percentages
for the other manufacturers were 23 percent for Burroughs,
16 percent for Control Data Corporation, 15 percent for RCA,
and 7 percent for IBM. New companies, such as Scientific
Data Systems (subsequently Xerox Data Systems) benefited
substantially from space and defense demands; in 1971, 28 per-
cent of all Scientific Data Systems' computers were located
in space and defense agencies. Other smaller companies such
as EMR Telemetry, Electronic Associates, and Autoneties all
had market shares which exceeded 15 per cent (Gropelli, 1970,
p. 78; and U.S. Congress, House, I965 and subsequent annual
editions). Table 2-6 shows the computer stock value of space and
defense agencies as a percentage of the total computer stock
value. All market data are based on the value of installed equip-
ment at the end of each year.
Technological Impacts
Although economic impacts are an important part of govern-
ment influence on private industry, they do not tell the entire
story. Essentially, they provide information regarding only the
flow of research funds and the distribution of sales revenue. Yet
government programs can also provide important technological
support. In the case of semiconductor and computer industries,
the technological benefits for individual firms were significant.
It is important to note that for semiconductor manufacturers,
learning by doing on the part of production workers is a relatively
unimportant source of learning economies. Most semiconductor
t
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Table 2-6
Space-Defense Computer Stock Value as a Percentage
of Total Computer Stock Value
(Selected years)
Year
Firm 1960 1961 1963 1964 1965 1968 1970 1971
IBM 10 10 8 8 8 7 7 5
Burroughs 18 19 8 5 14 10 23 18
Control Data
Corporation 5 6 10 13 20 14 16 14
General Electric 0 0 5 4 8 3 5 0
Honeywell 0 2 10 7 9 8 5 4
RCA 15 14 13 15 I7 12 15 15
Univac 6 10 lI 10 13 I5 24 21
Scientific Data
Systems -- — 11 8 4 10 21 28
EMR Telemetry — — 18 9 14 5 24 27
Electronic
Association — — — 0 12 14 15
Autoneties 13 8 13 22 20 26 15 15
Digital Equipment — -- 9 9 3 2 2 3
value of computer stock computed by using annual inWiltury data tin number
of units installed for each computer model and multiplN ins: this ticure bN estimated
monthly rental value for that model.
Source: A. Gropelli."The Gru»th Process in the Computer IndLISM "t1c» York:
Nexv York Universit y . 19701. doctoral dissertuation: and L,S, House e1
Representatives. 89th Ceng.. Ist Sess.. Invent(jrY of Ataruttcttiv Dam A-m-
essing Equipmettr in the Federal Goa vernntent (Washinaton. D,C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office. June 19051.
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learning economies are not an automatic by-product of produc-
tion but, rather, are produced by the deliberate efforts of firms
to upgrade production technology. Such economies are generated
by improvements in the production process arising from experi-
mentation with the length and temperature of the crystal prepara-
tion process, the measures taken to control crystal contamination,
the equipment used in assembly and testing, the scheduling and
organization of operations, and so on.
The defense and space programs demanded high-quality
components from the standpoint of both reliability and perform-
ance. The challenging specifications set by the military agencies
and NASA accelerated many of the learning economies related
to improved production processes. Military and space programs
established clear specifications for the types of components they
required. This prompted many companies, including newer ones,
to develop semiconductors which were at least as good as, if not
better than, those already under government contract (Tilton,
1971, pp. 85-87).
Whereas military demand accelerated the advance of second-
generation component technology, the U.S. space program was
dominant in accelerating the development of third-generation
technology. The development of the Apollo Guidance Computer,
a vehicular-borne computer, required extensive miniaturization
and extremely high reliability. The M.I.T. Instrumentation
Laboratories served as NASA's prime contractor for this project.
Twenty-two different component manufacturers participated in
the procurement process for the Apollo Guidance Computer.
Several of these firms worked with M.I.T.'s Instrumentation
Laboratories for seven or eight years, although their components
were never purchased by NASA. The firms remained potential
suppliers for such a long period of time because of the learning
experience generated by NASA's demanding technical specifica-
tions. While NASA's approach to component reliability did not
alter commercial production processes in the short run, over
the longer run firms did eventually redzsign production processes
and install new equipment in order to transfer space-defense
reliability methods to commercial production.
NASA's efforts to improve the reliability of MOS devices
illustrate the technological influence of space program demand
on the semiconductor industry. The NASA Microelectronics
Reliability Program was instituted to set criteria for the accept-
4
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ance of semiconductor devices and required NASA inspection
of the production facilities of serriiconductor suppliers. All
firms interested in supplying MOS devices to NASA had to
comply with the NASA Microelectronic Reliability Program
specifications. If a company was unable to meet the acceptance
criteria, NASA aided it in making the necessary changes to
meet reliability standards. Major integrated circuit suppliers,
such as Motorola, Fairchild, and Harris, participated in the
program and used NASA's technical assistance to improve their
processing capabilities (Denver Research Institute, 1972, pp. 153-
55; and interviews with executives of NASA, M.I.T.'s Instru-
mentation Laboratories, and semiconductor firms).
Space and defense demands also influenced technological
developments in the computer industry. Work on military and
NASA projects accelerated developments in two notable areas
of computer technology: (1) real-time operating systems and (2)
computer system reliability.
The first — and still most famous — real-time computer
system was the Air Force's SAGE. The system was set up to
protect the United States against a surprise air attack. The
SAGE system consisted of a network of radar-fed computers
that continuously analyzed every cubic foot of air space around
f the United States, instantly tracked all approaching aircraft, and
decided on an appropriate response. After seven years of develop-
ment work by M.I.T.'s Lincoln Laboratories, with the assistance
of IBM and Burroughs, the first of sixteen SAGE centers was
completed in 1958. The original computer programs for SAGE
i	 consumed eighteen hundred man-years of effort; the total
t	 system development cost has been placed at nearly $2 million.
!	 There is virtual unanimity throughout the data processing
community that all subsequent real-time computer systems owe a
f` great deal to SAGE. American Airlines implemented SABRE,
its $30 million real-time seat reservation system, in 1964. It is
unlikely that SABRE could have been developed at that early
date without the experience provided by SAGE.
In the mid-1960s space applications enabled computer manu-
facturers to further expand their real-time capabilities. Most of
the early computer operating systems, which are the set of
programs provided to the user by the computer manufacturer
for purposes of operating the system, were in a "batch" mode as
opposed to a "real-time" mode. For both IBM and Control Data
New Industries. Semiconductors and Computers • 7I
Corporation, it was NASA's demanding specifications that forced
them to advance their capabilities in providing "real time"
operating systems. In fact, IBM's first experience in developing
a real-time operating system was with NASA, and the technology
developed for that system soon became the industry standard.
Control Data Corporation's first real-time operating system was
also for NASA, at the agency's Langley Research Center. The
Langley center is Control Data Corporation's Iargest single
installation, and several features of NASA's Langley system have
becoone an integral part of the corporation's standardized real-
time operating system (interviews with executives at IBM, Control
Data Corporation, Univac, and several NASA computer centers).
Improved reliability of computer operations is a second area
where technological gains were accelerated by space and defense
demands. At IBM, Control Data Corporation, and Univac,
NASA's technical specifications prompted significant improve-
ments in the reliability of large computer systems. Indeed, IBM's
major involvement in the space program has been with the
computer complex at NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center in
Houston. This system collects, processes, and sends to Mission
Control the information needed to direct manned space missions,
such as Apollo and Skylab. The initial reliability specification for
this computer system was 41.7 hours of operation without a
major breakdown.
Originally the IBM system was unable to meet this specifica-
tion. Special teams of IBM production and test personnel were
assigned to work with NASA reliability specialists to correct the
problems. By paying extraordinary attention to every aspect of
reliability, these teams raised the reliability of the real-time
computer complex to a hundred hours of operation without a
catastrophic breakdown --- a level which was two and a half
times the initial speLi ications! These new reliability features
prompted and financed by NASA, were quickly incorporated
into IBM's commercial product line.
Manpower Impacts
Although economic and technological impacts have been the
dominant concern in most efforts to assess the influence of
government programs on industry, they do not fully cover the i
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range of possible impacts. Public programs also influence the
supply of manpower in industrial firms. These manpower
impacts occur in one or more of three ways:
(1) Direct supply:' A government program can be a direct
source of experienced manpower for companies in a
particular industry. Personnel may receive training and
operating experience in a government program and
eventually leave to join a private firm.
(2) Inte)firm mobility: If government demand enables new
firms to enter an industry, a high rate of interfirm mo-
bility may result as personnel leave established older
firms to join newer firms.
(3) Intrafirm mobility: A firm's work on a government pro-
gram may provide advanced training for its employees.
If the firm seeks to apply the expertise of these employees
to other government or commercial projects, a high rate
of intrafirm mobility may result.
In the electronics industry the manpower impacts of space
and defense demands have taken two of these forms. In semi-
conductors, the willingness of space-defense procurement officials
to purchase semiconductor devices from small new firms has
facilitated high interfirmn mobility. In contrast, the influence of
space and defense programs on computer industry manpower
has been to stimulate intrafirmn mobility. Large space and defense
computer systems have provided an important training ground
for project managers and engineers who later applied their
knowledge and experience to other large government and
commercial computer development projects which were awarded
to their firm.
Interfirm mobility in the semiconductor industry includes the
movement of personnel among existing firms as well as the
departure of engineers and managers from established firms to
set up their own companies. Bell Laboratories, Hughes, Phiico,
RCA, Sylvania, Texas Instruments, and Motorola have all
experienced the defection of key employees who set up new
firms. Fifteen separate new firms, which were formed between
1952 and 1967, can be traced back to Bell Laboratories. The
first new semiconductor firms formed by former Bell personnel
were Transitron in 1952 and Shockley Laboratories in 1955,
Fairchild Semiconductor, which spun off from Shockley
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Laboratories in 1955, had five direct and four indirect spinoffs
over the next twelve years (Figure 2.1).
Mobility among existing semiconductor firms dates back to
the movement of Bell Laboratories employees to Texas Instru-
ments and Sylvania during the early days of the industry's
development. During the 1960s, Fairchild was the focal point
of much industry mobility. A number of Fairchild executives
departed in 1967 to revitalize the National Semiconductor
Corporation, which had fallen on hard times. A year later
Fairchild recruited the general manager of Motorola's semi-
conductor division and a number of other Motorola executives
(Hoefler, 1968; "Fight That Fairchild Won," 1968, p. 106; and
Tilton, 1971, pp. 77-81).
Bell Laboratories has played an important role in the semi-
conductor industry's high rate of interfirm mobility. As the
research arm of AT&T. Bell Laboratories has contributed a
disproportionately large share of the major semiconductor
product and process innovations, Yet AT&T did not use its
strong patent position to prevent the entry of new firms into the
market, instead, the company adopted a liberal licensing policy
and expedited the transfer of technology in a number of ways.
It also established the precedent for the industry's tolerant
attitude regarding the departure of scientists and engineers to
either found new firms or accept positions in competing firms.
(Tilton, 1971, pp. 73-81, suggests that the government's
antitrust suit against AT&T was a major factor involved in the
company's decision to rapidly disseminate its new semiconductor
technology. As part of the 1956 Consent decree that culminated
lengthy antitrust litigation, AT&T surrendered the right to sell
semiconductors in the space and defense markets and to produce
for its own needs.)
In the computer industry there is substantial intrafirm
mobility in the form of project managers and engineers who move
from space-defense divisions to the commercial side of the
business. Alumni of IBM's NASA real-time computer complex
i	 have gone on to direct the development of major computer
1 systems for the Federal Aviation Administration, the Bank of
England, and New York City. At Univac, approximately two
hundred people per year are employed full time on NASA work.
Each year a number of these employees move to another area of
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the company; consequently Univac estimates that several
thousand of its current employees have previously worked on
some aspect of NASA systems. One specific example is the proj-
ect manager of a large computer network developed by Univac
for Bell Telephone who previously served as the firm's project
manager for NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. At Control
Data Corporation, several engineers who acquired real-time
simulation experience at NASA's Langley Research Center went
on to develop similar app `.?tions at Volkswagen and Grumman
Aircraft (interviews with ^_xccutives of the various firms pre-
viously mentioned).
Summary
Large government programs in defense and space have greatly
aided U.S. firms in their rise to a dominant position in the world
electronics industry. The most important impact of these federal
programs was the funding of research and development and the
initial demand they provided for computers and semiconductors
during the start-up years of both industries.
Direct and indirect financial support for research and develop-
ment by space and defense programs was an important influence
in the development of the semiconductor and computer industries.
Direct financial support for semiconductor research and develop-
ment totaled $66 million between 1955 and 1961. These govern-
ment grants helped semiconductor firms to greatly expand their
production capacity during this crucial six-year period. In
addition to this direct research and development funding, semi-
conductor firms received indirect federal research and develop-
ment support through subcontracting by weapons systems prime
contractors. The Defense Department estimates that the research
and development subcontracts awarded by its prime contractors
were more than equal to the direct research and development
expenditures. At the end of the I950s the total of direct and
indirect government-financed research and development was
approximately a quarter of total semiconductor industry expend-
itures for research and development.
Federal agencies, particularly the military services, provided
strong financial support for every major U.S. computer develop-
ment between 1945 and 1955. The Army supported the develop-
ment of ENIAC, the first electronic computer, for use in
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trajectory calculations. The major technological advances during
the first ten years of electronic computers were achieved as part
of the effort to develop large computers which met the specifica-
tions set by military and other government agencies. Most of
these advances were subsequently incorporated into the medium
and small-scale computers designed for the commercial market.
The large U . S. government outlays for computer development
during this period dwarf those of other countries, such as Great
Britain, and help account for the early dominance of U.S. firms
in the computer industry.
The second way in which federal space and defense programs
influenced the computer and semiconductor industries was by
generating huge markets for these products. Space and defense
demands were a major factor in the growth of the U . S. semi-
conductor industry, an industry where learning economies proved
essential. Learning economies have resulted in dramatic decreases
of semiconductor prices; the average price of an integrated
circuit dropped from 950 in 1962 to $0 . 63 in 1973. During the
early years of second- and third -generation component technology,
the space and defense markets provided a substantial part of the
sales volu ¢7ti which made these learning economies possible.
Space and defense demands accounted for at least 35 percent,
and as much as 45 percent, of semiconductor sales for each year
between 1955 and 1961, and over 70 percent of annual sales dur-
ing the last four years of integrated circuit production.
The market for military data processing systems had reached
the $200 million level before Remington Rand delivered the first
U N 1V AC computer for business data processing in 1954. The
space and defense markets accounted for more than 60 percent
of all computer sales during the industry 's first decade, and the
sales of commercial computers did not overtake space-defense
hardware sales until 1962.
As both the computer and semiconductor industries matured,
space and defense demands promoted competition among ex-
isting firms and aided the entry of new firms. The receptivity of
military agencies and NASA to the products of new semicon-
ductor companies enabled these companies to enter the market
easily. Several new companies used space and defense con-
tracts to establish their initial market position. The first sales for
Texas Instruments' silicon transistor and for Transitron 's gold-
bonded diodes were for use in military products.
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Control Data Corporation, a firm which was the third largest
)mputer manufacturer by 1965, depended exclusively on mili-
tary sales when it first entered the industry in 1957. Space-defense
business helped IBM's major competitors — particularly Univac,
Control Data Corporation, and Burroughs — to improve their
market position during the 1960s, By 1970, a fourth of all
UNIVAC computers were in either space or defense installations.
In addition to generating needed sales revenues for firms dur-
ing the early stages of growth, space and defense demands
accelerated the advance of semiconductor and computer technol-
ogy. The learning economies, which have been so significant in
the semiconductor industry, have not been an automatic by-
product of production. They have required deliberate planning.
The challenging performance and reliability specifications set by
the military agencies and NASA accelerated many of these
semiconductor learning economies. The space program's specifi-
cations for the integrated circuitry of the Apollo guidance
computer was a major impetus for improvements in the reliability
of third-generation component technology.
Space and defense demands also accelerated developments in
two other valuable areas of computer technology — real-time
operating systems and computer system reliability. The techniques
used in the earliest commercial real-time systems were derived
from SAGE, the Air Force's pioneering computer system. More
recently, the demanding specifications of NASA's computer
system caused both IBM and Control Data Corporation to
improve their real-time operating system capabilities. A prom-
inent example of' reliability improvements is the computer
complex which IBM installed at NASA's Manned Spacecraft
Center in Houston. Under the pressure of NASA requirements,
IBM improved -system reliability two and a half times initial
levels, these reliability improvements were subsequently incor-
porated throughout IBM's 360 product line.
Finally, space and defense demands have facilitated the
development and mobility of professional manpower in the
computer and semiconductor industries. The willingness of space-
defense procurement officials to purchase semiconductor devices
from small new firms often stimulated engineers and managers
from established companies to set LIP their own firm,. The
number of new semiconductor firms which emerged was very
large, Bell Laboratories alone was the direct and indirect source
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for fifteen new firms formed between 1952 and 1967. The impact
of space and defense programs on computer industry manpower
has been to stimulate intrafirm as opposed to intrrfirm mobility.
In the major computer firms, space and defense projects served
as an important training ground for project engineers and
managers who were later able to transfer these skills to
commercial projects.
The significance of space and defense demands for the U.S.
electronics industry can only be perceived by reviewing each
type of impact — economic, technological, and manpower. The
government's early research and development support, its as-
sured demand during start-up periods, its encouragement of
competition, its acceleration of technological progress, and
its facilitating professional mobility are the separate impacts
which together helped place U.S. firms in a position of world
leadership in the electronics industry.
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Chapter Three
Transformation of a Science:
NASA's Impact on Astronomy
ppECEDFNG PAGE BLANK NOT EU=
In the years since the end of World War 1I, astronomy has
experienced a period of discovery unmatched since Galileo first
turned his simple astronomical telescope toward the sky. During
its short lifetime, NASA has contributed the means by which
astronomers have made some notable discoveries, and the agency's
continuing contribution promises more advances for astronomy
in the future. Equally as meaningful as its contributions to the
development of the science have been NASA's effects upon the
structure and organization of the astronomical community.
In the 1950s, radio astronomers began to reveal a startling
new and different universe from the one seen by visible light.
With their new ground-based instruments, they discovered radio
galaxies more than a million times brighter than our own; they
found the faint, attenuated radiation of the great fireball from
which the universe was born; they traced the grand spiral
pattern of the Milky Way, obscured to optical telescopes by
dust; they identified clouds of complex interstellar molecules. To
their amazement, they found mysterious quasars (celestial bodies)
that may be far enough away to be galaxies but behave like
stars — and the strangeness of quasars is matched by pulsars,
believed to be small, super-dense concentrations of matter, as
massive as the sun but only miles in diameter, spinning from
one to thirty times a second.
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Even as these discoveries were changing our view of the uni- 	 d
verse, space observations of high-energy radiation revealed more
unexpected phenomena. Since the mid-1960s, space instruments
have allowed astronomers to observe explosive, hot events in a
universe of cosmic violence and exploding galaxies, filled with
omnipresent high-energy particles and twisting magnetic fields.
The observations even suggest such peculiarities as "black holes,"
stars in a state of relativistic collapse from which no light or
radiation of any kind can escape.
With the entire electromagnetic spectrum opened to observa-
tion over the past decade, astronomy has entered what has been
widely recognized in the science as a new golden age. The
National Science Board assured Congress in its 1970 report that
"the rapid pace of discovery in astronomy and astrophysics dur-
ing the last few years has given this field an excitement unsur-
passed in any other area of the physical sciences" (National
Academy of Sciences, vol. 1, 1972, p. 55).
Scientists realize that NASA has contributed to the exciting
discoveries in astronomy; NASA's financing has provided the
resources that have made the golden age more than just a
metaphorical term. However, NASA was not the initiating agency
in radio astronomy, and its support of radio observations has
been modest. Not until the 1960s, when rockets and satellites
allowed observations from above the earth's atmosphere, did
NASA add its own large and unique contributions to astronom-
ical discoveries. Its technology affected astronomy far more than
did that of radio observations, for NASA's contributions were
much more extensive and complex. In developing that technology,
NASA began to transform the science through the vast and
varied demands it had to make upon a small scientific community;
the resources it made available to meet these demands loomed
immense beside those that astronomers previously had available.
Through NASA's programs scientists were encouraged to
resurrect moribund subfields of astronomy grown old from lack
of new data. With NASA support scientists were able to dis-
cover new, previously unknown phenomena that required new
kinds of expertise and analysis; NASA's comprehensive and
widespread encouragement of space-related sciences enhanced the
quality and productivity of active subfields. The demands of
space technologies changed the very nature of large parts of
astronomy, fractionating it into well-defined specialties even as
E
Transformation of a Science: Astronomy
	
e	 $3
it integrated other specialties into new groupings. Most strikingly
it created -- or is creating — out of a small, university-bound
science, a Big Science, with all of the problems of manpower,
organization, and public policy that such a development entails.
Astronomy before NASA
Until recently astronomers have numbered their membership
in the hundreds; not until the late 1960s could they count them-
selves by the thousands (National Academy of Sciences, vol. 2,
1972, pp. 334-35). Thus astronomy has indeed been a small,
slowly growing science. One indication of that growth is the
4.5 percent annual increase of American membership in the
International Astronomical Union for the years 1923 to 1955;
after 1955 into the 1960s growth jumped to 8 percent a year.
Another indicator of both the small size and slow growth of
the astronomical community in the past is the number of
doctorates awarded annually in astronomy. In the I920s univer-
sities produced fewer than ten a year, increasing through the 1950s
at a rate of only 3.8 percent a year. The total number of
doctorates (in astronomy) awarded annually was smaller than
those in physics, with the growth rate hardly more than half as
large (National Academy of Sciences and National Research
Council, 1964, pp. 30, 31).
The number of astronomers was small because there were not
sufficient funds to support them, and few facilities with large
telescopes were available for advanced observation and study.
Until I950 Americans had built only thirteen optical telescopes
with apertures equal to or larger than 36 inches. Six of these
had been built before 1920, three of them before the turn of the
century! In the I950s another six were completed. The
opportunity for the science to absorb a sizable number of
optical astronomers did not exist until the 1960s when 28 new
instruments (36 or more inches) were built, increasing the
number by almost one and a half times. A dozen more instru-
ments of comparable size were to be installed in 1975 (National
Academy of Sciences, vol. 2, 1972, pp. 388-93, in which the
authors warn that the list was only "reasonably accurate as of
September 1971; but since additions and modifications occur
frequently, some inaccuracies are bound to be present").
Before the mid-1950s only a few astronomers had any but
limited access to large instruments. The three or four institutions
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that controlled the big telescopes, sixty inches or larger, dominated
the field in every way until recently. As a consequence,
astronomers were described by an informed observer (in Metz,
1973, p. 247) as
. a small number of men [and women] largely isolated
from the rest of science, who were supported for the most
part by priratc: funds and were comfortable with projects
that spanned decades. The profession has alwa ys been
a consortium of colorful individuals, i communit y with a
tradition of sharp. sustained, and at times personal
debates. . . . [W]ith typical measured pace, the deans of
astronomy discarded their 19th-century style of doing
science.
Astronomy in the nineteenth century and in the first halt of
the twentieth century remained a purely observational science
with few observing instruments. Astronomers did not design
experiments as ph ysicists might; nor did they manipulate samples
as chemists do. They were seldom encouraged to consider
improvements in instruments, first, funds were too limited to
conduct such work, and second, most astronomers enjoyed only
limited access in working with a major telescope. Furthermore,
the number of astronomers was so small and the problems so
many that these persons could specialize in an area of research
with little likelihood that another would encroach upon or
compete with them. They could easily keep busy and productive
using the available, familiar techniques and the instruments
provided them. They were not pushed to seek new approaches
to their research, and their penury persuaded them that their
wisest course was to exploit to the fullest the tools at hand. As
late as 1964 astronomers complained that so few major optical
telescopes were available "that no more than two or three
astronomers in the entire world now have the opportunity to
work on the most exciting problems in a given field" (National
Academy of Sciences and National Research Council, 1964, p. 16).
Such circumstances kept astronomy a small science and almost
guaranteed that it would lag in adapting technology developed
elsewhere.
An example of American astronomers' lagging response to
technological advance is the case of radio astronomy. Until the
1940s, astronomers contented themselves with a technology that
was limited to photographic. simple photoelectric, bolometric.
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and low- or high-resolution spectroscopic measures of photons
in one octave of the electromagnetic spectra, the optical "window"
in the earth's atmosphere. Meanwhile electronic discoveries and
advances had made new kinds of detectors possible, but only
for those with adequate funding and acquaintance in the new
technologies.
The panel on radio distronomy in the 1973 Greenstein report
(National Academy of Sciences, 1972, vol. 2, p. 22) asserts that
the science of radio observations "had its origins in the univer-
sities"; the originators were not astronomers, however. University
astronomers became interested in the new techniques only after
electrical engineers and physicists began to explore radio astron-
omy's potential. In addition, radio observations became a part
of astronomy as scientists from other fields moved into astronomy
and students enlarged their training to include study of the radio
branch of science.
Karl G. Jansky, of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, in 193I
first discovered — with primitive instruments --- that radio waves
from extraterrestrial sources could be detected. In the late 1930s
{ a radio amateur, Grote Leber, constructed a 32-foot paraboloid
that he set up in his back yard in Wheaton, Illinois; with it
he was able to trace a rough map of the sky's radio contours.
By the end of World War II, radio technology had devf.loped
to a sophisticated level, and many able people had become
familiar with it. Talented European and Australian scientists
{	 were particularly innovative in adapting the wartime electronic
1 developments for use in radio astronomy. They soon discovered
discrete radio sources and other phenomena that encouraged
them to build large radio telescopes and antenna arrays.
In the early 1950s, the Naval Research Laboratory began
a modest radio astronomy project, building the first fifty-foot
parabolic antenna. Cornell and Harvard universities soon followed.
In 1951, Harvard researchers detected a 2I-centimeter radiation
of hydrogen, and in 1953 the university graduated its first
doctoral student in radio astronomy (National Academy of
Sciences and National Research Council, 1964, p. 5).
The major impetus for the new branch of astronomy,
certainly for the early experimentation and development, came
from outside the small, well-established core of scientists who
i	 made up the astronomical community. An eminent radio
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astronomer, whose training was in electrical engineering,
explained in an interview with we author: "We knew the
technology and wanted to see what could be done with it."
But astronomers, he found, "looked down on it. They were not
particularly familiar with it"; and because at first it did not
appear that it would tell them more "about stellar activity or the
galaxies than they already knew, they weren't interested in
developing it." And he added, "They probably weren't capable
of developing it in any case. The concepts [i.e., the electronic
technologies] were foreign to them."
The radio astronomers were scientists who knew about the
instruments and understood engineering. They worked closely
with electronics experts in government and industry who were
pushing the development of the new technology. Much more so
than the optical astronomers, radio astronomers were a part of
the technological complex that developed in the 1950s. By the
end of that decade, the government turned to them for help. When
ins*ruments were needed to track the first Russian Sputniks,
the "dishes" and equipment of the radio astronomers could be —
and were — copied.
The development of radio astronomy needed more than
trained, able manpower and a promising technology — it
needed funding. The success of the radio astronomers depended
upon the willingness of the Defense Department, particularly
the Navy and Air Force, in the 1950s to support the expensive
installations.
The Armed Services also invested considerable sums in uni-
versity-managed and -manned optical installations, making
possible research activities and the acquisition of equipment and
buildings that astronomy departments had never before been
able to consider. An example is a contract granted by the Air
Force in 1952 to the Yerkes Observatory for studies of upper
atmosphere phenomena such as air glow and auroras. Although
the dollar amount of the contract was less than half a million
dollars, it was larger than all the rest of the observatory's
budget combined. With the appearance of such resources,
astronomers could begin investing in new and advanced equip-
ment and take advantage of new technologies.
Through the early and mid-1950s, a variety of government
agencies — the Office of Naval Research, the Smithsonian
Astrophysical Observatory, the Air Force, and the National
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Science Foundation --- began to fund astronomical research and
new ground-based instruments, both optical and radio, on a
scale that was sure to create profound changes in the science. The
most significant investment was in the Kitt Peak National
Observatory, a large public facility with six major optical
telescopes, the largest of which is 158 inches, completed in 1973
(National Academy of Sciences, vol. 2, 1972, pp. 388-93, with the
same caution as that expressed earlier by these authors).
Government funding for "space" experiments was limited
throughout the 1950s. Those carried out had only small rockets
or high-altitude balloons to carry experimental packages to the
edge of the atmosphere. The Navy and the Air Force were the
largest supporters of the space research that was conducted. The
number of interested scientists was small. A few were persuaded
that astronomers needed to Consider further ways and means of
observing from space. As early as 1940, Dr. Lyman Spitzer
of Princeton pointed out the advantages of an optical telescope
in space; and in I957 Dr. Lloyd Berkner, a geophysicist, called
upon astronomers to respond with experiments for space and
suggestions on how the science should proceed to use space.
NAS,et's Missions and Their Effects on Astronomy
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Many astronomers, like many scientists, were skeptical that
NASA had much to offer them. After Sputnik, the Air Force had
urged that the United States develop a manned satellite, and
the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (the agency
to which NASA was successor in 1958) had gone to work on its
own designs for a manned space capsule. In the public and con-
gressional debate preceding enactment of the Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, the merits of some kind of manned space
program won official approval. President Eisenhower assigned
specific responsibility for developing and carrying out a manned
venture into space to NASA. It proceeded with Project Mercury.
The Space Art required that NASA contribute materially to
one or more objectives, the first of which was "the expansion
of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space."
The third objective, "the development and operation of vehicles
capable of carrying instruments, equipment, supplies, and living
organisms through space," seemed likely to eclipse the first. The
large engineering effort required for manned flight and the
massive technology that had to be mobilized for it distressed
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many scientists. Such leading scientific spokesmen as Vannevar
Bush, James R. Killian, and George B. Kistiakowsky had made
clear their opposition to manned space flight. Its special, complex
demands and enormous costs, they argued, would of necessity
push other scientific interests and purposes aside. They doubted
that manned space flight would gain enough additional advantages
over unmanned space flight to justify its far greater expense.
Jerome B. Wiesner, who became special assistant for science
and technology to President Kennedy, also opposed the manned
space program. In a report to the President-elect in early 1961,
he and the advisory committee which he headed recommended
a lower priority than had been given by the outgoing admini-
stration to Project Mercury. It remains unclear whether Wiesner
and his committee had enough faith that "space" is a realm in
which many scientific achievements could be expected. Neverthe-
less, they recommended that it be presented to the public only
for its "cultural, public service, and military importance"
(Swenson, Grimwood, and .Alexander, 1966, p. 305). Unmentioned
were any scientific benefits that might recommend it to taxpayers
and voters.
The President did not follow the recommendations of his
science advisers. First, shortly after his inauguration, he chose
James E. Webb (an experienced government administrator and
business executive, but not a scientist) as the new administrator
of NASA. Some critics argued that Webb lacked the technical
background that would attract scientists and qualified engineers
to work for NASA. The critics were wrong; but Webb's appoint-
ment made clear that NASA's mission was not just scientific
explorations. Second, in May 1961, President Kennedy directed
the attention of NASA, and the nation, toward a great techno-
logical fc..t — to land a man on the moon within a decade and
return him safely to earth. As Swenson, Grimwood, and
Alexander (1966, p. 363) comment, "So impressive and dramatic
an enterprise was Apollo, so full of engineering and gadgetry,
that `he project seemed made to order for a new American
destiny." It was not the kind of project that was apt to reassure
many astronomers that they had a part to play and a place
to fill in it.
Not a few scientists, astronomers included, were concerned
about whether NASA could be a reliable supporter of science
when committed to so huge an engineering task. They feared
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that the production demands and technical considerations would
come first, whipsawing the scientists, shortchanging their interests,
and neglecting their needs in times of crisis. Their view was well
expressed by Dr. Gordon J. MacDonald in testimony before
the Senate's Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences
(U.S. Congress, Senate, 1968, p. 752): "The size and scope of the
U.S. space program was not determined by scientific re(luirements
but by the implicit recognition that a nation's power and vitality
are measured by its technological achievements."
Webb never forgot that Congress had charged NASA with
the responsibility to advance space science. He worked hard to
persuade scientists, and particularly astronomers, to help him and
NASA's staff to develop a scientific program that lay within
the jurisdiction that Congress had assigned to NASA; he wanted
a program that would be of value to them and also to the nation.
At a 1967 meeting, he reminded astronomers who still expressed
doubts about NASA's intentions that he could not give them
everything or anything they wanted. Congress had several
objectives to pursue through NASA, he said, not simply the
enchantment of science.
"While we are here to push science," he told the astronomers,
"we are not limited to science. We want this new [space] technol-
ogy to be available to any and all who can use it" from author's
research notes). He reminded them that they must consider the
second- and third-order benefits as well as the first-order benefits
"in all our missions." And he expressed his concern about the
role of astronomers by adding: "I have never thought of ... [the
astronomical experiments] as a piggyback. But ... [they are] in a
way piggyback to the United States' uses and purposes of the
whole space program. The astronomical community is a piggy-
back mission in our use of these , •ehicles for the benefit of the
whole country."
Skeptical that NASA's managers were truly interested in
astronomy, doubtful that the gigantic space agency would serve
the science, and seeing valuable but marginal benefits from space
observations, the astronomical community approached the
opportunities for space exploration less than enthusiastically. In
a major report to the National Academy of Sciences and the
National Research Council in 1964, the panel on Astronomical
Facilities, with Dr. A. E. Whitford as chairman, considered only
the need for ground-based instruments and research. While the
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panel recognized that the high-energy radiations only recently
observed in space raised fundamental questions, it assured its
audience that "progress will be made [in providing answers] by
clever and aggressive use of telescopes of the largest size, equipped
with detectors such as radio receivers, spectrographs, photometers,
and photographic plates" (National Academy of Science and
National Research Council, 1964, p. 3). Space observations,
clearly, were to play a secondary, though complementary role, to
the optical telescope. Space astronomy would contribute only
"certain key data, inaccessible from the earth." Plainly, the
report was greatly influenced by the older core of astronomers
familiar with and comfortable in using optical telescopes and
photographic plates for observing. Not until the Greenstein report
of 1972 did the astronomical community give full recognition
to the unique role observations in space can play in advancing
the science.
Resurrection of Old Astronomical Fields
Those who most easily and readily identify themselves as
astronomers are scientists who specialize in stellar phenomena.
The early space experiments did not contribute much to their
research, and probable future experiments did not appear to
promise more than a useful complement to data gathered through
ground-based instruments. Thus many of these prestigious astron-
omers had some reason to believe that the costs of involving
themselves in space projects might be greater than the benefits.
Other astronomers, in lower status astronomical fields, discovered
that space experimentation and space projects offered them
immediate and enticii,g rewards. Those in two very small,
almost moribund fields — celestial mechanics and geodesy (the
study of the size and shape of the earth) ----- were among the first
to benefit from space explorations. Any planned useful activity
in space required of those involved a thorough knowledge of the
physical characteristics of the environment. The shape, size, and
curvature of the earth had to be known more accurately than
in earlier times, for they affected orbits of satellites; success in
monitoring, and certainly in guiding, a satellite or recovering it
required an ability to predict its location at all times with a
very narrow range of error. To fulfill most of its objectives in
space, the space agency needed more and better services from
1
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experts in geodesy and celestial mechanics than had ever before
been rendered.
The second American satellite, Vanguard 1, launched in
March 1959, proved the usefulness of space experiments to
geodesists. Study of its orbits indicated that the earth is slightly
pear-shaped, bulging in the aqueous southern hemisphere to a
degree unsuspected before. Through triangulation measurements
of satellites' location from earth, one could refine and check
surface surveys; by measuring perturbations or satellite orbits
geodesists were able to map the zonal harmonics of the earth's
gravitational field and thus reveal its bulges and other anomalies.
Geophysicists also learned much about the upper atmosphere
previously unknown; for example, atmospheric density proved
greater, by a factor of 5, than previously assumed, and the
atmosphere was fcAund to bulge on the side of the earth facing
the sun. In general there exists a correlation between solar
activity and atmospheric densit y
 at high altitudes.
The military services were exceedingly interested in the ad-
vances of geodesy, since accurate maps are essential in the effec-
tive use of many weapons. The Air Force has been particularly
interested in being able to locate any given spot on earth, for
such a capability would allow it to direct its missiles with more
devastating accuracy. One leading astronomer asserted that
geophysicists can presently locate surface features with an
accuracy of ten centimeters and are developing measurements as
accurate as one centimeter.
{ The various constraints on possible flight paths and the
interaction between flight paths and mission objectives require
space systems analysts to be well versed in celestial mechanics
as well as engineering. Those responsible for space flights have
to have precise descriptions of spacecraft motions in various
situations in order ',,, plan and manage missions. Scientists were
asked to devise new fools of analysis to deal with the new data
that were collected. For example, the use of two-way Doppler
measurements of ihifts in radio signals retransmitted by space-
crafts to earth allowed a more accurate calculation of orbits
than had ever been possible before. New methods of analysis
were also required to meet the needs of new applications. If
scientists were to interpret photographs of the moon and planets
'	 from orbiting spacecraft and if they were to be able to
li
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measure surface features accurately, precise knowledge of orbits
had to be assured.
The number of astronomers specializing in celestial mechanics
and astrometry has remained small, probably about 6 to 7 per-
cent of all astronomers. Nearly two-thirds are in universities,
equally divided between teaching and research. Most of the
remainder are employed by the federal government. Not many of
the scientists interested in geodesy resided or worked in univer-
sities. Government agencies, including the Defense Department,
have long provided the major support for and employment to
most of those who worked in this area.
The new and added demands for advanced techniques and
inventive application required additional trained people, for the
number of specialists before the late 1950s had been extremely
small. The universities did not greatly add to their staffs;
and astronomers hardly considered the revitalization of geodesy
as a major contribution to their science. Although they had once
been closely identified with geodosy, most astronomers probably
consider it to be a subdivision either of' engineering or of
geophysics.
Space explorations resurrected another group of studies,
clearly astronomical, that had languished for years. In the last
#y	decade it has provided major fields of scientific research and
?	 experimentation in astronomy. By the 1920s astronomers inereas-
'	 ingly turned their attention away from lunar and planetary study.1
4	 Some techniques even then available were left unexploited and
7 unused. With Iittle additional information available then or in the
foreseeable future, lunar and planetary studies withered. Solar
studies continued, but the difficulty of observing the sun through
an obscuring atmosphere greatly hindered research. One astron-
omer estimates that probably no more than 2 percent of
astronomer.. in 1958 were interested in planetary studies.
One of the first questions to be answered by space experiments
was the number of meteoroids in space and thus the degree
of danger to satellites and men in spacecrafts. The number of
objects capable of causing serious damage was far less than
the worst predictions made by scientists. Later, longer missions
allowed scientists their first close look at the moon. The
detailed pictures of the surface by the Ranger and Lunar Orbiter
satellites and Surveyor landers gave scientists an extraordinary
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flood of data about the earth's nearest neighbor. One astronomer
deeply involved in planetary studies described to the author in
an interview how he feels about the situation ,
 ""There has been
a revolution in planetology due to NASA's contribution. We
now have a separate division of the American Astronomical
Society that is concerned with planetary science. Four or
five years ago, it amounted to almost nothing — few papers to
present. In our most recent meeting we had lots of papers. It
is a real revolution with lots of research and all kinds of
astronomers interested. . . . For a long time astronomers
ignored the planets. With what information we had there weren't
many difficult problems to solve. Study of the planets was a
game that second-rate astronomers played in."
The judgment may be too harsh since some able astronomers
had involved themselves in the study of the planets; but clearly,
the new information gathered through space missions provided
greater opportunity for scientific development than ever before.
Another leading astronomer pointed out that the extensive
lunar experiments of the Apollo program, and those that have
allowed more limited space probes of the surfaces of Mars, Venus,
Jupiter, and Mercury, have provided enough information to make
planetology a full-fledged, complex fiel i in its own right.
Moreover, scientists can engage themselves in studies of the
planets, They provide a tool for identifying common features
among the planets, and assisting in tests of causal relationships.
The observations to date have allowed astronomers to answer
a number of first-order questions such as: Are the far and near
sides of the moon the same or different? Do the planets have
atmosphere? Scientists can proceed to sccond- and third-order
questions that ask about the composition of the atmosphere
and the geographic, geologic, and chemical differences among the
planets. It is increasingly clear that the physical structure of the
moon and of Mars and Mercury are somewhat different from
that of the earth. When astronomers more fully understand
the causes of the differences and have mapped the surface
of Venus and probed its hot, dense atmosphere, they may hold
the key to an understanding of the origin of the solar system.
More directly relevant to issues that affect our daily lives,
astronomers may be able to contribute valuably to knowledge
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about the earth. They should soon be helping geologists explain
how and why mineral deposits form, forecast earthquakes, and
comprehend the processes of mountain building and continental
movement, The enlivening of lunar and planetary studies will then
be judged as much more than merely the refurbishing of some
old branches of astronomy; it will also be a practical step
toward improving our living conditions on earth.
To date NASA has accomplished much more than simply
bringing fresh breaths of information and data into the moribund
studies of the moon. It has also transformed the style of the
science and the activity of the scientists. They no longer need
merely ohserve the moon, for the astronauts brought back
samples of rock and soil to examine and with which to experi-
ment; they also set up sensor instrument arrays — for example,
seismic recorders --- from which information is still being
received. Lunar astronomy and planetary astronomy for the
first time are becoming experimelrtal sciences.
Observation of the sun from space has proved to be as
rewarding as astronomers interested in solar radiation had
expected, opening the field of solar studies to new and exciting
development. Although the links between solar radiation and
meteorological phenomena are not clearly known, scientists are
beginning to investigate possible interactions. They hope to be
able to improve prediction of the effects of solar activity on
radio communications. The Skylab studies produced a flood of
data, indicating that the sun's corona is much more dynamic
than earth-bound observations had led scientists to believe;
furthermore, flares, solar prominences, and other short-lived
solar events are more common and diverse than expected. What
has seemed from earth to be minor happenings on the sun can
be major events when seen from space in full spectrum. Years of
former ground-based data on solar activity may be recalibrated
to be made more useful in explaining the sun's behavior.
The enlivened branches of astronomy — lunar, planetary,
and solar — are uniquely dependent upon space observation.
The scientists who have specialized in them need satellites and
orbiting laboratories to carry out their research. Only NASA
possesses the capability that allows such research to proceed; it is
not surprising therefore that NASA supports 70 to 80 percent
of all planetary research.
i
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The Revelation Qj, et: NASA's Creation
of New Astronomical Fields
Among the exciting and unexpected consequences of' space
exploration, which could hardly have been guessed beforehand,
has been the discovery of new objects and phenomena in the
solar system, the galaxy, and beyond. Dr. Jesse Greenstein
has written that since the recent discoveries have been made in the
hitherto hidden ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum, "it [is]
clear that the astronomical universe was in many ways still
largely unexplored" (National Academy of Sciences, vol. 2, 1972,
p, xiv). And Drs. Franco Pacini and M. J. Rees (1973. pp. 98-
105) point out that
... the universe revealed by astronomy over the past three
centuries has been a calm one, except for the occasional
flare-up of a nova. This view has been shattered by the
discovery of phenomena that involve rapid and violent
changes. (Emphasis added.)
Space experiments that revealed the universe of high-energy
radiation in all its magnificence did not receive immediate and
large support by NASA. Both scientists and the managers of
the manned space program were primarily interested in the
conditions of space around the earth and moon. It is not
k
	
	 surprising that experiments designed to test theories about the
space environment, through which satellite and spacecraft would
i	 soon fly, took priority over speculative probes looking for
unknown, possibly unimportant, phenomena.
1 The first American satellite, Explorer 1, in 1958 revealed a
deep zone of radiation girdling the earth. It was named the Van
Allen Belt, after the principal investigator whose experiment had
recorded the phenomenon. Later probes and observations by
satellites provided detailed descriptions of the earth's magneto-
sphere that produces the radiation belts and of their complex
interactions with the solar wind.
The early discoveries led to the development, in the early
1960s, of a new astronomical specialty: particles and fields. This
specialty is concerned with the properties of atoms, nuclei, and
} electrons (particles), and electrical and magnetic fields that are
present in space. This new field of research is important to
astronomy for it allows what is still rare in the science, "the
possibility of measuring directly, in situ, many of the most
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important astrophysical processes difficult to study experimentally
on the ground (National Academy of Sciences, vol. 2, 1972,
p. 122). Before this field was opened for study some astronomers
doubted the existence of the solar wind, the lower levels of the
cosmic-ray nucleon spectrum was unknown, and the cosmic-
ray electrons had not been discovered.
The new studies of particles and fields have contributed
greatly to astronomers' understanding of stellar processes, but
they promise as well to help scientists analyze the nature of
laboratory plasmas and to provide valuable clues in attempts
to produce controlled thermonuclear fusion. In the case of
particles and fields, the technological needs of space exploration,
manned or unmanned, and the interests of astronomers con-
verged; both benefited, and from the knowledge they gained.
the general public may reap rewards as well.
Space, or at least very high-altitude, observation has allowed
scientists greatly extended study of infrared and ultraviolet
radiation, both supplementing and improving data provided by
ground-based instruments. Atmospheric water vapor absorbs
infrared wavelength radiation in the 25 to 300 ju, the middle
and shorter ranges; yet the most powerful discrete sources of
electromagnetic radiation in the universe and in our own galaxy
emit the bulk of their energy in these ranges. Some of the objects
emit more energy in the infrared than in all other waveleng! h
regions combined. These unexpected and still unexplained results
deserve and are receiving close attention from astronomers; and
NASA has provided strong support for the study of and
research into infrared radiation.
The Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-2 (PAS-2) opened a
new era in stellar-space astronomy, allowing for better viewing
of ultraviolet radiation than that attained through the Aerobee-Hi
sounding rockets. One of the most important astronomical
discoveries was that of molecular hydrogen in interstellar space.
The observations indicate that some stars lose substantial mass
as gases steam away from them at escape velocities, appreciably
modifying the surrounding medium.
It is the space observations of high-energy radiation. X rays
and gamma rays, however, that promise the greatest change in
astronomical theory and the deepest understanding of the uni-
verse. What that change may be and what its effects may be
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upon astronomy, physics, and other sciences and the lives of
Americans cannot now be predicted. A prominent scientist, Dr.
Freeman Dyson of the Institute of Advanced Studies, commented
(Met/, March 16, 1973, p. 1 l 14) that to ask what effects the nes%'
discoveries will have is like
. . . asking Galileo, one year after he first turned his
telescope on Jupiter, what would be the future of astron-
omy. This work is by far the most exciting thing to come
out of the space program, scientifically speaking. We
have found a whole menagerie of X-ray objects, perhaps
10 or 12 different classes. . . . For the firs' time since
Einstein, people are truly making progress in understanding
what his equations say.
Another scientist also expressed himself with superlatives when
describing the finding of the investigators whose X-ray experi-
ments were first carried on satellites (Metz, March 2. 1973, p. 884):
"They have had a greater influence on astronomy in the first
few years than the 200-inch telescope on Mt. Palomar did."
Ricardo Giacconi and Herbert Gursky first proposed an
experiment to look for X rays reflected from the moon. Whether
they were truly interested in reflections that would have been
very weak at best, or whether they offered that objective as a
way of looking for X-ray objects elsewhere is not clear. Such
data as were available to NASA officials and their scientific
advisory panels did not recommend the experiment as a fruitful
one. The advisers and officials ma y also have been a bit more
cautious in this case since Giacconi was not a university
researcher but, rather, was employed by a private laboratory.
When Giacconi's experiment was at length approved and flown
in 1962, the detectors mounted on a sounding rocket did dis-
cover some remarkable X-ray sources in the regions of Scorpius
and Cygnus, Other rocket-borne experiments continued over
succeeding years. HwAc%er, in the first half of the 1960s, the
accLrnuhaed observing time of X-ray sources by all the rockets
flown totaled only about one hour. Not until the Small
Astronomical Satellite-A, usually known as Uhuru, was flown in
1970 did astronomers realize the promise of X-ray observations.
The powerful X-ray emitter Cygnus X-I was quickly identified,
and by I973, 125 separate sources had been found. A number of
the sources were found to be orbiting other stars, and some were
li
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found to be of an unusual nature, such as the X-ray pulsars
that are gaining energy. Other objects such as Cygnus X-1 may
be the hard-to-believe stars, "black holes," that do not emit
radiation.
After Uhuru's launching. another satellite, an Orbiting Astro-
nomical Observatory (OAO). joined it. The OAO has been
making successful observations of X-ray sources, too. The two
satellites have provided astronomers with some of the most
remarkable discoveries to date from the space program. Con-
tinued observation of this totally new and significant branch of
astronomy is completel y dependent upon a space program. Only
an organization that can provide the capability to build, launch,
and monitor satellites offers the means to maintain it.
E A high-priority program in NASA and for astronomers is the
launching of high-energy astronomical observatories (HEAOs).
These satellites will he designed to detect X rays and other high-
energy radiation: they are especially equipped to discover faint
X-ray sources and to measure their characteristics. In its 1973
report to Philip Handler, president of the National Academy of
Sciences, the Astronomy Survey Committee (National Academy
of Sciences, 1972, vol. 1, p. 98) noted that
a measure of the importance attached to X-ray astron-
omy by astronomers is that they have scheduled large
blocks of time on major optical instruments to exploit
the discoveries and positional measurements of new X-ray
'	 sources by the Uhuru X-ray satellite,1
The committee implicitly recognizes that the creation of a neNv,
i	 exciting field of astronomy is going to affect not only theories
and ideas, but also the operations, organizational structures.
and scientific relationships in astronomy. Old and new fields -
old and new observing techniques as well as old and new skills
must work together as never before.
The S ynergistic Effect: NASA's Contribution tU
Optical and Radio Astrono Y
Space exploration is changing the style and organization of
astronomy because the nev, modes of observation complement
and supplement ground-based observation in complex ways that
can enhance the effectiveness of' bath. There is little doubt that
optical observation will remain central to ' s science. Optical
instruments provide abundant basic information about stellar
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objects, offer greater resolution than either radio or high-energy
detectors, and are more flexible, convenient, and available.
Astronomers can also carry out ground-based observations at far
lower cost than space observations. A major offsetting factor is
that space observations offer unique opportunities to detect a
wide range of phenomena. Astronomers must therefore work out
the tradeoffs between the two observational modes — the one
unique and costly, the other flexible and cheap.
The Astronomy Survey Committee (National Academy of
Sciences, 1972, vol. 1, pp. 87-88) recognizes that
... the spacecraft will play an essential role in the future
of astronomy. X-ray astronomy will increasingly become
a partner to optical and radio astronomy as more X-ray
sources are identified and their properties are correlated
with those of other wavelength bands.
Each will provide astronomers with information and data that
will enlarge the meaning of the other. For the same reason,
astronomers have recommended a large optical telescope in
space — from sixty to 120 inches in diameter, depending on
available funds. Such an instrument, above the atmosphere,
could detect radiation through the entire ultraviolet and infrared
range not accessible from the ground, as well as visible light.
It would also offer a five-magnitude gain in sensitivity over
ground-based instruments of comparable aperture and a good
deal more observing time. Although it is expensive to operate,
careful, selective use of such an instrument would return benefits
similar in magnitude to those of HEAOs, revealing special
events to be examined in other detail by ground-based
instruments, or analyzing special phenomena beyond the limits
of ground-based observation.
Two minor examples illustrate how space observations can
enhance ground-based studies. During the voyage of Mariner 9
to Mars, ground-based astronomers kept a close watch on the
planet. Before the spacecraft reached Mars, a trip of several
months, those monitoring it from earth discovered a fierce
dust storm that entirely enveloped Mars, obscuring its surface.
Had the ground-based spacecraft experimenters watching the
televised pictures of the planet not known that a dust storm was
in progress, the information could -not have been as easily
interpreted.
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R. M. HjeIlming, a member of the staff of the National
Radio Astronomy Observatory, reported another example. Space
observers discovered a powerful X-ray source, Cygnus X-3, in
1966. Later ground-based radio observations showed that the
source produced outbursts from time to time; an analysis of
X-ray observations of the source by the satellite Uhuru revealed
that the source emitted a double X-ray flux at a time when no
radio data were taken. The X rays also normally varied regularly
in a matter of hours, suggesting a double star. In early September
1972, certain radio astronomers in Canada and the United States
discovered that Cygnus X-3 appeared to be one of the strongest
point sources in the radio sky. Suspecting an event worth
observing in all possible spectra, the astronomers notified radio
astronomers round the world who tuned in at various different
frequencies. At Mt. Palomar, astronomers began observing
the source in early October with the 48-inch Schmidt camera and
the two hundred-inch telescope at optical wavelengths, including
infrared. Coincidentally with the radio observations, the X-ray
instruments in satellites also observed the source.
Hjellming comments (1974, p. 1089) that there "may have
been more investigation of a single object, by more astronomers,
in a shorter period of time, than ever before in astronomy." The
combined observations enhanced each other, for when astrono-
mers plotted all of the information from different instruments
and wavelengths, the data revealed much additional knowledge
about the source. For infrared astronomers, the source turned
out to be the first infrared object showing probable binary
characteristics; for X-ray astronomers, the source is the shortest
period X-ray binary known, by a factor of 10; and it is only
the second source showing coupling between X-ray and radio
events. From such new and puzzling data, astronomers have much
to fuel theoretical analyses and guidelines for other and further
observations.
Officials of NASA have long recognized that ground-based
and space observations will advance astronomy optimally and
provide the greatest returns of data and information by taking
advantage of the synergistic benefits of the two observational
modes. They have attempted to balance the needs of both in a
jointly useful astronomy program. The high costs of space
exploration have demanded the larger share of NASA's budget,
but NASA has not ignored ground-based astronomy. From
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fiscal 1966 to fiscal 1972, NASA contributed an average of more
than $9.3 million a year to ground-based astronomy, 17.6 percent
of the total federal support provided for it (National Academy of
Sciences, vol. 1, 1972, p. 65).
Since 1958 NASA has supported the building of new, or the
refurbishing of old, instruments so that astronomers at ground
observatories could meet the added demands made, and exploit
the new opportunities afforded, by the space program. It has
contributed support for many optical telescopes, ranging in size
from 24 to 107 inches, as well as a number of large tracking
instruments, It has also supported the construction of a number of
solar-optical telescopes as well as solar-radio telescopes. In
addition, it has contributed in full or in part to the building or
updating of about a dozen radio telescopes (National Academy
of Sciences, vol. 2, 1972. pp. 388-93, with authors' caution).
The peculiar observing conditions above the atmosphere
required NASA to develop new instruments or adapt existing
techniques for astonomical observing in space. Since information
from satellites usually could not be physically delivered to earth-
bound observers, it had to be transmitted by radio and television.
For these purposes NASA devoted considerable effort and
resources to the development of sensitive, reliable TV sensors.
Photomultipliers fit the needs and limitations of satellite
observation especially well. By the mid- to late 1960s, ground-
based observatories had borrowed the new detectors, both the
improved TV sensors and the Photomultipliers. They have
increased the efficiencies of optical telescopes significantly, for
they can measure light accurately within 0.1 percent accuracy,
while photographic plates are accurate within the 1 to 10 per-
cent range only.
Several astronomers at large observatories believe that NASA's
general support of astronomy both enabled and encouraged
astronomers to experiment more boldly than ever before with
new instruments that have enhanced the detecting range of
existing telescopes. The easy availability of funds compared with
earlier times had loosened budget constraints, allowing contem-
plation of new devices. And NASA's support for instrument
development and adaptation of military equipment, such as
improved infrared detectors and high resolution cameras, provided
exciting new kinds of detectors. Because NASA pushed the
technology of computer monitoring in real time, it may also have
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contributed to more effective observations with the large, ground-
based telescopes.
There exist only incomplete and sketchy data on NASA's
contribution to improvement in astronomical technology. The
judgment of a number of NASA managers and scientists
acquainted with the astronomical program and of several
astronomers interested in instrumentation is that NASA has been
a significant contributor. In 1969-70 the federal government
accounted for 28 percent of the manpower devoted to general-
purpose instrument development (National Academy of Sciences,
vol. 2, 1972, p. 314). Most of the rest of the manpower used for
that purpose was in the universities. It is reasonable to assume
that NASA's share of the funds supporting that manpower was
larger than any other agency's.
Astronomy as a "Big Science"
W/
The space program has helped add to the fundamental
knowledge of astronomy; it has opened new fields of inquiry
in the science and revitalized old ones; and it has enhanced the
older methods of observations. As meaningful as these contri-
butions have been, the effects of NASA and its space program
on the organization and structure of astronomy may equal or
surpass them. The large flow of funds into the science has
helped it move toward — if it has not already created — a Big
Science status. It was estimated in 1972 that the costs of proposed
new instruments, such as a large space telescope, would grow
from a level of about $20 million a year at the beginning of a
decade of development to around $200 million a year at the end
of the decade. Total costs over the entire period of fabrication
and launch would be at least $1 billion (National Academy of
Sciences, vol. 1, p. 106). These figures are large enough to justify
classing space astronomy as a Big Science.
The federal government already spends on astronomy an
amount comparable to that spent by it on high-energy physics,
the nation's most easily recognized Big Science. In 1969 the
federal government obligated $282 million for basic research in
astronomy, nearly 12 percent of the funds made available by
the government for all basic scientific research. By 1972 the
obligations for basic research in astronomy had declined by a
third to $189 million, only 7.4 percent of the federal total
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(National Academy of Sciences, vol. 2, 1972, p. 352; and National
Science Foundation, 1973, p. 35, Table B-8). Of the smaller
amount of funds allocated for astronomy in recent years, four-
fifths or more has come from NASA. This and the Iarger
amounts that were provided earlier have been sufficient to change
the organization of astronomy from its patterns in the 1940s
and '50s.
Dr. Hugh Dryden, deputy administrator of NASA from 1958
to 1965, early pointed out how the requirements of space science
would affect the way astronomers work and manage their field
(Proceedings, vol. 1, 1962, p. 89):
The university scientist who participates in satellite and
space-probe experiments finds an environment different
from that to which he has become accustomed. Tradition-
ally, a scientist conceives an experiment, builds the appara-
tus himself or has it built under his supervision in the
university shop or by contract, carries out his own experi-
ment, analyzes the data, and publishes his results. This
relatively simple procedure is not possible in satellite and
space-probe experiments, although a fair approximation to
it is feasible for experiments with small sounding rockets.
Satellite launching requires large rockets, special sites, a
worldwide tracking and data-acquisition network, sharing
by many experimenters in a single flight, and a large team
of cooperating specialists. The scientist becomes involved
in scheduling his work to meet a flight date once that date
has been set. His apparatus must be engineered to meet
several environmental requirements of vibration, tem-
perature, exposure to radiation and charged particles, and
so forth. Some universities are able to provide this service;
others must depend on industrial help. Thus the role of the
university scientist often reduces to concept of the
experiment, development of laboratory prototypes of the
equipment, analysis of the data and publication, plus par-
ticipation in a large team to design the actual satellite,
launch it, and receive the data. (Emphasis added.)
Despite the high expenditures on space experiments, the
number of astronomers who have conducted space satellite
experiments is still small. Less than I5 percent of astronomers
participated in space projects in 1969-70, although space experi-
ments have wider applications within astronomy than the number
of astronomers directly involved indicates (National Academy of
Sciences, vol. 1, 1972, pp. 60, 62), But Dr. Dryden's description
ii
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of the complex team effort required to accomplish satellite
missions will become a reality for increasing numbers of astron-
omers if and when more of them become involved in space
observations.
Even before space requirements have been widely felt among
the astronomical community, it had already turned to more
complicated managerial organization of facilities than were
known before World War II. To provide optical and radio
instruments to a wide section of the increasing number of
astronomers, a consortium of universities, the Associated Uni-
versities for Research in Astronomy, established the Kitt Peak
National Observatory in Arizona, funded by the National
Science Foundation. The observatory is open to all qualified
users, and in 1971 astronomers from 33 small institutions used
its facilities as well as astronomers from large universities or
other observatory groups.
To furnish better radio astronomy facilities, a number of
universities also banded together as the Associated Universities,
Inc., to found the National Radio Astronomy Observatory. It
has two centers, is funded substantially by the National Science
Foundation, and is also open to all qualified scientists. Thus
astronomy has been moving in the direction in which space
science will take it still further. Increasingly, astronomers will be
but a part of a team, established to serve their engineering,
technical, and managerial needs along with their scientific interests.
The Astronomy Survey Committee warned that "for space
projects . . . [NASA] centers are essential to the engineering
of much of the flight hardware. Few complete satellites systems
can be handled by university groups" (National Academy of
Sciences, vol. 1, 1972, p. 114). And if the nation should proceed
with development, launching, and use of the large space telescope,
the astronomical community will have to mobilize itself to under-
take so vast a program. The committee (vol. I, p. 106) realizes
that
... a program of this magnitude requires the highest quality
scientific leadership and the most advanced space
engineering available. The highest quality scientific leader-
ship in this field can be found in the academic community,
and the highest degree of space engineering talent exists in
the [NASA] centers.... Therefore, the best chance for
success lies in the merging of academic talent with that in
i
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the NASA centers. We suggest that NASA select one or
more centers to car ry out the engineering phases of the
program and the National Academy of Sciences encourage
the formation of a new corporate entity representing uni-
versities with strong programs in space astronomy.
Over the span of but one generation, astronomy has been
transformed, first by the technology of radio observation, and
now by space exploration. Once it was the preserve of individual
scientists pursuing independent studies in universities and remote
observatories. Astronomers lived and worked in considerable
isolation from other sciences and with instruments and equipment
left largely unchanged for more than sixty years. Today astrono-
mers increasingly must work as members of teams on complex
experiments that may involve the coordination of radio and
optical observations with simultaneous space observations. Some
of the scientists must assume the heavy administrative duties
of managing the activities of the large astronomical observatories
and centers, and of coordinating their interests and decisions
with those of the universities and government agencies that pro-
vide support for astronomy. Astronomers participating in space
experiments often find they have to concern themselves with
complex engineering tasks, meet large financial responsibilities,
and manage sizable personnel staffs. Such a radical shift in the
demands made upon astronomers will doubtless greatly change
the kind of manpower found in the science.
The rise in funding and the opening of opportunities for new
experimentation have indeed increased the quantity of manpower.
Through the 1960s and into the 1970s, there was an unprecedented
increase in the number of astronomers, By 1970 the total number
had approximately tripled in a decade, to about 2,500, averaging
an annual growth rate of nearly 15 percent over the Iatter part of
the 1960s. The number of scientific and technical personnel in
astronomy increased from about twelve hundred in I959-60 to
around 3,200 in 1969-70 (National Academy of Sciences, vol. 1,
1972, p. 56). The number of doctorates in the science increased
at the same rate (vol. 2, p. 325). These growth rates were about
four times larger than those over the previous forty years.
Through its project grants and sustaining university predoc-
toral traineeships and other university programs (1966 and '67),
NASA supported almost 40 percent of the 66 new Ph.D.s in
astronomy (National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
j
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1968, p. 29). Even before NASA support became an important
means of attracting students to the field, the number of doctorates
in astronomy had begun to rise sharply. The development of
radio astronomy and support of astronomy by the National
Science Foundation and the Armed Services contributed signifi-
cantly to that rise. No doubt the general stimulation of space
exploration, aside from NASA's educational aid, attracted some
students.
With the cutbacks in the space program and the leveling off
of government funding for all sciences, including astronomy, it now
appears that NASA may have induced a larger inflow of astron-
omers than is now needed at current and foreseeable government
funding for the sciences. By 1966 NASA engaged the services
of from eighty thousand to a hundred thousand engineers and
scientists, 5.5 percent of the national total (Newell, 1967, p. I).
By 1968, when NASA reached its peak, its managers realized
that the figures would be even higher. Some overly optimistic
forecasts suggested that by 1970 as many as one-fourth of all
scientists and engineers would be working on space programs.
Although NASA officials doubted the accuracy of such a fore-
cast, they certainly did not want to be accused of draining the
nation of its highly trained, skilled scientific and technical work
force and creating shortages for other sectors of the economy
(see statement by Dr. Hugh Dryden in National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 1962, p. 90).
Dr. Thomas L. K. Smull, director of the Office of Grants
and Research Contracts, explained the view of NASA's managers
in 1962. He declared that NASA needed the wholehearted coop-
eration of the universities for they supply "the creative ideas upon
which much of the program is based," and they also develop "the
scientific and technical manpower that will be required for
successful conduct of the program." He assumed that "the
university is the only segment of the team undertaking the space
program that produces manpower. The other two partners in
this enterprise — industry and government — only consume
manpower" (National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
1962, pp. 5I, 53). His assumption is probably erroneous. An
employer does not necessarily consume manpower; if the labor
force has any chance whatsoever to improve its skills and
increase its knowledge about and understanding of the tools
and techniques in use, it will increase its quality, adding to the
4
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productiveness of manpower. On-the-job training is probably as
important a factor for improving productivity as schooling, even
in the advanced sciences.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration did not
need to support Ph.D. students in the numbers it did, unless
its officials believed that the nation could long sustain the
growth in number of `space scientists that was experienced in the
early 1960s. The numbers of astronomers increased per year at
10 to 15 percent, high enough to double the ranks in five to
seven years! One might argue that present government support
for science students, scientists, and basic research is too low for
the national good. It seems hardly possible that taxpayers would
support the research and development at the rate they did from
1953 to 1967 -- 10.3 percent. Continued for another fourteen
years, research and development spending wou ld have been
nearly a third larger than total expenditures for national defense
in 1967.
The supply of scientists may well be more flexible and their
numbers more expansible in any particular area or field than lay
citizens, or even managers, recognize. Scientists can and do slide
from specialty to specialty without great difficulty. Any labor
force of well-schooled persons provides a reservoir of flexible
manpower capable of easily and quickly transferrin g, skills and
competencies to related occupations. In the case of astronomy,
both the new direction of research (toward particles and fields,
and X-ray experiments) and the type of research (team efforts
involving complex engineering requirements) attracted physicists.
So many were attracted that by 1972 the number of "astronomers"
with doctorates in physics exceeded for the first time the number
who earned doctorates in astronomy (National Academy of
Sciences, vol. 2, 1972, p. 323). A smaller portion of other Ph.D.
researchers, around 6 percent, left their specialties, such as chem-
iGrry, engineering, and geology, to become astronomers too
k , , ol. 2, p. 334, Table 9,18).
The rapid inflow of manpower to the field probably lowered
the average age of astronomers. In 1968 nearly 35 percent of all
scientific and technical personnel were under the age of thirty
and 37 percent were in their thirties; thus almost three-quarters
of these men and women were younger than forty (National
Academy of Sciences, vol. 1, 1972, p. 59). No data are available
for earlier periods.
i
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The increase in numbers of astronomers has been so large and
so rapid that today's astronomical community hardly resembles
that of a decade ago, and it is indeed different from that of a
generation ago. It is a far more open science, with more numerous
facilities and research opportunities; it is populated with young
scientists and technicians who come from more diverse educational
backgrounds than ever before. In this change, NASA has been a
principal cause. Its large expenditures — more than $100 million
annually for basic research alone — dwarf the funds astronomy
once had for its modest work in the 1940s and early '50s. The
funding provided by NASA also dominates the federal support
now provided for astronomical research. In 1970 NASA contrib-
uted 65 percent of federal research grants for astronomy in
academic institutions and 56 percent for all astronomical
institutions (National Academy of Sciences, vol. 2, p. 351).
Secondary Consequences of Astronomy's Transfbnnatiora
With its transformation, astronomy has become a complex
scientific field — or more accurately, a group of related but
rather distinct sciences. Each has as many or more personnel
involved in its conduct as the whole of astronomy a generation
ago. Each now possesses a complicated array of instruments and
c.,aipment that can best be used to advantage when operated
cooperatively with those of other astronomical areas. Financing
depends primarily upon the federal government, with the largest
share coming through NASA, whose allotments for astronomy
make up less than 5 percent of its total budget. The federal
government distributes its funds through NASA research centers,
national observatories, universities, and other nongovernment
corporations, each of whom must maintain administrative staffs
to manage operations and financial flows. The varied astronomical
areas of research, the large number of astronomers, and the many
adiministrative agencies require more effort and impose far
higher transaction costs than in earlier times; it is more
difficult and more complex to set priorities, to ensure joint orJ
	
coordinated efforts, and to manage effective programs.
One administrator of astronomy programs has pointed out
t (in an interview with the author) that the problems of setting
priorities in the science will grow. "Astronomy," he said,. 'is
beginning to fractionate. We find solar physics, planetary studies,
and research into the interplanetary medium, each, as a separate
r
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discipline in addition to stellar and galactic astronomy. They were
all within the purview of a single science only a few years ago.
But the information flow has become so great and specialized
that we can now concentrate in distinct specialties of worth."
The fractionation has gone so far that in reporting on scien-
tific advances, the American Association for the Advancement
of Science separates earth and planetary studies from physics and
astronomy (Science, December 1973). Such labeling also suggests
more than a simple reorganization of astronomy into subfields, but
also a combining of various parts with other sciences. Astrophysics
received equal billing with astronomy in the title of the recent
report by the prestigious Astronomy Survey Committee. Dr.
Harvey Brooks for the Committee on Science and Public Policy
of the National Academy of Sciences notes the "increasingly close
relationship [of astronomy] to virtually every subfield of physics
and, increasingly, to chemistry" (National Academy of Sciences,
vol. 1, 1972, p. v).
Despite the separation of fields in astronomy and new
combinations, the Astronomy Survey Committee succeeded, in its
1972 report, in setting straightforward priorities for future
astronomical programs. One commentator observed that "few
government advisory committees have been able to accomplish"
such a task. He suggested, however, that the committee made
agreement on priorities easier than it might have by opting for
expensive space programs without enough attention to these
programs' past or likely future scientific effectiveness (Metz,
I972, p. 248).
i	 If NASA's budget is Iarge enough, astronomers may
`	 reasonably hope that funds will trickle through and around the
1 specific space programs to support a condsiderable amount of
other kinds of astronomical research. Thus the present unanimity
of astronomers may be more a function of NASA's single
large contribution to the science than to a c;,mmon scientific
interest and outlook among the diverse specialties that astronomy
now includes. Should the government distribute its funds
through a number of agencies, the problem of securing the
l	 'E	 scientists' agreement on priority may become far more difficult
}	 than at present.
With recent cutbacks in NASA's budgets, astronomers see
some difficult problems facing them. First is the balance of
1	 resources between the national observatories and the university-
i
a
i	 priority for space exploration.
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based astronomy departments. Astronomers in the latter may be
at a disadvantage in developing new instrumentation. In optical
observation, an area they have dominated it the past, they have
made major technical advances; they fear their contributions may
be diminished in the future. Should an increasing share of the
national funds allocated to astronomy go to national observato-
ries and government in-house programs, the universities may find
that they cannot hold their place and continue their influence
in the science. A kind of nationalization of facilities and observa-
tion will follow the nationalization of financing.
In its heyday of expanding budgets, NASA encouraged a
number of colleges and universities (that had been involved) to
build up space science departments. As budgets shrink, NASA
officials — and the astronomers who advise them — must
decide not only the relative preference in support between uni-
versity and national observatories but also the priority among
schools. When confronted with the latter issue in their science,
the Physics Survey Committee (with Dr. Alan Bromley as chair-
man) explicitly recommended that scarce resources should be
concentrated on "the support of excellence" at major facilities
and at the best universities, rather than be broadly distributed
(National Academy of Sciences, August 1972). The committee
members were prepared to recognize that under such conditions
the science of physics will henceforth be an elitist science.
Astronomers at Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, and Princeton, reported that astronomy is implicitly following
the same policy. Schools whose astronomy programs depended
completely upon government funds have had to be reduced or
terminated. The larger, stronger schools that have private
resources to supplement the reduced federal funding have been
able to hold their talented researchers and continue their astron-
omy programs, although sometimes on a smaller scale.
` Even in the strong "elite" universities and private observa-
tories, the space program can have a destructive, or at least
morale-shattering, effect upon the scientists involved when the
government cuts budgets or, to save funds, stretches programs
over longer periods than originally planned. For example, in
January 1973 NASA cut the HEAO program by $200 million,
although the astronomical community had given it the highest
i.
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Professor Donald C. Morton, Princeton University Observa-
tory, saw NASA's action as a serious breach of trust (quoted
in Sky & Telescope, March 1973, p. I43):
Many young people have based their studies and
careers on the HEAO and other government-supported
projects and are now going to have to re-think their
futures. Who among them, and us, will plan on devoting
the next ten years of our lives to such a project if the
government does not honor its rromises?
The wide swings in government funding and consequent sudden
shifts in program plans add to what already are sizable risks
for scientists who conduct space experiments. The Princeton
astronomers became involved with a major satellite project in
1959; the satellite was planned to fly in 1965, but because of
technological difficulties, was not launched until 1972, seven
years later. At that, the experimenters were more fortunate than
others who worked on satellites that failed in launching or soon
afterward.
The risks of long lead times are compounded by the large
commitment a space project requires. One knowledgeable astron-
omer, during an interview with the author, said, "You are going to
get little else done over the years you work on it, and even then
you do not know if there is going to be much of a payoff. You
could wind up with very little research." Another scientist, an
astrophysicist, told the Subcommittee on Space Science and
Applications (U.S. Congress, House, 1973, pp. 15-16):
I
[T]he prime scientific resource in our country [the
scientific researchers] should be treated tenderly.... [T]o
be sure, the scientific community will bounce back for the
most part, but I think that the most talented experimenters,
who discover the really new things, may well become
disillusioned and will work in other fields.
i
Perhaps enough university researchers will always be found
to contribute sufficient time and talent to space science to help
the nation maintain a program of quality; it is not clear whether
j the demands and risks of space science will allow present
relationships between the universities and the government centers,
national observatories, and space agency to continue.7
	
	 The transformation of astronomy effected first by radio astron-
omy and later by NASA's massive expenditures relative to past
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Ievels, and its opening of space, is but partly accomplished. The
old structure of the science and the ways it was organized and
managed have been swept away; present forms and relationships
may be temporary and in flux.7he National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and its managers have helped create a new science,
more complex and costly than the former science, with a new and
larger, broader constituency of scientists. Astronomers, even
with all of their supporters and amateur star -gazers, are not apt
ever to be a potent political pressure group. But in creating today's
astronomical community, NASA has assumed a more difficult
responsibility than officials may have realized in the early days of
the space program.
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Chapter Four
•
Predicting the Unpredictable:
Economic Impacts of Weather Satellites
W
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Meteorological satellites represent one of the most valuable
technological advances in the history of meteorology. The launch-
ing of the television and infrared observation satellite, Tiros I, on
April I, 1960, revolutionized methods of weather observation.
Tiros I demonstrated that meteorological satellites are an effective
way to overcome the limitations of conventional observation
methods. Previous techniques, such as radar, weather reconnais-
sance aircraft, weather ships, and weather balloons, supplied
information for less than a fifth of the earth's surface; Tiros I
covered almost the entire globe.
To assess the impact of Tiros I and its successors, one must
examine two major relationships:
(1) The relationship between weather satellites and the
accuracy of weather forecasts. Have weather satellites
contributed to any observed improvement in forecast
accuracy?
(2) The practical value of improved weather forecasts. What
is the dollar value of the savings and benefits from better
weather forecasting? What proportion of these . savings is
due to meteorological satellites?
In order to answer these questions, one must begin with an over-
view of the U.S. meterological satellite program. The following
section is largely based upon the extensive historical descriptions
115
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found in Widger (1966, pp. 38-49) and Legislative Reference
Service (1962, pp. 26-36).
The National Meteorological Satellite Program
National support for satellites did not emerge until after the
Russians had launched their first Sputnik in 1957. In the after-
math of Sputnik, the Defense Department established the
Advance Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The agency initiated
many of this country's space projects before NASA was established.
During the spring of 1958, ARPA determined that a meteoro-
logical satellite would be an appropriate part of the U.S. space
program and requested the three military services (Army, Navy,
and Air Force) and the U.S. Weather Bureau to furnish their
recommendations in support of such a project. At that time the
national clearinghouse for weather forecasts was the Weather
Bureau, which has undergone two major reorganizations since
1965. From July . 1965 through October 1970, it was part of the
Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA). In
October 1970, that agency was reorganized into the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Beginning
with the Environmental Science Services Administration, satellite
activities were set up in a separate entity now known as the
National Environmental Satellite Service (NESS) of NOAA. Both
reorganizations were designed to consolidate federal activities
in the environmental area into a single agency (Hughes, 1970;
Popkin, 1967; and Space Science and Engineering Center, vol. 1,
pp. 399-434).
Representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Weather
Bureau subsequently served on ARPA's Committee on Meteo-
rology, which was formed to guide the development of the
satellite that eventually became Tiros 1. Project Vanguard, under
the direction of the Naval Research Laboratories was already
under way. Vanguard II was successfully placed into orbit in
February 1959, but because of a variety of technical problems,
no meteorologically usable data were obtained. However,
experiences gained during the development and ' operation of
Vanguard proved valuable in the design of Tiros.
Program responsibilities were centered in ARPA until April
1959, at which time these functions were t ransferred to NASA.
Preliminary plans for the organization and funding of the national
,_
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meteorological satellite program were first drawn up in I960-61
by an interagency working group, the Panel on Operational
Meteorological Satellites. The panel report in April 1961 recom-
mended assigning management responsibility for a national
operational meteorological system to the Weather Bureau, with
NASA participating in the developmental aspects of the program.
Under  1962 agreement between the Weather Bureau and NASA,
the former was to determine overall meteorological requirements,
process satellite data for operational purposes, disseminate data
and forecasts, and conduct research on the climatological use of
satellite data. The latter (NASA) was to be the research and
development organization with responsibilities for designing,
building, launching, and testing satellites. When a satellite became
operational, it was to be turned over to the Weather Bureau for
continued research (Delbeq and Filley, pp. 72-85).
Eight Tiros satellites were launched between April 1960 and
December 1963. The pictures provided by these satellites began
to satisfy the meteorologists' need for worldwide picture coverage
of the weather. Because local weather is often influenced within
a relatively short time interval by remote atmospheric conditions,
i	 meteorologists had always sought closely spaced observation
i	 points with a maximum time interval between measurements of
E twelve hours. Traditional weather observation techniques could
not satisfy this need because, even with radar and weather
reconnaissance planes and ships, only a fifth of the earth's
surface could be observed. Observations in the ocean areas were
particularly inadequate.
!	 In addition to supplying more complete weather coverage,
. Tiros satellites provided types of data that could not be
obtained through other means of observation. The detailed
pictures of cloud patterns provided by satellites cannot be
y duplicated by balloons, rockets, or radar. Satellites are also
particularly suited for the observation of reflected solar and
emitted infrared radiations. The continual exchange of energy
between the earth and the sun produces winds, clouds, rain,
and other forms of weather. Because observations of outgoing
j	 infrared radiation from the earth were impractical on any regu-
1
	
	 tar basis before satellites, most meteorological research and
almost all weather forecasting techniques have been forced to
.	 assign values for the energy input and losses of the atmosphere.
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While the Tiros satellites provided data never before available
in any form, there were these problems: (1) only about 20 per-
cent of the earth was visible to these satellites on any one day,
and (2) not all latitudes could be photographed. Nimbus 1,
launched in August 1964, overcame these limitations by taking
pictures of every part of the earth (except for the winter pole)
once every 24 hours. Nimbus I also provided a breakthrough
in the use of the automatic picture transmission camera. This
slow-scan camera made it possible for relatively inexpensive
equipment at ground stations to receive pictures showing the
cloud cover over the surrounding area as it existed just 3.5
minutes earlier.
The second post Tiros milestone occurred when the Applica-
tions Technology Satellite (ATS-1), the first geostationary sat-
ellite equipped with a camera, was launched in December 1966.
Because of the particular orbit plane of the synchronous (or
geostationary) satellite, it appears to be stationary over a particu-
lar point on the equator. Thus the spin-scan cloud camera on the
synchronous satellite can continuously view the same portion of
the earth. Cloud displacements over short periods of time can
t	 readily be measured, and from them many features of the wind
field can be inferred.
The next major breakthrough came with Nimbus 111, launched
in April I969, when vertical profiles of temperature, ozone
content, and water vapor were furnished by satellite for the first
time. Subsequent improvements in the Nimbus series resulted in
more sophisticated spectrometric measurements of the temperature
and moisture fields. In addition, satellites are now able to
determine wind information at cloud Ievel through the careful
measurement of cloud motions.
The first operational weather satellite, ESSA 1, was orbited
in February 1966. This was followed by eight additional first-
generation (ESSA) operational satellites and a series of second-
generation (NOAA) operational satellites beginning in December
1970, as shown in Table 4-1 (Hubert and Lehr, 1967, pp. 29-52;
Popkin, 1967, pp. 154-60; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1971,
?	 pp. 1-5; and National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
1975, pp. 61-64, 134). These systems provide global observation
'	 of atmospheric elements to central readout stations; local
k.
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weather information is transmitted via satellite automatic picture
systems to local receivers distributed all round the world.
The major weather satellite development of the 1970s has
been the launching of the synchronous meteorological satellite
(SMS), which is a NASA-funded prototype for the geostationary
operational environmental satellite (GOES). The SMS/GOES
carries an infrared spin-scan radiometer system which provides
nearly continuous observation of cloud cover day and night and
measurements of cloud-top and surface temperatures. The first
full-time weather satellite in synchronous orbit was launched on
May 17, 1974.
Federal expenditures in support of the operational weather
satellite program totaled $55.7 million in 1974. This funding
represented 13 percent of total federal expenditures on meteoro-
logical operations. An additional $36.5 million was devoted to
research supporting the weather satellite program. These research
expenditures amounted to 53 percent of total federal expenditures
on research supporting meteorological operations (U.S. Depart-
merit of Commerce, 1974, pp. 5-55).
Advances in Weather Forecasting Techniques
Satellite observation is not the only technological advance
that has helped transform weather forecasting during the last
two decades. The development and refinement of mathematical
models for weather prediction have been a major influence
on weather forecasting since the mid-1950s. The traditional
method used by weather forecasters has been the synoptic
approach, which is both empirical and largely subjective in nature.
Using this approach, individual forecasters gather data concerning
present and recent atmospheric conditions. They then use
experience and judgment to extrapolate this weather pattern.
As weather forecasters became more aware of the limitations
of synoptic forecasting, they intensified their search for methods
which were less subjective. Although numerical weather predic-
tion had been envisioned in the 1920s, its application was not
feasible until modern electronic, high-speed, stored-program com-
puters became available in the 1950s. In numerical weather
prediction, a mathematical representation of an observed atmo-
spheric state is developed. •A set of time-dependent mathematical
equations, which represent the physical laws governing atmo-
W
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Table 4-1i	 N
U.S. Meteorological Satellite Launchings
(1960-72)	 Pe b
Date of Launch	 Name	 Launch Vehicle	 Remarks]s
April 1, 1960 Tiros I Thor-Able First weather satellite providing cloud cover photography. 10
November 23, 1960 Tiros 11 Thar-Delta
July 12, 1961 Tiros Ill Thor-Delta o
February 8, 1962 Tiros 1V Thor-Delta
June 19, 1962 Tiros V Thor-Delta `S
September 18, 1962 Tires VI Thor-Delta S
June 19, 1963 Tiros VII Thor-Delta
December 2I., 1963 Tiros VI II Thor-Delta First weather satellite designed to transmit continuously local cloud con-
ditions to ground stations equipped with APT receivers. o
August 28, 1964 Nimbus 1 Thor-Agena B Carried advanced videcon camera system, APT, and a high-resolution
infrared radiometer for night pictures. a
January 22, 1965 Tiros IX Thor-Delta First weather satellite in a sun-synchronous orbit, ;
July 2, 1965 Tiros X Thor-Delta M
February 3, 1966 ESSA I Thor-Delta First operational weather satellite-, carried two wide-angle TV camera z
systems. Cal
February 28, 1966 ESSA 2 Thor-Delta Complemented ESSA l with two wide-angle APT cameras. n'
May 15, 1966 Nimbus 11 Thor-Agena B
October 2, 1966 ESSA 3 Thor-Delta Odd-numbered ESSA spacecrafts carry two advanced camera systems. 0Even-numbered spacecrafts carry two automatic picture transmission
acamera systems.
December 6, 1966 ATS-I Atlas-Agena D Provided continuous black-and-white cloud cover pictures from a syn-
chronous orbit, using a Suomi camera system.
January 26, 1967 ESSA 4 Thar-Delta
April 20, 1967 ESSA 5 Thor-Delta
November 5, 1967 ATS-3 Atlas-Agena Provided continuous color cloud cover pictures from a synchronous orbit,
using three Suomi camera systems.
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Table 4-1 (continued)
November 10, 1967 ESSA 6 Thor-Delta
August 16, 1968 ESSA 7 Thor-Delta
December 15, 1968 ESSA 8
February 26, 1969 ESSA 9 Thor-Delta
April 14, 1969 Nimbus III Thor-Agena Provided first vertical temperature profile on a global hasis of the atmo-
fromsphere
	
the spacecraft to the earth's surface.
oJanuary 23, 1970 ITOS 1 Thor-Delta Second-generation operational meteorological satellite. _
(Tiros M)
April 8, 1970 Nimbus IV Thor-Agena Fifth in a series of seven advanced research and development weather
n
satellites.
December 11, 1970 NOAA l Thor-Delta Second-generation operational meteorological satellite.
(ITOS A) b
August 16, 1971 Fen to (CAS-1) Scout French satellite to gather data from constant-density surface balloons re- A
laying meteorological dam for the study of the characteristics and
movements of air masses. New balloons are released daily from three
sites in Argentina fo_- this cooperative French-U.S. project.
October 15, 1972 NOAA 2 Thor-Delta Second-generation operational meteorological satellite.(ITOS D) ^.
F	 [ December 11, 1972 Nimbus V Thor-Delta Provided the first atmospheric vertical temperature profile measurements
d through clouds.
® November 6, I973 NOAA3 'Thor-Delta Second-generation operational meteorological satellite.
z
t
`'
(13 OS F)
May 17, 1974 SMSI Thor-Delta First full-time weather satellite in synchronous orbit.
November 15, 1974 NOAA4 Thor-Delta Second-generation operational meteorological satellite.
(11 OS G)
^t Source- National Environmental Satellite Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,	 U.S.	 Department of
i Commerce, Satellite Activities of NOAA 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Jane 1973), p. 10;
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1974 Activities N(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975), p. 134. ..
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spheric motion, is then used for purposes of prediction. The
solution of these complex mathematical equations requires the
computing power of the largest and fastest computers as well as
the extremely advanced numerical methods (Maunder, 1970,
pp. 266-89).
The application of numerical weather prediction techniques by
the National Weather Service began at the National Meteoro-
logical Center in 1958. The center supports the National
Weather Service by providing regional weather forecast stations
round the United States with forecast guidance; and it acts
in a sense as a forecaster's forecaster by providing the regional
forecaster with information that he or she requires in the
preparation of forecasts.
The accuracy of the initial mathematical models was limited
by gaps in scientific knowledge and the existing state-of-the-art
in numerical methods. Advances in both of these areas were
prerequisites for progress in weather prediction. Throughout
the 1960s and early '70s, computer capacity proved to be an
important factor limiting further progress in numerical prediction.
In fact, most major improvements in the accuracy of the National
Meteorological Center's forecasts coincide with its acquisition of
a new and more powerful computer system. Each new computer --
the IBM 704 in 1958, the IBM 7090 in 1962. the CDC 6600 in
1966, and the IBM 360-195 in 1974 —enabled the center to
develop more sophisticated and ar:na[e mathematical models.
During its seventeen-year experience with operational numerical
weather prediction, the center has achieved impressive progress
in improving forecast accuracy and extending the length of the
forecast period (Shuman, March 1972).
Technological Advance and Forecast Accuracy.
How have these technological developments in weather fore-
casting -- satellite observation and numerical weather predic-
tion — affected the accuracy of weather forecasts presented to
the users of weather information? Two sets of data are available
from the National Meteorological Center to answer this question.
Comparative data document the superior accuracy of the center's
man-machine mix forecasting system over traditional methods
of forecasting. Trend data trace improvements in accuracy at the
center over time.
d
{
r	 `!
1
w.
i
Economic Impacts of Weather Satellites 	 O	 123
A comparison of numerical prediction and subjective fore-
casts for varying forecast periods is shown in Figure 4.1.
Correlation coefficients were computed between forecast and
observed sea-level pressures for as much as six days. Four
different forecast methods were used — persistence, unaided sub-
jective, raw model, and model-aided subjective (i.e., man-
machine mix). The superiority of the man-machine mix fore-
casts has prompted some observers to suggest that the extension
of numerical predictions to six days can assist in improving
present methods, especially when modified by experienced fore-
casters (Namias, 1968, pp. 438-70).
The National Meteorological Center data indicate that the
accuracy of the center's pressure and precipitation forecasts has
improved substantially from 1958 to 1975. From 1958 to 1972,
the accuracy of forecasts of pressure had increased by 28 percent
at sea level and by 22 percent for the mid-atmosphere. The
center's skill in precipitation forecasting increased by approxi-
mately 13 percent from 1960 to 1971 (Brown and Fawcett, 1972,
pp. 1175-77).
These data make clear the fact that numerical prediction
methods have enabled the National Meteorological Center to
achieve impressive improvements in the accuracy of its forecast
guidance. However, forecast verification records of the National
Weather Service suggest that improvements at the center have
not produced comparable improvements in the public's daily
temperature and precipitation forecasts. Precipitation predictions
for 150 to 250 National Weather Service forecast stations round
the United States improved by 5 percent between 1959 and 1972.
Larger improvements in prediction accuracy have been recorded
for individual cities. Over a thirty-year period the proportion of
correct daily precipitation and temperature forecasts for Chicago
has improved by about 10 percent (Cooley and Derovin, 1972).
Increases in the accuracy of the National Meteorological
Center's forecast guidance do not necessarily guarantee increased
skill in local predictions of temperature and precipitation. A
.
	
	 recent study conducted in M.I.T.'s Department of Meteorology
monitored the accuracy of daily temperature and precipitation
y forecasts made at M.I.T. No secular increase in forecasting skill
was found for the 1966-72 period. This finding was especially
surprising since the M.I.T. forecasters made use of the National
i
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Meteorological Center's forecast guidance, which was steadily
improving during this period. The paradox of more skilled
center forecast guidance and no improvement in local Boston
forecasts is explained in the limited state-of-the-art in adapting
the center's regional forecasts to predict more localized weather
conditions. Improvements in local weather forecasting may not
depend on further advances in the center's forecast guidance;
they may require, instead, an improved ability to cope with local
weather influences (Sanders, 1973, pp. 1171-74).
When we turn from numerical prediction models to meteoro-
Iogical satellites, it becomes more difficult to assess the impact
on forecasting accuracy. Until recently, the National Weather
Service had not conducted any controlled tests comparing fore-
cast accuracy with and without satellite data. As a result, there
is no way to quantitatively estimate the effect of satellite data.
Instead, it is necessary to rely on more subjective evidence.
Currently, satellites play a significant role in storm warning
and forecasting. By the end of 1964, Tiros data had been used
to discover and track more than a hundred hurricanes and
typhoons. The National Environmental Satellite Service of NOAA
estimates that since the inauguration of the operational satellite
system in 1966, no tropical storm has gone undetected anywhere
in the world. Similarly, the forecasting of severe local storms
over the continental United States had advanced to the stage
where area alerts and watches are issued routinely (Sanders,
1973, pp. 1171-74). The new geostationary satellites (SMS and
GOES) now play a major role in this area (U.S. Department
of Commerce, April 29, 1974, pp. 1-5; and Widger, 1966, p. 127).
The use of satellite data in forecasting parameters such as
temperature, humidity, and wind is less extensive than in storm
forecasting. Satellite data have been used as one input, but the
forecasts of major parameters are primarily based on conventional
methods of observation. Until 1969, the biggest difficulty in using
satellite data was that forecasters could not develop a quantitative
forecast of the wind or temperature on the basis of cloud pictures.
The advent of vertical . temperature soundings with Nimbus III
proved that temperature and humidity data could be provided
from satellites. While the National Meteorological Center has
established an experimental program to use these data, uncer-
tainty about the accuracy of satellite sounding data restricted
!f
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their use before 1973. Routine use of satellite remote sounding
data in daily public forecasts provided by the National Weather
Service did not begin until mid-1973. It is still too early to
accurately assess the impact of these satellite data on forecast
accuracy (Burtsev and Cistajakov, 1971, pp. 19-36). This is borne
out in a personal letter to the author from Dr. Duane S. Cooley,
Technical Procedures Branch of the National Weather Service.
In response to a question concerning the use of sateli. to data
in daily weather forecasts, Dr. Cooley wrote on April 15, 1973:
We are just beginning to develop quantitative informa-
tion ou the influence of satellite remote sounding data on
operational forecasts. In the past, the use of satellite
information in preparing initial analyses had largely been
limited to location of storm centers over the oceans and
extraction of approximate high and low level wind infor-
mation from clouds over the oceans.
In addition to providing weather services to the general
public, the National Weather Service furnishes a variety of
specialized forecasts. Included among these specialized services
are the Agricultural Weather Service, the Aviation Weather
Service, and the Marine Weather Service. There are indications
that the accuracy of these specialized weather forecasts has
improved more than the accuracy of the forecasts disseminated to
the general public. Although no quantitative trend data tracking
the accuracy of specialized weather forecasts are available, the
increased use of such services appears to reflect a growing
recognition of their importance and increased user satisfaction
with forecast accuracy. For example, the improved accuracy of
marine forecasts has induced shipping companies to make
greater use of weather routing — using specialized weather
forecasts to gain all of the advantages of the prevailing
weather conditions, but to avoid most of the disadvant-ges.
In addition, private weather consultants are playing a growing and
more seminal role in shipping (Maunder, 1970, pp. 117-19).
Economic Value of Weather Forecasts
Most human activities are either directly or indirectly
influenced by weather. Yet until recently the value of more
accurate weather forecasts was unexplored by both social
E
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scientists and meteorologists. The increasing recognition of the
potential for an economic evaluation of weather forecasting is
due to the costly technological advances described above. The
public expenditures associated with these advances dwarf the
relatively small costs of earlier weather service-,. As the invest-
ments in operational meteorology and atm ,)spheric research
have increased, greater attention has be gin focused on the
prospective economic and social benefits of these investments.
In general, benefits can be realized from weather forecasts
if the weather itself can be modified or controlled. Currently,
weather modification is only feasible in limited areas for special-
ized purposes. Protecting activities and property is regarded as
the most practicable of the alternatives, and economic studies
have focused on the protection alternative.
The total value of annual weather-caused losses in the United
States is huge. Thompson's survey (1972, pp. 7-11) of agricultural,
industrial, and other activities suggests that the annual value
of weather-caused losses was $ I2.7 billion. Approximately $5.3
billion of this total were losses which could have been averted
if adequate warnings were provided. However, it is important
to recognize that all of these "protectable losses" cannot be
avoided since the costs of protection must be taken into con-
sideration. Perfect weather forecasts can save about 15 percent
of these protectable losses. While this is a relatively modest
proportion bf total protectable losses, the absolute value of
these savings is very large — $739 million according to Thomp-
son's estimate.
Achieving these economic benefits does not depend entirely
on improving weather forecast accuracy. A significant portion
of the economic benefits can be attained through proper use
of present weather forecasts. The available evidence indicates
that weather forecast users (and nonusers) do not fully exploit the
value of current weather forecasts. This may be due to incom-
plete dissemination of forecast information or poor operating
decisions. Thompson calculates that better use of existing
forecasts accounts for 44 percent of his projected annual savings
of $739 million (Table 4-2).
A striking proportion of the potential economic gains are
in agriculture. Although it is generally acknowledged that
agriculture is the single most important sector subject to the
a
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Table 4-2
Potential Annual Savings Due to Improvements in
Weather Forecasting in the United States
(Millions of dollars)
Impro%cments in Total
Activity Use Accuracy Gains"
Agriculture $250.3 $316.7 $567.0
Aviation (commercial) 1.4 2.2 3.6
Construction i3.1 18.4 31.5
Communications 0. t 0.4 0.6
Electric power 0.5 0.8 1.3
Energy (e.g., fossil) fuels (b) 0.1 0.1
Manufacturing 8.1 11.9 20.0
Transportation (rail,
highway, and water) 1.3 1.9 3,2
Other (general public,
government, and so on) 47.3 64.5 111.8
TOTAL 322.2 416.9 739.I
Sums may not hahince because of rounding.
Less than 550,000.
t
Source: J. C. Thompson, "The Potential Economic Benefits of Improvements in
Weather Forecasting" (San Jose: Deparimcnt al ilicteorulogy, California
State University, September 1972), p. 53,
potential economicvagaries of the weather, the estimates of
^	 g	 P
gains vary widely. There is no apparent way to reconcile
quantitative estimates made for the total agricultural sector with
case studies of individual agricultural crops. In 1972 Thompson
p	 estimated the potential savings in agriculture at $567 million; an
4 earlier Stanford University study (1966) placed savings at $313
million. Yet a case study of Wisconsin hay farmers concluded that
more accurate weather forecasts could produce savings in the
' range of $42 million to $84 million in Wisconsin alone, depending
on the particular harvesting strategy employed. Similar differences
exist between aggregate national estimates and case study pro-
jections for construction, manufacturing, recreation, and other
sectors of the economy (Smith, Boness, and Smith, vol. 11,
1	 i	 PP• 148-68).
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In certain sectors, such as agriculture, the predicted economic
gains should be adjusted to take into account longer run con-
sequences of improved weather prediction. In his study of the
Oregon pea industry, Lee Anderson (1973, pp. 115-25) adjusted
predicted economic gains downward because processing capac-
ity limitations would prevent pro-,essors from accepting all the
additional pea supply. Another illustration is L. B. Lave's
raisin study (pp. 151-64), which suggests that $10 million
worth of raisins could be saved each year through improved
decision making. However, the improved decision making
would lead to excess supply, thus forcing the less efficient
raisin farmers out of business and making land available for
other purposes. An estimated $20 million to $40 million of
additional savings could be realized through proper use of this
land.
In nonagricultural sectors, such as construction and trucking,
institutional barriers may prevent organizations from instituting
appropriate protective action. The large number of small firms
and the high degree of Iabor intensity in these industries are two
such constraints. A preponderance of small firms in construction
implies a small number of projects and a localized geographical
base of operations. Both factors would limit the firm's ability to
adjust to weather forecasts. Furthermore, small size implies
limited planning efforts, making it unlikely that the firm would
be able to use weather information more than one or two days
in advance.
Another constraint is the high wage structure in construction
and transportation. This often means that it is less costly from
the firm's standpoint to incur weather losses than it is to speed
up work by employing additional workers or by paying premium
rates for overtime work. Moreover, even if firms wished to speed
up work, skilled craftworkers are not always readily available.
Union-imposed limits on layover time for drivers in the trans-
portation industry and restrictions on the type of job a particular
worker may perform are additional examples of institutional
}	 barriers (Smith and Boness, vol. 111, pp. 5-I06).
i Potential economic gains from accurate forecasts vary con-
siderably according to the length of the forecast period. In all,
the greatest economic benefits are obtained by improving longer
j	 range predictions. More than half of the annual savings. estimated
W,
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W,in Thompson's study are for forecast periods of thirty days or
more (Table 4-3). Predictions for periods of different length vary
in their importance to different sectors of the economy. Thus
the high importance attached to the ninety-day forecasts in the
table is primarily due to the value of such seasonal forecasts to
agricultural users. In contrast, aviation users attach primary
importance to exceedingly short-range predictions (i.e., three to
twelve hours) and little to forecasts beyond five days (Smith and
Boness, vol. 111, pp. 5.106).
The most destructive weather phenomenon in economic terms
is the tropical storm. Hurricanes. have in fact caused more damage
in the United States than any other type of catastrophe, with
seventeen thousand lives lost and property damage of $5 billion
in the first sixty years of the century. An example of the destruc-
tive consequences of hurricanes occured on June .27, 1957, when
Hurricane Audrey moved inland aver Louisiana. In less than two
days, more than five hundred people lost their lives, forty thousand
to fifty thousand cattle died, and property damage was estimated
at between $150 million and $200 million (Thompson, 1972,
pp. 54-55). The economic losses in the United States and Canada
from selected hurricanes are shown in Table 4.4.
While the average annual damage from hurricanes in the
United States is estimated to be $300 million, the cost of an
individual hurricane has been as high as $3 billion (Hurricane
Agnes in 1972). Even the best forecast cannot prevent the
structural devastation brought about by a severe hurricane like
Camille, Hazel, or Betsy. However, it is likely that 15 percent of
residential and commercial property damage could be avoided
if the entire population were to heed hurricane warnings and take
action to protect property. With estimated annual property damage
of $72 million, complete protection would save $10.8 million.
Since only 20 percent of the population heeds warnings, $8.6
million is therefore lost unnecessarily (Anderson and Burnham,
1973, pp. I26-33; and Simpson and Hebert, 1973, pp. 323.33).
Hurricane forecasting has improved from virtually no warning
during the first and second decades of this century to a current
forecast 24-hour displacement error of about a hundred miles
(Maunder, 1970, p. 11). This measure of forecast accuracy means
that forecasters can predict the point of a hurricane landfall;
i.e., where the hurricane first touches down inland within a
i
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Table 4-3
Potential Annual Savings Due to Improvements in Weather
Forecasting in the United States, by
Forecast Period Length
(Millions of dollars)
Improvements in	 Total
	
Forecast Period	 Use	 Accuracy	 Gains'
One to five hours	 $ 3.8	 $ 7.6
	
$ 11.5
Six to eleven hours	 8.1	 14.1	 22.2
Twelve to 36 hours
	
42.9	 69.7	 112.6
Two to five days
	 79.1	 94.2	 I73.3
Thirty days	 82.0	 86.9	 168.9
Ninety days	 106.3	 I44.4	 250.7
	
TOTAL'	 322.2	 416.9	 739.1
'Sums may not balance because of rounding.
Source: J. C. Thompson, "The Potential Economic Benefits of Improvements in
Weather Forecasting' (San Jose: Department of Meteorology, California
State University, September 1972), p. 55.
hundred miles. Economic gains would result from improved
accuracy; if the present error were reduced by 50 percent, the
20 percent who now protect themselves and their property would
realize about $15.2 million instead of $10.8 million (Sugg, 1967,
pp. 143 .46). The economic gains are dwarfed by the potential
benefits that would result if a higher proportion of the population
used protective measures. If the proportion of the population
taking such measures rose from 20 to 28 percent, the potential
saving would be $25 million; an increase to 68 percent would
yield a total saving of approximately $60 million (Anderson and
Burnham, 1973, p. 126).
The economic value of tornado forecasting has received less
attention than the economics of hurricanes. Two factors probably
account for the more limited investigation. First, early statistics
regarding the damage caused.by tornadoes were less extensive than
those for hurricanes. Second, those statistics that were available
suggested that tornadoes, while costly, were far less destructive
W
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'Fable 4-4
Hurricane Damage in the United States and Canada
Hurricane Year Dam, ge
Agnes 1972 $3,100.0
Camille 1969 1,421.0
Betsy 1965 1,420.0
Diane 1955 800.0
Carol 1954 450.0
Carla 1961 400.0
Unnamed (in New England)	 1938 389.0
Donna 1960 387.0
Hazel 1954 252.0
Dora 1964 250.0
Beulah	 1967	 200.0
Audrey	 1957	 150.0
Cleo	 1964	 129.0
t	 Hilda	 1964	 125.0
Unnamed (in Florida)	 1926	 112.0
k	
Isobell	 1964	 10.0
r	 Alma	 1966	 10.01
Unnamed (in Florida Keys)	 1966	 5.0
Inez	 1966	 5.0
1	 Ginny	 1963	 0.4''i
"Millions of dollars.
b The loss was offset.by the rains that proved beneficial.
Source: A. L. Sugg, "Economic Aspects of Hurricanes' Want* Labor Re-
view, 1967), vol. 45. no. 3. pp. 14346; A. L. Sugg and R. L. Carrodus.
"Memorable Hurricanes of the United States since 1873" (ESSA
. Technical Memorandum. WBTM-SR42, 1969); W. J. Maunder, The
Value ajthe Weather (London: Methuen & Co.. Ltd.. 1970). p. 9; and
R. H. Simpson and P. L. Herbert. "Atlantic Hurricane Season of
1972" (ltlanthly Labor Review, April 1973), vol. 101, no. 4, pp. 323-33,
l
t ^.	 .._..	 ...._- -
	
_.
Economic Impacts of Weather- Satellites	 •	 133	 W,
than hurricanes. A mid-1950s study estimated total tornado
damage for the United States during the 36-year period from
1916 to 1952 at about S15 million annually (Flora, 1956).
More recent studies indicate that losses due to tornadoes
since 1960 are far greater than these earlier estimates. A study
of the 1963-70 period suggests that losses from tornado
destruction approaches an average of 5200 million per year
(Sanders, 1971, pp. 446-49). These tornado losses reflect the
damage inflicted by the Palm Sunday storms in the lower Great
Lakes on April 11, 1965, and the disasters at Topeka, Kansas, on
June 8, 1966 (Galway, 1966, pp. 14449) and at Lubbock, Texas,
on May 11, 1970.
The widespread tornado outbreak of April 3 and 4, 1974, attests
to the awesome destructive potential of tornadoes. This outbreak
was a once-in-a-century event that far exceeded earlier tornadoes
in terms of numbers, length of tracks, total area affected, deaths,
and damage. Somewhere between 75 and 85 tornadoes occurred
within the area encompassed by a line from Chicago southward
almost to the Gulf of Mexico and eastward to the Appalachians.
Property damage attributable to these storms has been placed at
5540 million; in addition, 328 deaths and 6,142 injuries were
recorded (U.S.Department of Commerce, April 29, 1974).
Conclusions
Four conclusions emerge from this review of the development
of meteorological satellites, their role in weather forecasting, and
the economic value of weather prediction.
Conchtsion one: Meteorological satellites have transformed
methods of weather observation; however, it is. not yet pos-
sible to measure any specific improvements that may have
occurred in the accuracy of temperature and precipitation
forecasts disseminated to weather information users.
Since their inception in 1960, meteorological satellites have
transformed methods of weather observation. The unique value
of satellite data stems from several factors which distinguish these
data from other kinds of environmental observations. One
characteristic is paramount: the effectiveness of the satellite in
providing information, routinely and dependably, in areas where
i
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conventional data are sparse or absent. Closing observational
gaps over oceans and remote Iand areas is cited time and again
as the basic contribution of space satellites to improved weather
forecasts.
Another factor is the rapidity with which forecast offices
receive pictures and weather charts transmitted directly from
satellites. In some remote areas, satellite data are received and
used hours ahead of the regular data arriving through normal
communication channels. A third aspect of satellite data that
has proved of great value in numerous applications is the
overall view of the earth and atmospheric features obtained from
orbital altitude. Observations from this vantage point reveal Iarge-
scale organization and structure of cloud systems that are not
attainable from high-flying aircraft or conventional ground-based
observations.
Despite the advantages of meteorological satellites, there
are not yet quantitative data to suggest how satellite data have
improved the accuracy of forecasts for the users of weather
information. There is some evidence that satellite data have had
a significant impact on the specialized forecasts for marine,
aviation, and agricultural interests, but specific measures of
accuracy improvement await the results of controlled numerical
prediction experiments instituted in 1974.
Interest in the economics of weather prediction has increased
in recent years. However, all of the studies reviewed in our
analysis refer to the potential gains from improved forecasts.
Despite a general belief in the value of more accurate forecasts,
no actual economic gains or benefits have been identified in
these studies. It is also significant that studies of potential
gains tend to focus on the economic value of perfect weather
forecasts. It is highly unlikely that such studies could be refined
enough to estimate the economic value of intermediate improve-
ments in forecast accuracy.
Conclusion two: To date, the major benefits derived from
operational satellite systems resultfrom improved storm
warnings and forecasts.
Satellites now provide daily blanket coverage of the tropical
oceans, permitting detection and surveillance of every disturbance.
a
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Satellite data permit earlier and more dependable forecasts of
hurricane development, future path, and intensity. Although no
tropical storm has gone undetected since the installation of the
operational satellite systems, no quantitative data exist on the
improvement in hurricane forecast accuracy that has resulted.
The forecasting of tornadoes and severe local storms over
the continental United States has also advanced to the stage
where area alerts and watches are issued routinely. However, the
science of tornado forecasting has not reached the stage of
specifying the time and precise location at which a tornado will
strike. Individual storms can be discovered only by personal
sighting, or by weather radars with a range of a hundred to 120
miles. These methods may provide warning only a few minutes in
advance, which may be too late. Geostationary satellites now
provide pictures that cover areas beyond radar range, and show
the early stage of storm development when distinctive cloud
patterns first begin to form. These patterns appear in the sateIIite
picture several hours before the clouds develop to a point where
the water droplets in them are large enough to be detected by
radar.
The annual cost of the damage produced by hurricanes,
tornadoes, and severe storms in the United States is currently
in the range of $400 million to $500 million. Assuming that
satellite data have increased the accuracy of storm forecasts by 50
to I00 percent since 1966, the potential economic benefits through
avoidance of property damage over the 1966-73 period approxi-
mates $100 million. However, because only 20 percent of the
population protects during any storm, economic savings have
probably been limited to a maximum of $20 million over this
period. The true potential economic and social benefits of an
accurate storm warning system will be realized only when there
is a substantial increase in the proportion of the affected popula-
tion that takes protective measures.
Conclusion three: The full potential of meteorological satellites
in weather forecasting has not yet been realized. Advances in
satellite meteorology should permit significant improvements
in weather forecasting accuracy by 1950.
In assessing the fourteen years of satellite experience, one
must recognize that satellites did not provide quantitative data on
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temperature and humidity until April 1969. Prior to 1969, satellite
data were not available in a format that could be a direct input
to mathematical models. Thus meteorologists have had less
than five years' experience at coupling satellite data with numer-
ical prediction models.
To date, quantitative measurements have been primarily
successful in the optical and infrared ranges of the spectrum.
While optical and infrared instrumentation continue to improve,
clouds have proved a serious problem in infrared measurement
of temperature. Consequently, the effective use of microwave
sounders on Nimbus V, launched in 1973, to measure tempera-
ture down to the earth's surface, even in the presence of clouds,
constituted a valuable milestone in satellite instrumentation
development.
The operational meteorological system will be updated in 1978
with the addition of sophisticated new scanning instruments,
including microwaves. The use of this improved satellite data in
refined numerical prediction models is expected to yield marked
improvements in one- to three-day weather forecasts, particularly
in those coastal areas where weather comes from data-sparse
oceanic regions.
Longer range weather forecasting accuracy is expected to
improve considerably as a result of the Global Atmospheric
Research Program. This program reflects the optimism of the
world meteorological community regarding space observational
capabilities. The first global experiment of the program (scheduled
for 1978-79) will be an internationally supported research effort
whose objective is to bring the entire global atmosphere under
constant surveillance for a period of about a year. This is to be
done with satellites, balloons, ground stations, buoys, and ships.
The data collected by this observational network will be dis-
tributed over the global telecommunication system organized by
the World Meteorological Organization to research and forecasting
centers all over the world. These centers will use the . data in
numerical prediction models to determine how far the time range
of effective prediction can be extended.
The data collected from the program's 1978-79 first global
experiment will exceed by orders of magnitude anything available
before. Prediction experiments with these data will indicate the
observational requirements for long-range prediction models. Some
i)
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observers envision that the data from this first experiment will
permit weather prediction centers to issue weather forecasts for
about a one-week period with the accuracy now available for one
day (Tepper, 1974).
Conchtsion four. Very large economic gains are realizable
with present levels of weather forecast and stoma warning
accuracy.
It is unlikely that the contributions of meteorological satellites
and numerical weather prediction in meteorology will be fully
exploited until two major barriers are overcome. First, substantial
improvements in the dissemination of weather information are
required. The most pressing need in this respect is to provide the
user with the specific type of weather information that he or she
requires. As an illustration, most economic models used to
estimate potential savings from better forecasts focus on how
users should make optimum use of weather information in
decision making. Such models presume that weather predictions
include information concerning their uncertainty. It is only
recently, however, that the National Weather Service began to
meet this requirement by disseminating "probability forecasts." As
of 1973, operational probability forecasts existed only for the
occurrence of measurable precipitation (personal correspondence
with Dr. Duane Cooley, I973).
Second, decision making by farmers, businessmen, builders,
and other users of weather information is far from optimal.
The inadequacy of present decision strategies is demonstrated
by Thompson's estimate that 44 percent of potential economic
gains could be achieved through better use of current forecasts
(Table 4-1). Furthermore, the economic benefits of more accurate
weather forecasts are unlikely to materialize unless users employ
decision strategies which capitalize on the improved information.
In light of these operational barriers, it is useful to examine
the share of federal meteorological expenditures allocated for
dealing with these problems. Of the estimated I974 federal expendi-
tures for meteorological operations, 15 percent is allocated to
dissemination. However, the more significant ratio is the low
2 5 percent of meteorological research expenditures budgeted
i	 for dissemination research. Given the severity of the dissemination
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problems and the high economic payoff from solutions, dissemi-
nation research appears to be substantially underfunded.
In all, it is evident that the economic impact of NASA's
meteorological satellite program cannot be reliably assessed
fifteen years after the launching of the first weather satellite.
While this is partly due to the problems of inadequate data, it is
the case primarily because the true impact of such a program can
be measured only over a much longer time range. It will be at
least 1980 before the full potential of satellites in weather fore-
casting begins to be realized; and even then, the limitations
on dissemination and utilization of available forecasts may remain
open issues,
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From case studies to Generalizations
PRE'CEDiM PAGIR BLANZ NYkUWAM
The case studies of the semiconductor and computer industries,
the field of astronomy, and the gains from meteorological satellites
have each provided interesting findings regarding the impact of
NASA on particular institutions. But they also yield another
benefit. Together with the previous studies commissioned by
NASA, these three case studies provide a basis for formulating
generalizations regarding the impact of large-scale public pro-
grams. The generalizations relate to four significant issues: the
determinants of program impacts, the relationship of impacts to
program evaluation, the link between program activites and
technological change, and the manpower implications of pro-
gram impacts.
Deternfinants of Imparts
The first set of generalizations suggested by our studies is
related to the question: How do impacts come about? The rela-
tionship between budgetary and programmatic decisions math. by
administrators and the impacts generated by their programs
is not random. Impacts do not merely happen; they are not due
to serendipity. Goals, budgets, programs, and operating deci-
sions established and carried out by managers of large public
programs shape these programs' impacts.
A systems view of the major stages of planning and decision
making which shape a public program is helpful in analyzing the
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determinants of program impacts. The four key stages are (I) the
formulation of a social goal (or goals), (2) the establishment of
an agency budget, (3) the development of' legislative and adminis-
trative programs, and (4) operational decision making. The
process is shown in Figure 5. 1.
The first phase of public program planning is the establish-
ment of goals. Two significant characteristics of a program goal
are mission priority and mission specificity. Mission priority
reflects the degree of national support for the social goal. If
there is substantial national support for the objective, and it is
not perceived as impinging unfavorably on other valued social
goals, high mission priority is likely. Mission specificity reflects
the precision of desired program achievements. How specific are
the time, quantity, and quality dimensions of goals? is the mission
specified as "placing a man on the moon by the end of the decade,"
or is it a more broadly worded objective such as "improving the
quality of health care for the aged"? Both mission priority and
mission specificity are important influences on subsequent budget-
-!-y and programmatic decisions.
+	 Our studies indicate that budgetary decisions are the single
most important determinants of program impacts. However,
r absolute investment is not the key factor; the primary determinant
is the size of the program's expenditures relative to the existing
budget of the institution affected. The impact of a public program
upon a given institution — an industry, a science, a community —
is primarily determined by the relative rate of public investment
! in that institution. Thus in a sector whose total expenditures are
$10 billion to $20 billion, a public program with a $500 million
budget will not generate significant program impacts; but in a
sector with total expenditures of only $5 billion, a public program
with the same $500 million budget may produce substantial
impacts.
The importance of an agency's budget in influencing institutions
was a common theme that emerged from the case studies. Con-
sider the impact of the space program on astronomy: NASA's
expenditures on astronomy have not been huge; they are small
1	 compared to total space expenditures or, for that matter, when
compared to NASA's spending on computers. However, NASA's
i	 financial support relative to the budgets of existing astronomical
i	 institutions has been large, and the effects have been correspond-
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ingly large. Thus NASA was able to stimulate the study of
previously moribund areas, provide new observational facilities
and instrumentation techniques, and attract new manpower to the
field through the space program's considerable financial leverage.
A public program's social goal is elaborated through the
development of legislative and administrative programs. In
selecting legislative and administrative strategies, managers make
two significant sets of allocation decisions. First, there is the
allocation of the budget among major program elements. These
decisions fix the size and duration of programs, determine the
role of outside vendors and contractors, and shape the involve-
ment of university and other nonprofit institutions. For example,
NASA's initial investment in astronomy was resolved during this
phase, A second set of allocation decisions relates to the division
of program funds among regions. Decisions to construct or locate
new facilities in particular geographic areas determine the regional
socioeconomic impacts of the public program. The technological
requirements of NASA's manned space flight dictated certain
locational constraints which favored communities in the "southern
crescent." The economies and social structure of these communi-
ties were substantially modified by the space program's presence.
The two broad classes of allocation decisions made during the
development of legislative and administrative strategies produce
the resources available to and constraints imposed upon program
managers as they make and implement operating decisions.
Program budgets, the number and location of facilities, the size
and skills of the civil service and industrial work forces, the
capabilities of university researchers, and similar considerations
all shape the nature of decisions at the operating levels of public
programs. In turn, these operating decisions directly yield specific
accomplishments and program impacts. Purchasing decisions are
one class of operating decisions that is a strong influence on
program impacts. Does the program purchase conventional "off
the shelf' equipment or does it contract for the development of
new technology? Must contractors meet demanding technical
specifications? The purchasing decisions NASA made reflected
the space program's emphasis on new miniaturization technology
and totally reliable computer systems. This emphasis proved
important in accelerating technological advance in both the semi-
conductor and computer industries.
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Evaluation arlmpacts
The relationship between the planning and decision-making
phases of a public program, the two types of program outputs,
and evaluation processes is shown in Figure 5.1. A distinction
is made between formal and informal program evaluations. For-
mal program evaluations compare specific program accomplish-
ments with stated program objectives. In contrast, the informal
evaluations compare program impacts with the value preferences
of various groups. Although the informal evaluations are often
Iess structured and less visible than formal evaluations, they are a
significant factor in review of public programs.
Informal evaluation is further compounded by the absence
of a consistent standard for measuring impacts. Different groups
in society disagree over the goals and purposes of a public
program and consequently judge the same program impacts
against different 'standards. Moreover, the goals of various seg-
ments of society change, and thus the basis for assessing pro-
gram impacts shifts. This dynamic aspect of impact assessment
has especially affected NASA.
Although there was no direct public involvement in the formu-
lation of the nation's space objectives, there was a high mission
i priority for space at the outset of the program. This high mission
priority was established lari :ly on the basis of appeals to national
security needs. Furthermore, space goals did not appear immedi-
ately to impinge on other social goals; there were no lobbies
opposed to sp-.ce in the early years. Throughout, NASA was
t perceived as "benefiting all Americans." But in the process of
achieving its mission to place a man on the moon, the huge space
budget and manpower demands produced certain negative
responses. The large-scale budget made space a highly visible
target for groups promoting other social goals. As the Vietnam
War claimed federal resources sought for Great Society programs,
the defense-linked space program was viewed by many as a direct
threat to domestic programs.
Another sector which raised objections to the space program
i"	 was the scientific community. It criticized the manpower distor-
tions created by NASA and the heavy engineering orientation
j	 of the program. These contradictory evaluations which character-
ized the space program are inevitable for all large public programs.
i	 Only the political process, where debate and compromise yield at
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least a tentative consensus among the major groups, can resolve
i	 these differences.i
Technological Dimensions
The role of large public programs in advancing science and
technology is paradoxical. The managers of a large government
program face a major dilemma in making scientific and technical
decisions. If they are to ensure the accomplishment of specified
program objectives, they must plan to use only currently available
scientific knowledge and technology. They must be technically
conservative and focus on exploiting the existing state-of-the-art
rather than carrying out revolutionary scientific advances within
their program. Consequently, it is unlikely that public programs
will originate major innovations, although they can play an
important role in technological advance. Given the constraints
imposed by specified program objectives, it is unrealistic to expect
evaluations to show that a government program deserves sole or
direct credit for generating important scientific developments.
While public programs usually concentrate on exploiting the
existing technology, they do not necessarily receive a "free
ride" from other institutions, such as industrial firms or univer-
sities. Programs such as space and defense have increased the
speed at which the state-of-the-art advances. The case studies
uncovered several examples of the space program's acceleration
influences. In astronomy, NASA accelerated the changes that had
already been initiated by nonspace-related advances in radio
astronomy. While NASA did not play the role of "pioneer" in
the computer and semiconductor industries, it did contribute to
accelerate (cehnological trends torvard extensive miniaturization
and high reliability. Ccmmer- al products such as pocket calcu-
lators and digital watches, promoted as space-age innovations
(complete with "Apollo' trademark), did not result from the
space program, but they probably have become available to
consumers much earlier because of NASA.
Public programs also play a weighty role in overcoming the
resistance to technological change which inevitably limits early
acceptance of new products and managerial methods. In the
computer industry the "demonstration effect" provided by the
space program's computers greatly increased the acceptance of the
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computer by the business world. The widely publicized use of
computers for NASA space missions made business executives
more willing to use computers for their industrial applications.
The "demonstration effect" in computers is analogous to the
"revelation effect" observed in astronomy. Space exploration led
to the unexpected discovery of new objects and phenomena in
the solar system, the galaxy, and beyond. These revelations
caused astronomers to alter long-held traditional views of the
universe. Eventually, the discoveries led to the development of
new astronomical specialties, such as particles and fields, and
X-ray astronomy.
Another characteristic of technological impacts is that they
rarely yield quick economic payoffs. The process of converting
a significant technological advance into new products or processes
is complex and time consuming. Studies of major twentieth
century innovations indicate that the time interval between an
invention and its commercial use averages between ten and
twenty years. Although such studies indicate that the average
time interval between invention and innovation for government-
supported innovations is shorter than the average for privately
supported innovations, the lag is still substantial (Lynn, 1966).
Consequently, we should not expect the significant technological
impacts of public programs to produce economic returns in the
short run.
The meteorological satellite is a good example of a govern-
ment-supported technological advance with a substantial time lag
before economic returns are realized. The first weather satellite,
Tiros 1, was flown in April 1960, and since then satellites have
transformed methods of weather observation. However, eco-
nomic payoffs have not yet been realized from this important
advance. In this case, a major limitation is that weather observa-
tion represents but one part of the total system which produces
weather forecasts. The improved observational data provided by
the space satellites must first be integrated into the numerical
prediction models used for weather analysis and forecasting. Then
dissemination methods for presenting weather information to the
public must be altered so that the public receives forecasts in a
useful format. These complex integration problems must be
solved before the full economic benefits of meteorological sat-
ellites are realized.
f
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Manpower Dimensions
Important manpower impacts have occurred in each institution
related to the space program. Earlier NASA impact studies
documented the notable influence of the manned space flight
program on employment growth and economic development in
communities comprising the "southern crescent" along the Gulf
of Mexico. The influx of scientific, technical, and professional
personnel to smaller communities produced marked improve-
ments in the educational systems at the elementary, secondary,
and college levels.
By 1966 the space program employed 5.5 percent of the nation's
engineers and scientists. Because NASA officials were concerned
that the agency's demands for skilled scientists and engineers
would create shortages in other sectors, it established a Sustaining
University Program to award doctoral grants and pre-doctoral
traineeships in a number of scientific fields. The astronomy case
study provided some insight into the magnitude of these
educational efforts. The space program's educational programs
and project grants supported almost 40 percent of the 66 astronomy
doctorates awarded in 1966-67. Funding by NASA, the National
Science Foundation, and the Department of Defense, together
with the new opportunities for experimentation provided by
space exploration, increased the total number of astronomers
threefold during the 1960-70 decade.
There was, however, a major flaw in the rationale for NASA's
efforts to develop scientific manpower. Space officials erroneously
assumed that the university is the only producer of manpower
while the other two institutional members of the space program
— industry and government -- only consume manpower. And
NASA underestimated the flexibility of a well-trained, highly
skilled work force. Scientists shift among specialties with greater
ease than is generally recognized. It is incorrect to assume that
an employer only consumes manpower. The training provided
for scientists, engineers, and managers by working on complex,
advanced systems is as important a factor in increasing produc-
tivity as is schooling. High-technology government programs
actually afford valuable developmental opportunities.
This training role for the space program was evident in the
computer industry where NASA projects were a significant
training ground for project engineers and managers. Computer
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firms have used this training by transferring substantial numbers
of project managers and engineers from space-defense divisions
to the commercial side of the business. In the case of astronomy,
the new research opportunities induced a substantial number of
physicists to shift into astronomy. By 1971 the number of
researchers in astronomy with doctorates in physics exceeded
those with earned doctorates in astronomy. Additional Ph.D.
researchers left specialties, such as chemistry, engineering, and
geology, to become astronomers.
The manpower development programs of NASA helped pro-
duce a supply of scientists which now exceeds current demand.
In astronomy, for example, space program cutbacks and other
declines in government funding have sharply reduced the need
for astronomers. In retrospect, it is clear that NASA dia not have
to support Ph.D. students to the extent that it did. However,
because of its substantial funding of astronomy and its specific
efforts to attract and educate more astronomers, NASA has
taken on a difficult responsibility. The instability of government
funding and sudden changes in program plans have direct
consequences for the affected astronomers.
There are those who contend that NASA's recent cancellation
of astrornmical programs constitutes a serious breach of trust,
which has had destructive effects on the astronomical community.
The message for public program managers is clear: Large public
programs cannot become deeply involved in influencing manpower
flows for the purposes of accomplishing specific agency objectives
and avoid responsibility for subsequent negative impacts which
may result. Indeed NASA's experience in astronomy suggests
that government managers must be more sensitive to the longer
term manpower consequences of their programs.
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Chapter Six
•
Managing Program Impacts
RRECEDINQ PAGE BLANK NOT rnzeD
Our study of the impacts of NASA carries significant impli-
cations for the overall management and strategic planning of
large public programs. The long-range effectiveness — even
survival — of such programs depends on their managers' abiltiy
to shape the programs' impacts and to meet the shifting needs
of a wide range of groups as well as to achieve specific
objectives. Simply stated, the strategic management of impacts --
economic, technological, and manpower — is essential to the
success and survival of public agencies.
The magnitude of difficulty of the task does not, nevertheless
make it any less important. Peter Drucker (1974, p. 18) states
the case for impact management at the outset of his book:
The manager has to be a craftsman. His first duty
is indeed to make his institution perform the mission and
purpose for the sake of which it exists — whether this be
goods and services, learning, or patient care. But this is not
enough. Any institution exists for the sake of society and
within a community. It therefore has to have impacts;
and one is responsible for one's impacts. In the society of
institutions of the developed countries, the leadership
groups, that is, the managers of the various institutions,
also have to take social responsibility, have to think
through the values, the beliefs, the commitments of their
153
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society, and have to assume leadership responsibility
beyond the discharge of the specific and limited mission
of their institutions. This responsibility creates a major
new challenge — and raises the most difficult problems,
both of management and of political theory and practice.
But it has become a fact.
In recent years, there has been growing recognition at the
federal level of the need for predicting and controlling the impact
of technology. In 1974 the congressional Office of Technology
Assessment was established to assess the technological impacts
of programs for which Congress appropriates money. Similarly,
the Office of National R&D Assessment in the National Science
Foundation has a major program element — socioeconomic
effects of technological innovation — whose primary objective
is "to identify, measure, and examine the effects of technological
innovation" (National Science Foundation, 1974, p. B-1).
This chapter maps out a structured approach to strategic
planning and evaluation which will aid the managers of NASA
and other public agencies to respond to the challenge of impact
management. Before outlining the approach, we must make
explicit the key assumptions which were derived from our impact
studies and which are the basis for the recommendations. In
addition, the three phases involved in developing an overall
NASA strategy should be examined. These three phases are:
(1) Impact group analyses
(2) The forecasting of program impacts
(3) Impact evaluation and control
Once these three stages have been examined, it will be possible
to present a structured process for the management of impacts
by NASA.
Key Assumptions and Managerial Implications
The findings of the case studies indicate that the following
set of observations and assumptions provides a firm foundation
for building a management strategy. First, NASA is a continuing
organization whose activities, at any given time, consist of a
bundle of programs. Each of the programs has a relatively
independent existence in the sense that each ranges over a
different time span, pursues a unique mission and objective, andiii
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is managed as a relatively autonomous enterprise. That such
diverse programs could be comfortably accommodated under
a single NASA umbrella is a tribute to the agency's senior
administrators who have been able to conceive its mission in
much broader terms than "getting a man to the moon before
the Russians do."
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in
common w=in other complex public, nonprofit organizations,
continuously faces a challenge in executing its overall objectives
and missions. Under the supervision and direction of Congress
and the Executive branch, it is charged with advancing the "public
good" and with serving the interests of "all Americans." Desir-
able and laudable as these goals may be, they become rather
fuzzy in application. In reality, "the public" consists of a large
variety of groups, classifiable along many axes: social, profes-
sional, geographic, or functional. Some of these groups may
become deeply involved in, or deeply affected by, any specific
program. Others may be almost totally distinterested or unaffected.
Some groups consist of direct contributors to a given NASA effort,
some may be direct beneficiaries of its efforts, while still others
may be drastically affected by the methods chosen for their
implementation.
Even relatively specific missions, such as landing a man on
the moon, involve a variety of societal segments whose interests
need to be considered and balanced. Site selections may involve
competing geographic groupings. Technology decisions often
affect different industry and professional sectors, while such
conflicting demands as safety, low cost, deadlines, and career
advancement are always present in any series of program decisions.
As overall missions become broader in nature, it becomes more
difficult to identify the groups most directly concerned with
or impacted by program implementation. Thus a realistic
approach to pursuing the "public good" or the "all-American
interest" is to identify the major "impact groups" (a term that
will be used for the purpose of brevity) involved in the bundle
of NASA programs and to attempt to optimize their benefits.
This is no mean task, particularly as the organization finds
itself with limited resources and growing pressures from both
Congress and the Executive branch.
In the long run, NASA's effectiveness is linked to its ability
to fulfill the expectations and needs of a diverse clientelle, rep-
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resented by major impact groups. These expectations are
fulfilled (or frustrated) by program impacts as well as by
specific program accomplishments. In some cases it is quite
possible for the former to overshadow the importance of the
latter. Program impacts. as defined in the preceding chapter,
must of necessity be included in any assessment of the agency's
total contribution.
In its earliest years, NASA's specific- accomplishments were
both popular and dramatic enough to satisfy, even enthusias-
tically fulfill, the expectations of key impact groups. It is
not surprising, therefore, that its program impacts were treated
as by-products which could be assessed post facto. The many
impact studies, both voluntary and commissioned, followed
this approach. The attitude was essentially: We've carried out our
program, have competently executed its stated objectives; now
let's get some experts to look back and assess the program
impacts. Whom did they affect? Was it favorably? And, if possible,
at what dollar cost or benefit?
The pattern of earlier years is changing rather dramatically
and will continue to change. The relatively clear, dramatic
program missions have been completed, NASA's impacts have
broadened, and new "competitors" have emerged for meeting
comparable expectations. Current and future impact groups will
seek more diffused goals than any single program's specific
accomplishments can meet. As a result they will look also to the
impacts of each program to fulfill their needs. This is another
way of saying that in the future, program impacts need to be
carefully considered in the early planning stages of each program,
rather than left to chance or for later researchers to discover.
The dominant managerial implication which emerges from
these fundamental assumptions is the urgent need to formalize
a process for the planning and evaluation of impacts. This
requires an organized approach which (1) anticipates program
impacts, as well as produces specific accomplishments, and (2)
periodically assesses the total mix of impacts resulting from
the aggregate portfolio of programs.
A second managerial implication derived from our o`,serva-
tions and assumptions is that NASA must incorporate impact
group analysis as an integral part of a formalized impact planning
effort. That is, NASA must explicitly identify the groups con-
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cerned with individual space programs and describe their stakes,
interests, and expectations. The case studies highlight one striking
feature: the multiplicity and diversity of institutions which are
impacted. The number of institutions modified and transformed
by NASA is large. This process is not all one-way; the shifting
interests, beliefs, and values of constituencies exert significant
influences on the future direction of the space program.
The space administration's traditional approach to the assess-
ment of its impacts on any segment of society has been essen-
tially a post facto audit or review. A more effective approach,
which is consistent with the planning and evaluation framework
essential for effective management, is to conduct an ongoing,
periodic review of program impacts. Consequently, the third
management implication of our case studies is that NASA must
develop a system for impact control as well as for impact
planning. Specifically, NASA requires an organized process for
measuring and evaluating its impacts.
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Impact Group Analysis
As noted in the previous section, NASA programs affect a
large and diverse set of institutions. This set is dynamic in
two significant ways. First, the value of any given group may vary
considerably among NASA programs. University-based scientists,
for example, may play a key role and therefore hold immense
stakes in one NASA program and almost none whatsoever in
another. Second, each group's concerns tend to shift (often
dramatically) over time or across events. The clear implication
for long-term strategy is twofold: A high level of awareness of
the needs and values of contributors and beneficiaries in
NASA activities and a sensitivity to changes in those needs is
essential for performance which truly serves the "public good."
It is interesting to note that even private, profit-making
organizations (whose objectives and missions are considerably
less complex) find it necessary to analyze the impacts of their
operations on a much wider set of impact groups than the
simple "profit maximization" adage would suggest. The
approach of at least one large progressive business corporation
provides some guidelines to an intelligent attack on this problem.
First, the corporation identified the full range of its impact
groups ("stakeholders" was the term), beyond the tradition-bound
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Big Three: stockholders, customers, and employees. It divided
some categories, such as employees, into smaller, more homo-
geneous grouping (e.g., managers, professional, and nonexempt).
It added several which were not previously considered -- the
local communities in which unit plants were located, for example.
Once the key stakeholders were identified, a brief list of their
expectations was compiled. This was typically accomplished by
asking business unit managers to answer, for each impact group,
such questions as: What are the group's basic expectations about
your business and performance ? Which needs has your business
been satisfying? The answers were combined and classified into
a series of statements about the current expectations and needs
of key stakeholders. The next move was to project the most
probable future trends. A variety of techniques, ranging from
attitude surveys to scenario projections, was used in answering
such questions as: Do we detect a shift in impact groups' needs
or values? Are they likely to expect more or less of us? In what
directions? How rapidly and strongly are such changes likely
to occur? Significantly, in directing its managers' attention to
stakeholder analysis, the corporation strongly emphasized
concern with nonfinancial, nonquantifiable, and often non-
economic needs and expectations. The use made of these stake-
holder analyses, in formulating both unit and corporate strategies,
k will be seen later in this discussion. At this stage it is more useful
simply to suggest an adaptation of this approach to NASA
operations.
Specifically, the suggestion is for NASA to structure and
formalize important planning activities which are doubtless
already being informally or sporadically performed. A careful
analysis of NASA's key impact groups should be undertaken.
f	 Considerable thought should be given to subdividing groups
k	 into relatively fine, homogeneous categories and to going beyond
p identifying only the most obvious ones. Some preliminary
examples include: Congress and congressional committees; key
departments of the Executive branch; employees of NASA — per-
haps subdivided into such categories as managerial, scientific,
engineering, permanent and on-loan; vendors and contractors;
communities where NASA installations contribute significatly to
}	 the local economy; the academic community; and, finally, the1
r	 general public (classified into a few relatively homogeneous cate-
gories). No outside consultant can have the intimate familiarity,
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the long experience, or the requisite sensitivity to analyze all of
the relevant impact groups. This is a task which is best entrusted
to NASA insiders with broad knowledge of both operations and
political history.
Once the groups are identified, their stakes, interests, and
expectations of NASA should be described. Business planning
often classifies stakeholder interests and expectations into four
major impact areas: economic, technological, political, and social.
A similar classification would help public agencies identify and
project likely impacts in the planning stage. Another useful
device which might be adapted is the identification, at this
stage, of other agencies (public or private) which also contribute
to meeting the expectations of each of the major impact groups.
This permits subsequent decisions in the selection of specific
programs to consider NASA's unique strengths or comparative
advantage in providing benefits most effectively and to identify
programs which might rightfully be left for other agencies.
The next step involves the assessment of trends and probable
future direction of impact groups' expectations and values. This
is a complex effort in which social science researchers and astute
political observers would probably prove helpful. The questions
t to be answered here are similar to those cited in the corporate
analysis analogy: Are the groups' values, expectations, and depen-
dence on NASA changing? In what direction and how rapidly?
What are likely to be their highest level needs and expectations
over the next several years? And who else is likely to supply
	
1	
these effectively?
In the case of NASA, where a complex set of both contributors
and beneficiaries is likely to emerge, an additional refinement
not often practiced in corporate planning would be appropriate:
NASA should identify key spokesmen for various impact groups
and use them as "listening posts" or "barometers." Periodic
updating of group values and the testing of probable alternate
reactions could then be performed relatively quickly and easily.
As planning alternatives are being considered, a variety of "what
if. ." questions, as well as periodic survey questionnaires,
could be directed to these carefully selected representatives.
}
Forecasting Program Impacts
	i	 The nature of NASA's mission and operations compounds the
	
i	 difficulties associated with forecasting program impacts. The
a
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planners of NASA have an especially complex task because of
the space program's unique planning structure.
Management literature often distinguishes between two basic
types of planning structures: standing plan structures and single-
use plan structures. The former guide and direct the continuing,
repetitive aspects of an operation. Standing plans, at high levels,
establish policies for the repetitive aspects of purchasing raw
materials, hiring personnel, or the quality levels of different prod-
uct Iines. At lower, more operational levels, standing plans
specify which forms are to be filed where, which bolts are to
be tightened in what order, and how many units are to be
measured in each production batch. These are the plans which
direct the day-by-day repetitive pattern of activities which char-
acterize the operations of most business units. It is not surprising,
therefore, that they constitute the bulk of the volume of plans
and planning in large organizations.
Single-use plans, on the other hand, deal with one-of-a-kind
nonrepetitive efforts of the business. In a typical organization,
single-use plans would be used in the construction of a new facil-
ity or the implementation of a new organization structure. These
are comparatively rare sets of planning activities which do not
reoccur on a periodic basis. In such situations, single-use plans
are the auxiliary or secondary set of activities designed to support
the primary set of standing plans which are the crucial ones in
achieving efficiency in performance.
{ The space administration's planning structure is an almost
direct reversal of the conventional pattern. Single-use plans are
the backbone of each program and mission, many of which are
one-of a-kind events in themselves. Very little repetitive activity
is involver! in NASA activities (particularly if the actual manu-
facturing operations in vendor's facilities are excluded from consi-
deration). Standing plans in NASA focus on such activities as
bookkeeping, office procedures, or personnel policies. In this
sense, standing pians can be viewed as the secondary plans sup-
porting a primary set of single-use plans which direct each
i program's progress toward its targeted objectives.
When single-use plans comprise the primary planning effort
T in an organization, the forecasting of impacts inevitably requires
dealing with relatively high levels of uncertainty. With a limited
repertory of directly comparable earlier programs, the forecasting
W,
i
i
I
i
k
a
1
f
r
i	 I
Managing Program Impacts	 *	 16I
of "single-point" values or relatively certain results becomes
much less realistic and much more dangerous. The realities of a
stochastic, or contingency, universe, rather than the simple-
minded but comfortable assumption of a relatively mechanical
and certain world, must be faced squarely. All of this becomes
even more critical as one attempts to project or forecast impacts,
as well as primary, accomplishments.
Forecasting the impacts of single-use plans is further compli-
cated by the limited application that trial and error methods
have for single-use plans. In improving and refining repetitive
operations, trial and error (or iteration) plays a significant
if not a dominant role. The very act of repetition provides the
testing ground for the improved idea or the newly available
material. One-of-a-kind activities, on the other hand, can only
draw on trial and error by analogy or some similarity to earlier
activities. Thus the more pioneering the effort, the less likely the
contribution of trial and error methods. Instead of iterative
methods, planning activities must be based on the ability to pro-
ject and forecast the specific and unique results that may be
anticipated from alternative courses of action.
Given the high orders of uncertainty associated with NASA's
single-use plans, the expanded use of forecasting methodologies
designed to cope with highly unpredictable futures is most
appropriate. The probable magnitude of program impacts may be
projected by a variety of techniques. These range from relatively
simple single-point or three-point estimating to rather complex
applications of risk analysis techniques, from almost wholly
qualitative approaches, such as scenario writing or delphi-method
forecasting, to the highly quantitative manipulation of simulation
models. Estimates of "optimistic," "pessimistic," and "most likely"
results can be made not only in terms of time dimensions (as is
commonly done in PERT planning, from which this approach
and terminology are borrowed) but also in terms of severity and
direction of impact. In other instances it might prove more
effective to canvass the opinions of a group of experts in the
field, and by a Delphi-like exchange of forecasts and assumptions,
reduce the range or probable impacts to some manageable set.
On the other hand, a single expert or a research team might be
requested to present a set of alternative future scenarios, with
some• indication of the linkages in their probabilities and some
early warning indicators.
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Impact Evaluation and Control
For managerial purposes evaluation and control have distinct
meanings. Control is not seen as an accounting check on the use
of assets or the confirmation of the accuracy of inventory
reporting. Rather, it refers to that stage of the management proc-
ess which asks the questions: Are we getting there'? Will we
meet our targets? Do we need to take any corrective action?
Managerial control, therefore, emphasizes the need for the
following components of a control system: (1) a target, bench-
mark, or "standard," against which progress must be measured;
(2) a means of measuring — preferably in quantitative terms —
the gap between the desired "standard" and the actual perform-
ance; and (3) a decision mechanism to determine whether the gap
is significant and, if so, the corrective action to be taken.
There are, again, a number of conceptual differences in the
setting up of control systems for the two major types of
planning structures. A principal difference is that evaluation
standards for standing plans are derived from a variety of
sources, while the control targets for single-use plans are deter-
mined largely by the planners. In other words, the effective single-
use plan is not complete until a set of benchmarks is established
against which implementation will be gauged.
All of the above is well known to professional managers,
especially those involved in controlling the large and complex
projects typical of NASA. Indeed, by reputation, NASA is
considered one of the most competent controllers of project
execution, vendor commitment, and overall program progress.
It would be extremely presumptive to offer any suggestions for
the improvement of NASA controls over the execution of its
specified programs.
However, the issue in this study is evaluating and controlling
the impacts of NASA programs, rather than the progress of the
programs themselves. This is a distinctly different concept, and
one which has received little attention to date. The traditional
approach of NASA to the assessment of its impacts on any seg-
ment of society has been essentially a post-facto audit or review.
The earlier impact studies cited in this book are typical examples
of an approach which sets out to determine what happened
and to assess the relative benefits and contributions. One of the
key themes of this study is that the array of impacts of any NASA
W/
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program should be assessed a priori and hence considered in its
early planning. In other words, to the extent possible, the broadest
range of both specific accomplishments and program impacts
should be planned in advance, rather than treated as a series
of almost random surprises to be discovered in retrospect.
The first phase of impact control should occur during early
planning for impacts. As planners identify the kind of impacts
to be anticipated at different stages of the program's evolution,
and the principal impact groups, they should establish the
benchmarks or standards against which impacts are to be
measured. Ideally, a series of progressive evaluation targets
should be established rather than an all-or-nothing final measure.
If, for example, a desired impact is to increase the ease of entry
for small firms in a particular industry, a series of control
points could be established to measure progress toward that
goal. Successive target points might consist of the number of
active firms in the industry, industry concentration ratios,
geographical dispersion measures, and so forth.
Another useful device in the establishment of control points
is to select "early warning" or leading indicators; that is,
attempting to identify those tell-tale developments which, if
accomplished, would signal an almost certain achievement of
the end goal — or, conversely, identify those events or occurrences
which are almost sure to precede failure or severe difficulty.
By monitoring progress against such early warning indicators,
program managers can provide themselves with as long a lead
time as possible, and hence greater flexibility in taking corrective
action. Experience has shown that the selection of appropriate
control points is best accomplished at the time plans are made.
At that time, all aspects of the plan and the forecasts are
still fresh and alive in the planners' minds. The tracing of probable
event chains, probable group responses, and the probability
distribution of possible impacts provides the planner with a
vivid, dynamic picture of the unfolding scenario. Then is the
time to select control points -- especially the early warning type.
Once control points have been selected, the control task
shifts to one of monitoring and comparing. The selected points
provide a focus for the monitoring of an otherwise endless
series of events. They make it easier to select certain segments
of the economic, technological, social, or political environment
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for close observation. Even sharper focus is possible if the
key impact groups are identified in the setting of control points.
At this stage, good use may be made of the spokesmen or sound-
ing boards identified earlier. As experts in what is happening in
their particular arena and as valid interpreters of their group's
needs and values, each spokesman can be most useful in
assessing the width and severity of the gaps between standards
expected and performance actually delivered. It also is possible
to make use of outside research organizations in determining
gaps between anticipated and delivered impacts. Rather than
commission a post-mortem assessment, planners would get more
utility from an interim study which focused on actual develop-
ments that are contrasted against some set of anticipations --
planners' and impact groups' anticipations alike.
Finally, as in any control system, there should exist a feedback
loop which provides new inputs for improved planning. In the
above example, the periodic measuring of the extent to which
impact groups' expectations are being met almost automatically
provides an updating of the shifts and trends in their needs and
values. Whether impact control is exercised through sampling
the identified spokesmen, through assigned research projects or
through more direct contact with many of the groups, it cannot
help but lead to closer familiarity with their changing expecta-
tions. Thus successive efforts at impact group analysis tend to
improve their validity, increase sensitivity to subtle change, and
i	 reduce the time investment required.
f	 A Guide to Impact Management
Impact group analysis, the forecasting of impacts, and a
forward-looking impact control system are essential to the task
of impact management. A number of specific steps are required
to provide NASA with an organised but flexible process for the
effective selection and strategic guidance of' the programs it
undertakes -- that is, a process which attempts to plan both
specific accomplishments and program impacts for individual
projects, and to assess the total mix of impacts of any one of
several bundles of programs which together make up NASA's
mission at any particular time.
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The emphasis is oil the long-run effectiveness of NASA as
a continuing and evolving organization, rather than on the indi-
vidual projects in which it engages. Important and spectacular
as the specific projects may be, they are viewed here as the
tactical components of a complex strategic whole. An organiza-
tion consisting of a series of essentially one-of-a-kind, non-
repetitive events often lacks the recurring patterned missions and
activities which gave it permanence and stability. Theorists
emphasize the necessity of both stability and innovation within
any organization if it is to survive and grow. In fact in most
organizations the concern is that too much emphasis on conti-
nuity and stability may suppress innovative and creative activ-
ities. The concern of NASA should be oppositely directed.
The relationship between individual NASA programs and the
agency's total mission is analogous to the relationship between
corporate strategy, and the business unit or functional strategy,
in the private sector. Within this framework, the corporation is
seen as the enduring, organizational entity which is made up of
many temporary businesses. Each of these businesses needs to be
managed within a strategic plan devised for its specific missions
and functions. The role of the corporate strategy is to coordinate
and balance these individual business strategies. While there
have been important advances in methodology for designing unit
strategy, there has not been comparable progress in conceptual-
izing the design of corporate strategies.
Not surprisingly, the factors which complicate the task of
corporate strategy planning are rather similar to those which
confront NASA's total institutional mission. The overall strategy
must cope with several business units (programs) of varying
size, complexky, and duration. Some of these units may be in
the early stage of their life cycle; others may be reaching ma-
turity or declining. The key impact groups for any given unit or
program may not be equally important for other units, or may
even form a set of competing interests to other programs or
units. The corporate strategy must deal with many less tangible
goals and objectives than do the individual units, and it must
anticipate the diverse impacts of corporate action, which the in-
dividual units can frequently ignore. Because of the similarities
between NASA's impact planning problem and corporate
strategy formulation processes, adaptations and modifications of
concepts and approaches recently developed in the still-evolving
i
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search for more effective corporate strategy formulation can pro-
vide NASA with a basis for action. To simplify terminology,
"agency strategy" and "program strategy" are used throughout
this discussion to correspond to the analogous concepts of cor-
porate and unit strategies, respectively.
The strategic planning and evaluation process may be visual-
ized as consisting of an interaction between two levels: program
strategy and agency strategy. It follows a prescribed, timed pat-
tern (Figure 6.1.) — probably on an annual basis -- and con-
sists of the major steps in the discussion below.
A. Impact Group Analysis. The first stage in the proposed
process involves a careful analysis of NASA's key impact groups.
Once these groups are subdivided into relevant, homogenous
categories, their stakes, interests, and expectations of NASA
need to be described. The analysis should serve both agency and
program strategy formulation. At the upper level (designated Al
in the figure), impact group analysis can be translated into a set
of guidelines for NASA's overall strategy and mission. It can be
pushed farther, it is hoped, to a statement of "essential" and
"desirable" targets and objectives for NASA's total range of
operations. At the lower or program level (A2 in the figure), im-
pact group analysis can provide a set of checklist questions
against which individual programs can be rated.
B. Agency Strategy Formulation. In the second stage of the
process, the agency-level planning unit develops a broad set of
overall NASA goals and constraints which are to be used as
guidelines for the program-level strategic planners. These guide-
lines would be derived from agency-level assessment of the on-
going mix of programs, the anticipated political and economic
climate, and the aspirations and expectations of NASA's top
management team. The guidelines would be rather broad in
nature and might suggest specific impact groups for special atten-
tion, as well as certain caveats or restrictions.
In addition to the general mission guidelines, agency-level
planning might also consider providing program planners with
one or more scenarios of its view of the future. Obviously these
scenarios should focus on those aspects of the world which would
be of interest to program planners. Political forecasts, probable
major trends in technologies of selected industries, economic
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forecasts, and probable issues of future public concern are the
kinds of topics which could be covered in a futurist's scenario.
The final item to be provided by the agency-level planners is
an outline of questions or procedural steps which program plan-
ners could use for program strategy planning and to present the
proposed strategy for consideration by top management. It is
often advantageous to suggest a format and also to identify the
key issues which should be included in the program planner's
presentation.
C. Program Strategy Formulation. Armed with guidelines,
future outlooks, and procedural directions, the program-level
managers develop a program strategy in the third phase of the
process. The content of strategic planning in terms of specific
accomplishments is somewhat familiar to NASA planners and
therefore need not be discussed here. Our emphasis at this stage
is to include the forecasting of program impacts and to consider
the impacts of programs on the entire range of impact groups,
rather than on only the most obvious or direct.
The procedure here is to consider a series of alternative ways
of achieving each step in the program and the impacts they will
have on the key group. The methods of impact group analysis
and impact forecasting have already been described; only the
flexibility of the methodologies to be used in dealing with rather
uncertain futures needs to be stressed again.
D. Program Strategy Review. The preliminary program
strategies formulated in stage C of Figure 6.1 are now presented
for agency-level review. The presentations need to include a set
of projected impacts (costs and benefits) by group. It might also
require the proposing of one or more alternatives which would
have significantly different cost-benefit profiles. The presenta-
tions would probably be most effective if they combine a brief
written report with a longer oral presentation and an opportu-
nity to answer questions and criticisms. The agency-level
planners in their review should be concerned with validity, logic
consistency, and realism as well as issues of degree of risk,
probability of success, and acceptability of the means suggested.
E. Compilation of Total Agency Profile. After each prelimi-
nary program strategy has been reviewed in stage D, the agency-
level planners prepare a summarized profile which aggregates the
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impacts of existing programs with the newly proposed ones, or
modifications of older ones. Again the impacts need to be classi-
fied ray group and presented in juxtaposition to their expecta-
tions. At the completion of this phase, the agency-level planners
present the total agency profile to NASA's top directorate. The
presentation will indicate what the total agency impacts are likely
to be on key impact groups if NASA were to pursue one set of
programs as against another. An important part of this presen-
tation should also be a time-scaled estimate of the latest date by
which major commitments must be made if that particular port-
folio is adopted. The intent is to provide top management with
an indication of the degree of flexibility available with each alter-
native. It is also a means of injecting as much flexibility as pos-
sible into a highly uncertain planning activity.
F. Development of Operating Plans and Budgets. As a result
of the review in stages D and E, the agency directorate has se-
lected a portfolio of programs which appears to best meet the
needs of the public served by NASA. The individual program
strategies submitted by the respective program managers have
been approved or modified. The go-ahead has been given for any
required major commitments. Now, in stage F, program man-
agers devise operating plans based on the approved strategy,
develop budgets, establish personnel needs, and lay out the many
operational details involved in implementation. Again, this is an
activity highly familiar to NASA management and needs no
further elaboration.
G. Program Budget Approval. The annual operating plans
and budgets developed for each program in stage F are presented
to senior NASA management for final approval. Agency-level
planners assist in this process by verifying that the program plan,
budget, and other key operational elements are consistent with
the previously approved program strategy. In submitting final
operating plans, program managers must also iden4y the bench-
marks against which program impacts are to be measured. Since
these impacts will be reviewed periodically, as well as on a year-
end basis, evaluation targets should also be submitted. After ob-
taining final approval of program budgets and operating plans,
and instituting any modifications suggested by this final review,
program managers assume responsibility for the implementation
of plans.
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H. Impact Evaluation and Control. This final step involves
the monitoring or control phase of the process. The specifications
of an effective impact control system already have been fully dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter. What needs to be added here is
that this activity should be carried out at both the program (H2
in Figure 6.l) and agency level (HI in the figure). The monitoring
process will pick up deviations from targets, assumptions which
have failed to materialize, and new data previously unknown. All
these provide the grist for the next annual review. Agency-level
review (step B in the process) results in modified guidelines, while
program-level monitoring suggests modifications in unit strategies
(step C in the process). The seven-step process is thus recycled
and refined.
The proposed approach to impact planning and evaluation
has significant organizational and personnel consequences. Im-
plicit in the above recommendation is the need for a high-level,
centrally located organizational unit, which should be concerned
with the continuity of the organization, its long-term relationship
to its environment and its public, and its absorption of a variety
of programs into a consistent, stable whole. Restated in the
terminology introduced earlier, the crucial concern of this high-
level unit should be the formulation of agency strategy.
There are subtle personnel considerations which bear on the
staffing of an agency strategy unit. Any organization engaged in
the pursuit of largely nonrepetitive activities must be prepared to
staff programs and projects with a variety of different (and often
unpredictable) skills and experiences_ Even within any ongoing
program, because of its one-of-a-kind nature, a great flexibility
in the available skill mix must be anticipated. Such staffing can
be achieved by a combination of measures: by hiring people of
broad educational backgrounds and flexible personality, by
providing periodic training and retraining or updating, and by
rotating assigned personnel. Obviously, NASA relies on con-
tractor personnel and the use of consultants to provide for the
changing mix of skills its technical missions demand. It is hoped
that it also searches for the breadth and flexibility which should
typify its permanent personnel. One of the major tasks of the
permanent career professional in NASA is the maintenance of
the continuity needed in strategic planning. Career professionals
provide not only the historical knowledge of the agency's evolu-
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tion, but also the extensive contact with and sensitivity to
NASA's impact groups.
It is valuable to note here that the impact group analysis de-
scribed earlier in rather formal, rational, and (possibly) somewhat
mechanistic steps is also a highly informal, politically sensitive
process. Many decisions are reached through discussion, nego-
tiation, and tradeoff between several competing points of view.
To the extent that permanent NASA planning staffs can readily
relate to and represent those different perspectives, the impact
groups analysis will reflect a consensus of the cost and benefits
each group expects. In this way, direct spokesmen within NASA
serve to augment and internalize the points of view communi-
cated by the "listening posts" or "barometers" suggested earlier.
Such staff representation should not simply reflect the concerns
of Congress or the Executive branch, but also the several other
groups which contribute to NASA's efforts or are its primary
beneficiaries.
A Final Word
A few final words need be said in support of what must
sound like a highly complex, slow, and cumbersome process.
In the first place: It works! At least it has in many large business
corporations which have tried it. Second, great flexibility is built
into this system, despite the seemingly mechanical nature of the
steps described. It must be remembered that the strategies dis-
cussed here would typically involve a five-year forecasting frame,
Thus none of the plans, targets, or missions analyzed is expected
to evolve as originally projected. Annual reviews would continu-
ally adjust current operations and modify the next five-year
strategy. Thus planning described here is in the nature 'of a star
by which to steer, rather than the actual target to be hit in five
years.
Third, it does not take enormous amounts of additional time
and energy. Most of the planning, thinking, and exploration
proposed here normally take place anyway. It is usually scattered,
relatively unorganized, and rarely coordinated. Imposing a for-
mal structure could actually reduce rather than increase the
workload. Fourth, the process may prove painful at first, but
experience shows that each subsequent recycling becomes easier,
quicker, and more effective. Much learning and adapting need
be done, and they can only be done through on-the-job training.
172	 a	 Economic Impact of'Large Public Programs i
Finally, strategic planning may be an extremely difficult and
challenging activity, but there is much persuasive evidence to
suggest that it is absolutely essential for success and survival. In
NASA's case, it may not be a luxury or a frill, but a basic and
vital need.
It would have been illuminating to review the decision-making
process involved in a number of past NASA programs and to
contrast them with the normative approach recommended in this
chapter, and use structured steps of the model presented in the
preceding chapter. This exercise, however, would have demanded
a significantly different set of efforts and called for rather differ-
ent bodies of data from those needed for the probes presented in
earlier chapters. It would also have required additional time for
both information gathering and analysis. It is therefore suggested
that such testing of the current recommendations be scheduled
for future research and exploration. Testing could proceed along
two different, but parallel, paths — a review of earlier program
decisions and a monitoring of an ongoing planning effort.
The first effort should reconstruct the decisions made in plan-
ning and implementing a recently completed program, and then
recast it in terms of the steps proposed here — particularly im-
pact group analysis and impact monitoring. The second, and
perhaps more significant, effort would focus on a conscious effort
to test the procedures described here in structuring and formulat-
ing the basic plans for a new program in its early stages. These
procedures could be tested as a parallel, redundant effort, and
thus avoid introducing any additional risk to current practice.
These tests would, however, provide a secondary structuring of
the problems and — more importantly --- suggest modifications
or elaborations to make application more effective. It is by
applying and doing that innovative approaches and processes are
sharpened and made to work. Neither theory elaboration nor
logic refinement can substitute for test and application.
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